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The Institute of Governance Studies (IGS) of BRAC University from 2006 has annually examined the 
nature and form of governance in Bangladesh in its flagship publication- The State of Governance in 
Bangladesh (SoG) Reports. This year's The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11, coming out after 
a hiatus of nearly two years, is the fifth Report published by the Institute. While the previous SoG reports 
identified and analysed the internal causes for poor governance in Bangladesh, IGS felt that there is a 
need to critically analyse the role and influence of external stakeholders in shaping the country's socio-
political and policy arena over the last 40 years and its effect on governance in the country.   
The forces of globalisation during the second half of the last century especially during the 1980s and 
1990s have blurred social, cultural, political and economic boundaries across the globe. As a result, the 
primacy and autonomy of the state as a unitary actor in the policy arena is being eroded with growing 
influence of international and non-state actors. This has also happened in the case of Bangladesh. The 
ever-changing policy and development prescriptions and discourses of the Bretton Woods Institutions 
and other international/ national development organisations as well as civil society, over the years 
played a crucial role in the development and policy arenas in Bangladesh. However, though the first two 
decades of the country were heavily dependent on foreign aid which resulted  in external influence on 
policy directions, since the 1990s the share of aid in relation to the country's development budget has 
been declining steadily. Even then, successive regimes have not embarked on a more indigenous policy 
process mechanism  by drawing on domestic expertise and ideas backed by general political consensus. 
This has led  to a situation in which, according to Rehman Sobhan (2002),  the state lacks capacity to 
uphold state sovereignty in Bangladesh's policy arena. In Bangladesh, political fragmentation, 
confrontational politics, patron-client traditions, and personalised leadership have further contributed 
to an unstable system of governance with a highly centralised political system. Thus, as the findings of this 
Report indicate the role and extent of external influence in the country can be traced to both endogenous 
and exogenous factors which have contributed to rather palpable and lingering influence in socio-
economic and political policy domains, and to lesser extent in the development discourse of the country.  
This Report is the outcome of the hard work of a young research team of the Institute, overseen by M. 
Shahidul Islam, Research Coordinator who undoubtedly deserves recognition for their dedication and 
commitment for completing this report within a time-frame of seven months. In this collaborative 
endeavour, there are many people whose contributions require to be acknowledged. Among them, Dr. 
Hossain Zillur Rahman, Distinguished Economist and Former Advisor to the Caretaker Government of 
Bangladesh, Professor Ataur Rahman, Professor Salahuddin M. Aminuzzaman, and Professor Niaz A. 
Khan of University of Dhaka, as well as Barrister Manzoor Hasan, Insitutional Advisor of IGS and Dr. 
Gopakumar K. Thampi, fellow of IGS deserve special mention for their interest, guidance and inputs into 
the Report. Mention must also be made of Professor Geof Wood, Emeritus Professor of University of Bath 
whose initial ideas led to the conceptualisation of this Report.
We would also like to express our gratitude to International Development Research Centre (IDRC) whose 
Think Tank Initiative grant to IGS has made this fifth State of Governance in Bangladesh Report possible.
Rizwan Khair
Director
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The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11 is the fifth Report published by the Institute of 
Governance Studies (IGS) at BRAC University. The Report is the product of an ongoing long-term 
research programme on governance in Bangladesh initiated by the institute in 2006. The concept of 
governance is viewed by IGS as the sum total of the institutions and processes by which society 
orders and conducts its collective or common affairs. The institute's mission is to identify, promote 
and support effective, transparent, accountable, equitable and citizen-centric government in 
Bangladesh and South Asia. In pursuit of this broader objective, IGS is dedicated to understanding 
the strength and weaknesses of governance in Bangladesh and South Asia through research and 
academic pursuits.
The State of Governance (SoG) reports' aims to provide an evidence-based, critical and analytical 
investigation of the governance scenario in Bangladesh. The previous SoG reports identified and 
analysed the internal causes for poor governance. The Institute recognised the need to critically 
inspect external stakeholders' role in governance, given that ideas from abroad can and in 
Bangladesh's case have shaped the country's policy-making dynamics.   
It is against this backdrop that The State of Governance 2010-11 explores an uncharted yet integral 
new dimension - the role of external influence, in shaping Bangladesh's policy-making process. 
Despite Bangladesh's foreign aid dependency declining drastically, and the country making much 
economic and social strides, external stakeholder influence on the country's internal policymaking 
process is nevertheless significant. The Report examined how external interventions in terms of aid 
conditionalities and policy prescriptions, among other, influence the country's governance 
structure. 
This external influence generally originates from important stakeholders, including development 
partners, key donor countries, non-profit organisations (popularly known as International and 
National NGOs [INGOs/NGOs]), multinational corporations, and supranational institutions.
To understand what is meant by external influence in Bangladesh's context the study delineated 
the concept through four areas/components: understanding the external actors and their forms of 
external influence; the conditionality- policy ownership debate; the evolution and scope of 
governance and the process of policy transfer. 
Based on the rationales, the objectives of the Report are to analyse how external influence affects 
the following five critical areas of governance in Bangladesh, which constitute the scope of this 
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11
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study: democracy and good governance (D&GG) agenda, public sector governance, economic 
governance, CSO/NGO's governance and political governance.
The external influence generally enters into Bangladesh's policy making process through these 
actors and areas. The eventual impact on the quality of governance however depends on the 
strategic interplay among all actors, considering the vested interests of each player and their 
respective strengths and weaknesses and the context under which external influence has emerged. 
In addition to the introductory chapter, the report has five chapters that present analyses and 
findings on: democracy and good governance agenda, public sector governance, economic 
governance, CSO/NGO governance and political governance. The conclusions are presented in the 
final chapter.
Appropriate analytical frameworks and methodologies were opted to fit the objective of each 
chapter. The report extensively reviewed published literature, interviewed academics, policymakers, 
donors and development partners, among others. 
This chapter analysed the interaction between the GoB and donors and development partners 
(D&DPs), specifically with regard to aid given for the purposes of promoting democracy and good 
governance (D&GG). 
The analysis was arranged to answer three broad questions:  (1) How has the D&GG agenda 
emerged in the donor community; (2) How is the donor community pursuing this agenda in 
Bangladesh and how are D&GG interventions prioritised, designed, negotiated and implemented 
in the country; and (3) How does the GoB respond and react to this agenda and to what extent does 
it converge or conflict with the GoB's own vision of D&GG reform in the country.
Notwithstanding differences in how D&DPs define D&GG, many of them have made the 
intellectual shift in acknowledging the importance of political context. As a result, D&GG aid today 
is informed by a far more mature and nuanced understanding of the political economy of the 
recipient country, which underlines the need to prioritise, sequence and time reform initiatives in a 
strategic way, rather than launch an overambitious governance agenda. The question arising then 
is how are donors translating this newfound understanding of political structures, processes and 
actors into concrete strategies for governance reform in Bangladesh? Analysing the World Bank 
1
(WB), Department for International Development (DFID)  and United Nations Development 
Programme's (UNDP) D&GG portfolio in Bangladesh is an attempt to answer these questions.
The research focused on three key Donor Agencies' aid portfolios: WB's Public Procurement Reform 
Project (PPRP) and Strengthening Parliamentary Oversight; DFID' Managing at the Top (MATT); and 
UNDP's Local Government Support Project- Learning and Innovation Component (LGSP-LIC). 
It has been found that the absence of an effective vision of D&GG from the GoB has opened up a 
space for donors to experiment with different governance reforms most of which is technocratic 
and executive-driven, while cautiously engaging political actors and processes. While the donor 
Democracy and good governance agenda 
1 Now known as UKAID
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community is increasingly beginning to acknowledge the political challenges facing D&GG reform 
in Bangladesh, this does not always translate into interventions capable of changing the status quo. 
This is largely due to two reasons. First, some donors are restrained by their institutional mandate to 
engage heavily in political matters. Second, a contextual analysis of Bangladesh reveals that the 
GoB has fledging ownership of D&GG reforms that are sponsored by donors. In reality, the GoB that 
is at the receiving end of the donors' agenda is struggling to navigate a new type of aid 
conditionality - D&GG.
That previous donor experiences with aggressive anti-corruption interventions and involvement 
with political processes have not been beneficial or pleasant. Consequently the response, in the 
case of WB and DFID, has been to move back to promoting 'good enough governance', which 
implements targeted but largely depoliticised reforms. The UNDP on the other hand, has retained 
its focus on an all-encompassing agenda continuing to cautiously engage with political actors, 
albeit with a less than inspiring track record. 
Despite its shrinking role in post-liberalised economy, state remains the key provider of public 
goods. Against this backdrop, this chapter assessed the influence of D&DPs in the country's policy-
making process, by drawing on examples of interventions from the health and education sectors, 
with a particular focus on their sectoral impact. The role of various domestic stakeholders, including 
politicians, bureaucrats, professional practitioners, NGOs and civil society are also discussed in this 
discourse. Given the limited 'policy ownership' in health and education policies, the chapter 
identified the factors that have had contrasting results on the respective sectors. 
Healthcare reform in Bangladesh started with the formulation of the country's Health and 
Population Sector Strategy (HPSS) in 1997, marking a shift from the multiple project approach to a 
single sector programme known as the Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp). From the outset, there was 
little ownership and acceptance of the two policies by some key stakeholders. Implementation 
efforts were unsuccessful, owing to both political and non-political reasons. There have been 
frequent policy reversals resulting in enormous suffering of healthcare recipients. This also had 
serious implications for co-operation between the GoB and DPs.
The section identified a number of areas of mis-governance preventing the GoB from assuming a 
more dominant role in policy management, bringing greater consensus to strategy formulation, 
implementation and monitoring, and building capacity to improve service delivery. They are: public 
administration deficiencies, lack of consistent political support and absence of feedback 
mechanism. 
A number of recommendations are proposed for better governance of the health sector. They are, 
among others, strong political commitment that supports policies and their implementation; 
consensus building among stakeholders transcending the barriers of a political divide; strong civil 
society participation in policy making and implementation; civil service reforms; regular and 
rigorous policy analysis and greater focus on strategy by the GoB. 
The section on education reveals that DP involvement in the primary education sector in post 
independent Bangladesh broadly took two forms, namely the project-based approach and the 
Public sector governance
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Programme-based Approach (PBA). Their (DPs) working partnership with GoB has contributed 
towards achievements in school enrolment and improvements in the quality of learning. 
The decentralisation framework that has been developed under the Second Primary Education 
Development Programme (PEDP2), among other, through community involvement resulted in 
effective and efficient service delivery in the sector. Moreover, NGO provisioning of primary/non-
formal pre-primary education demonstrated a superior performance with respects to efficiency 
and higher quality. These achievements were attained in the vacuum of an overreaching national 
education policy. 
However, sustainability of these accomplishments is questionable, due to the absence of national 
policy ownership. Therefore, it is recommended that the GOB undertake greater responsibility for 
planning and prioritising in order to promote national ownership in the primary education sector. 
Moreover, the existing decentralisation process should be continued for improving governance at 
school levels.
The chapter on economic governance appraised the trajectory of D&DP-driven economic reforms 
since the mid-1980s; particularly, how these reforms impacted the economy, understanding the 
roles and interplay of various actors. Given a mixed bag of results of economic liberalisation, the 
study explored two cases of banking sector reform and energy price adjustment. 
The analysis indicates that any reform that presents the potentiality of political gains, either 
through rent or increasing vote banks- will find support from the politicians. However, political 
incentive alone has proven inadequate unless there is a firm commitment from politicians and the 
commensurate capacity of bureaucrats. 
Politicians showed commitments towards key reforms of private participation, privatisation, 
economic openness, agriculture reform, public resource mobilisation and macroeconomic stability, 
inter alia. However, they hesitated to liberalise certain areas which are politically costly. The 
government and its agency bureaucracy did not show long-term commitments towards reform 
measures such as modifying the fuel mix in favour of coal and developing other large 
infrastructure. 
With regard to D&DPs' policy advocacy, denationalisation and privatisation policies have worked in 
some sectors but simultaneously have not produced measurable change in others. The banking 
sector case study indicates that privatisation including private participation, may not be a solution 
to the problems accumulated through nationalisation, unless emphasis is placed on regulation and 
supervision. 
As far as reforms' impact on good governance is concerned, the study identified a number of facts. 
In line with the burgeoning body of research, it suggests that the D&DP guided reforms have had 
little impact in improving overall governance structure of the economy. The case study on the 
banking sector reform clearly designates that liberalisation does not automatically improve 
governance quality. The regulatory lapses in state-owned banks in the recent past suggest that the 
Economic governance
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reform's continuation of success is uncertain if the nexus between politicians and businessmen find 
ways to channel liberalisation's gains to serve their vested interests. 
The case study on energy price adjustment suggests that while some of the reform objectives 
concerning governance have fulfilled, market-based reform in the sector has been unsuccessful in 
improving overall governance quality, thereby precluding the long-term investment critical for 
cost-effective electricity production. This is largely due to the short time horizon of any ruling 
political party, declining governance capabilities of the bureaucratic organisations and the market-
based reform's limitations in improving governance indicators. 
The D&DP guided market-based reforms (and their governance expectations) often do not serve 
the vested interests of political elites. This has generated tensions between politicians and the 
D&DPs, depriving the power and infrastructure sectors of urgently needed financing. 
There are limitations to economic reforms. The reform advocacy of the 1990s which urged 
developing countries with weak institutions to undertake economic reforms with the implicit 
assurance that political progress and good governance would follow as a consequence, has proven 
to be erroneous.
Going forward, the country's future challenge to growth could arise from its governance 
challenges, as is already being witnessed in power and infrastructure sectors. D&DPs could remain 
the preferred source of financing and technical assistances for large projects. However, the WB, 
ADB and other development partners' greater emphasis on governance performance as the major 
determinant of fund allocation should be revisited placing higher weight on sectoral performance 
and potentials. Given the market-based reforms limitations in improving governance capabilities in 
sectors such as energy and infrastructure owing to political constraints, D&DPs should study the 
'political settlement' arising from competitive clientalism, when they devise governance reforms. 
Moreover, given the limitation of market enhancing governance capabilities in Bangladesh, this is 
also the right moment to contemplate the need for alternative thinking on governance such as 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities. However, further research is needed in this regard. 
Since the role of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as part of civil society is graduating from 
a mere social and economic development agency to governance actor, this chapter identified the 
extent to which NGOs operate as policy advocacy actors, and the degree of 'policy ownership' they 
avail while shaping the policy agenda in Bangladesh. To understand this third sector's involvement 
in this discourse two case studies- introduction of Right to Information (RTI) Act and formation of 
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) - were presented. 
The case study on RTI analysed the role of NGOs vis-à-vis government and donors in introducing the 
RTI Act, along with the processes through which their role took shape; and deciphered whether the 
NGOs' RTI advocacy agenda was externally driven or home grown. 
NGOs were the proactive civil society actors for policy change regarding RTI in Bangladesh. They 
successfully adapted the idea from other countries with technical assistance of INGOs and 
NGO/CSO governance 
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consequently advocated for the introduction of an RTI law, prepared a draft law, generated public 
opinion in support of the law and engaged with government accordingly. 
However, civil society's prioritisation of RTI reflects internationally recognised values of good 
governance, freedom of expression, transparency, accountability and corruption prevention, 
which are enshrined in international regimes and often promoted by donors. Facing NGO policy 
advocacy, the government eventually accepted the demand for the RTI law, introduced the RTI Act 
and implemented it with NGOs' technical assistance. 
The case study on NHRC explored if NGOs, as civil society actors, demonstrate a tangible role 
leading up to policy change, regarding protection and promotion of human rights in general and 
the formation of a national human rights commission in particular. 
The NHRC was primarily an external actors' agenda that civil society welcomed from the very 
beginning, due to their convergence of interests. NHRC's institutional design however did not 
reflect civil society's expectations in terms of independence and effectiveness. 
The study underlines that NGOs in Bangladesh can sometimes bring policy change as policy actors. 
The analyses of NGOs' roles in the introduction of RTI and in protection and promotion of human 
rights and establishment of NHRC respectively necessitate this mixed answer. 
The success of NGOs in policy change is conditioned by levels of government response to NGO 
advocacy and development cooperation with donors. Again, government response to NGO 
advocacy varies according to policy field, whether it is RTI or Human Rights and regime type, 
caretaker or a political government. The RTI and NHRC governance impact on respective fields is 
still to indicate clear success. Even after three years of the RTI Act's introduction, it is still not widely 
used by broad sections of people.
For RTI and NHRC to achieve their full potential, it is recommended that NGOs, as representatives of 
civil society, will have to continue their engagement with government and gradually scale up their 
involvement in the governance process. Simultaneously, the government also has to be more 
mature in its response to NGO initiatives. It has to further institutionalise NGO participation in 
governance through the setting up of mechanisms of formal consultations. 
The study works with a hypothesis that external influence in Bangladesh is largely catered by 
domestic political weaknesses. To analyse the role of external influence in Bangladesh's political 
discourse, the research conceptualises the phenomenon through supply-side and demand-side 
perspectives. The demand-side of external influence examined how the political distortions of 
Bangladesh generate demand for external penetration. The supply side, on the other hand, 
focused on opportunities that Bangladesh retains - through its geopolitical and geoeconomic 
advantages vis-á-vis the external actors and examines the extent to which the country has been able 
to exploit those to its advantages.
To test the hypothesis that the domestic political weaknesses channel the room for external role-
playing, the analysis organised in terms of a democratic transition and consolidation framework. 
Political governance 
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The democratic transition process is destabilised by the prevalence of a couple of key factors. The 
constitution has suffered from ad hoc changes, and national or across-party consensus was not 
derived while such amendments were conceptualised and implemented- thus jeopardising the 
constitution's capacity to provide the 'rules of the game' within the political arena that will be 
acceptable to all. While the caretaker government monitored the election process in 1996, 2001 
and, 2008 to enable political governments to transfer power, the defeated political side has always 
rejected the elections hindering the overall democratic transition in Bangladesh.
The country's confrontational political culture is also responsible for the recurrent transitional 
crises and limping democratic consolidation efforts, leaving most political institutions fragile. 
Parliament remains ineffective in facilitating broad-based national consensus and resolving 
conflicts amongst political actors peacefully. Political parties so far largely failed to be properly 
institutionalised, thereby do not adhere to norms of internal democratic practices including 
leadership succession. 
Democratic deficit emanating from these transition and consolidation processes, enable external 
actors to assume a role of any kind. While on the demand side phenomenon, the domestic political 
actors themselves create vulnerable situations and invite external interference; the same political 
weakness restricts the country from harnessing supply-side benefits in the nation's best interest. 
While external influence is not necessarily detrimental, the domestic political fragility and 
misrepresented power-games contribute to transmuting the prospective beneficial engagement 
into a win-lose situation. However, maintaining the equilibrium in relations generally depends on 
the strength of negotiation and bargaining power that could only emanate from domestic 
solidarity and broad-based national consensus, a function of democratic strength of the country 
and its institutional resilience.
Consolidating democracy can also provide a better safeguard against undesirable external 
penetration. To diminish such possibilities, parliament has to emerge as an avenue for building 
national consensus. In this regard, revision of Article 145A of the constitution, which guides inter 
alia the status of treaties signed with foreign countries, could provide a better safeguard to the 
government, to avoid undue pressure from external forces. Parliament members should also be 
given more room in the parliament to speak up freely or take separate stance on such issues, for 
which revising Article 70 of the Constitution is critical.
Besides, non-democratic leadership creates space for compromising broad national interests. 
Therefore, to break the monopoly, dismantle the evils of personalised politics, and facilitate 
infusion of new bloods, there could be a term limit for the key executive posts of the government.
Without reforms and institutionalisation, the counterproductive practices of parties and leaders 
will continue polluting the political landscape, thereby always facilitating a room for external 
penetration and unsolicited interference. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction
1.1  Context, objective and rationale of the study  
The Institute of Governance Studies (IGS) has been publishing its flagship report The State of 
Governance (SOG) in Bangladesh since 2006. The reports' objective is to provide an evidence-based, 
critical and analytical investigation of the governance scenario in Bangladesh. The first three 
reports (2006, 2007 and 2008) focused on the institutions and politics of Bangladesh from a 
governance perspective. Departing from the examination of cross-cutting macro themes to that of 
sectors, the SOG 2009 Report looked at four key sectors of Bangladesh: Energy Crisis, Food Security,  
1Digital Bangladesh and International Labour Migration.   
th
Coinciding with the 40  anniversary of Bangladesh's independence, the 2010-11 SOG Report   
explores an uncharted yet integral new dimension - the role of external influence in shaping 
Bangladesh's policy-making process. In effect, the report examines how external interventions in 
terms of aid conditionalities and policy prescriptions, among other's influence the country's 
governance structure. Despite Bangladesh's foreign aid dependency declining drastically (see 
Figure-1), and the country making much economic and social strides, as reflected by various 
2economic and social indicators;  external stakeholder influence on the country's internal 
policymaking process is nevertheless significant.
Such external influence is considered one of Bangladesh's conundrums and is not merely              
3confined to economic policies. As the eye-opening Wikileaks  revelations indicate, the country's 
political process  far from immune to external influence. It is in fact the state which provides the 
space, willingly or reluctantly, to external stakeholders for such policy manoeuvring to take place.
C H A P T E R
1 Introduction  
1 The reports are available on the IGS website.
3 Bangladesh has attained near self-sufficiency in food production, its [GDP] growth has been steady averaging over 5 
percent for two decades, and the country has outshone many of its South Asian neighbours with regards to social sector 
development, among others.
4 See Wikileaks Exposé: Bangladesh, available on http://www.bdnews24.com/Bangladesh/the-US-embassy-cables/, 
accessed on 10 June 2012. Though there is a debate on whether the cables/classified information released by 
Wikileaks can be used in academic or policy exercise.
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Figure 1
Source: Based on World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank
4This study delves into how external stakeholders influence Bangladesh's policy making processes  
and the consequences of such policy transfer, whether coercive, voluntary or mixture. This external 
5influence generally originates from important stakeholders, including development partners,  key 
6 Ndonor countries,  non-profit organisations (popularly known as International and National on-
Governmental Organisations [INGOs/NGOs]), multinational corporations, and supranational 
7institutions.
While previous SOG reports identified and analysed the internal causes for poor governance, IGS 
recognised the need to critically inspect external stakeholders' role in governance, given that ideas 
from abroad can, and in Bangladesh's case, have shaped the country's policy-making dynamics.  
In this respect, this report intends to provide insights on the governing calculus of 'external 
influence', in particular explaining the nature of 'external influence' that prevails, and isolating the 
conditions, creating a demand and supply for such influence. Furthermore, the report maps the 
effects such influence bears on the overall governance scenario, especially in key areas of the public 
and private sphere. This requires a thorough examination of the extent Bangladesh's governance 
paradigm is shaped by donors and development partners' (D&DPs) governance agenda (Rodrik 
2008); and of Bangladesh's reliance on imported governance ideas and policies, which concurrently 
ignore local needs, culture and customs.  
 Trends in Official Development Assistance (ODA), remittances, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
and exports: 1972-2010
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11
 4 i.e., how policies are being transferred, who are the key local actors by whom policies are transferred and more 
importantly how the influences are filtered through and what the consequences of policy transfer are.
 5 The WB, ADB, IMF, DFID (now known as UKAID), USAID, JICA, IDB, among others, who provide external aid, technical 
assistances, soft loan.
 6 Such as United States, Japan, United Kingdom, India, China and Saudi Arabia. 
 7 Primarily, European Union and the United Nations.
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Is the 'Bangladesh paradox' - a state of relatively high economic growth coexisting with poor 
governance scenario - an outcome of such imported policies which have yielded economic growth, 
but without good governance? In fact, some scholars (Khan, 2009) argue that there is a limitation of 
8market-enhancing governance capabilities  (protecting property rights, minimising rent-seeking, 
among others) in developing countries and suggest that their policy-focus should be centred on 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities (coping with the property right instability, managing 
technological catching up, and maintaining political stability in a context of patron-client politics). 
To begin with, an understanding of what is meant by external influence in Bangladesh's context is 
essential, with this study delineating the concept through the following four areas/components:
1. Understanding the external actors and their forms of external influence
2. The conditionality- policy ownership debate 
3. The evolution and scope of governance
4. The process of policy transfer
Given the complexities of the global system as well as the non-linear nature of inter-state relations, 
it is hard to measure the degree of influence of external stakeholders. For instance Japan, though 
providing more aid, technical assistance and loans to Bangladesh than the United States (US), exerts 
far less influence than the latter. This is perhaps due to the 'exorbitant privilege' the US enjoys 
9globally as the world's lone 'superpower' or 'hyper-power' . Similarly, the influence of NGOs, 
 
whether as a component of 'soft power' (Nye 2004) or as a 'global conscience' (McArthur2008), and 
as an integral part of civil society, goes beyond its financial numeric.
Nevertheless, since its inception, Bangladesh has been a crucible for both economic and political 
influence. Economic conditions during the post 1971 period meant D&DPs' roles were critical for 
Bangladesh's socio-economic sustainability. At the same time, the D&DPs collective assistance 
created space for their influence to creep into Bangladesh's policymaking domain. Since 
independence, a large portion of Bangladesh's development budget has been financed by D&DPs. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bangladesh's public and publicly guaranteed 
debt stock was $23 billion at the end of June 2011, which was equivalent to 22.6% of the country's 
GDP. Moreover, multilateral debt consists of 85.5% of Bangladesh's total external debt. The World 
Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) are the two key sources of multilateral debt 
comprising 48.6% and 32%, respectively (International Monetary Fund [IMF] 2011). 
This enabled such agencies to push forward their reform agendas, which were apparently in line 
with the 'Washington Consensus' prescriptions. In the post 1980 period, donors were facilitating 
various 'policy packages' under Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ESAP), inter alia, promoting “the minimum government concept” with an 
increased emphasis on trade liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation. This was partly 
1.2 Understanding the nature of external influence 
Chapter 1 : Introduction
 8  According to Khan, 2009, the dominant 'good governance' reforms aim to promote governance capabilities that are 
market-enhancing. They aim to make markets more efficient by reducing transaction costs. 
 9 A state that dominates all other states in every sphere of activity, akin to the erstwhile Roman Empire, Ancient China, and 
the British Empire, inter alia (Cohen 2004). 
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motivated by the neo-liberal philosophy that perceives 'governments' as inefficient entities; and 
trade distortions through protections as generally harmful to citizen welfare. Nevertheless, the 
state's role in providing key public goods, notably health and education, is now widely recognised. 
In its World Development Report, 2009, WB argued against reducing government to a minimalist 
state, explaining that development requires an effective state that plays a facilitator role in 
encouraging and complementing the activities of private businesses and individuals (World Bank 
[WB] 1997).
In contemporary times however, the dependency of the “State” on foreign assistance has sharply 
reduced (as reflected in Figure-1). At present, Bangladesh has one of the lowest external debt 
stocks among developing countries. Annual net bilateral aid flows from Development Assistance 
10Committee  (DAC) is nowadays barely US$1 billion, approximately 1% of Bangladesh's GDP . While 
direct aid flow to the government has declined, grants through NGOs have increased from US$105 
million in 1990-91 to US$658 million in 2010-11(NGO Affairs' Bureau). The same source also 
revealed that the country has received over $5 billion since 1990 as foreign grants through NGOs to 
finance nearly 18,000 projects. 
This is hardly surprising given the surge in NGO activities over the past two decades. According to an 
th
estimate, the NGO sector globally constitutes the 8  largest economy in the world, representing 
over US$1 trillion annually (equivalent to the economy of California); with 19 million paid workers 
and countless volunteers; and US$15 billion development aid disbursals every year (McArthur 
2008). The states' inefficiency in providing public goods has prompted the entry of NGOs into the 
development discourse. 
Some analysts argue that in promoting a 'New Policy Agenda (NPA)', bilateral and multilateral 
donor agencies have been keen, particularly since the Cold War's end, to finance NGOs on the 
grounds of their economic efficiency and contribution to 'good governance'. Edward and Hulme 
(1998) have characterised NPA by two theories: first, governments have enabled NGOs to become 
private providers because of their supposed cost-effectiveness and ability to more effectively reach 
the masses than the public sector; second, NGOs are vehicles for democratisation, possessing a 
fundamental humanitarian role to fulfil which should counterbalance state power, protect human 
rights, open up communication channels and participation, and promote activism and pluralism. 
This warrants examining how the civil society/NGOs have served the governance agenda thus far, 
and to what extent the ideas they preach are home-grown as opposed to foreign. 
The changing nature of Bangladesh's economy (i.e. the increasing importance of export and 
11
remittances, see Figure 1) also implies that the country now depends on Europe and US  for 
market access and less for development assistance. This is because roughly two-third of 
 
Bangladesh's exports, worth over US$12 to US$15 billion, is directed to Europe and the US. The 
Middle East also remains a key player for the domestic economy, given that 65% of remittances 
12 come from the region, amounting to approximately US$6.5 to 7 billion annually.
It is also worth noting that a supranational institution like the United Nations (UN) is not merely a 
development partner, since it also employs a large number of Bangladeshi defence personnel in its 
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11
 10 The United Kingdom is the main source of DAC aid flowed by the EU institutions, the Netherlands and the United States.
 11 Being an LDC country, Bangladeshi products, particularly RMG, enjoys tax exemptions and other privileges in the 
western, notably in the European, markets. 
 12 This is true for FY2011. For more information, please see http://www.bangladesh-bank.org
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various peace mission programmes. Nearly 100,000 members of Bangladesh Armed Forces have 
13participated in UN peacekeeping missions since 1988.  Indeed, Bangladesh's reliance on the European 
Union (EU), United States, Middle East and the UN has created a new type of dependency over the past 
two decades. While one can argue whether the dependency is mutually beneficial or otherwise, this is 
also a marked departure from the country's two decades of aid dependency (1972-1990).  
  
The demand for external influence is also increasingly generated from the conflicts that have 
defined Bangladesh's political domain. More precisely, after the independence in 1971, the 
political climate witnessed severe volatility, as coups and counter coups rocked the political 
structure of the newborn nation. Numerous political stalwarts have fallen victim to assassination 
attempts, while the nation experienced two turbulent military regimes from 1975 to 1990. 
th
Democracy returned however, with elections, in which all parties participated, held on the 27  of 
February, 1991. Since then, the two principal political parties,  Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP), have succeeded each other in every respective election.  Despite this, the 
nation's democracy is still considered to be in a transitory phase, as 'winner takes all' and 
'confrontational' mindsets have undermined the prospects for democratic consolidation. These 
political scenarios have also meant that conflicting political forces have often demanded legitimacy 
from external quarters for political issues on which they have failed to attain consensus. Hence, this 
report attempted to offer a disaggregate analysis of the factors that have allowed external 
influence to stem out of Bangladesh's democratic deficit.         
The supply of external influence, on the other hand, has emerged out of the geo-political context in 
14which Bangladesh operates. As the global centre of economic gravity shifts towards the east,  
Bangladesh finds itself in the midst of both advantageous economic opportunities and immense 
geo-political challenges. Tensions exist among big geo-political players in the region to control the 
key waterways, notably the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Bangladesh's geographically 
advantageous position between India's land-locked and virtually isolated North-Eastern States 
(NES) and its mainland offers certain negotiating leverage and opportune NES market-access. 
15Furthermore, India's need for Bangladesh to allow transit and transhipment facilities  holds 
prospective bargaining strength.  
China's expressed interest to develop the deep sea-port (The Daily Star 2012) in Chittagong 
underlies an effort to ensure its energy security and reduced dependency on the Malacca Straits. 
However, Delhi's geo-political prism views Beijing's strategy as an expansion of its String of Pearl 
Strategy, aiming to encircle India (DeSilva 2011). This provides an interesting niche for China's 
influence to penetrate Bangladesh's policy-making domain, where the latter's policy makers can 
derive some leverage considering China's geo-political strategy. Finally, after the World Trade 
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13 Since 1988 a total of 100014 members of the Bangladesh armed forces have participated in 52 peacekeeping missions in 40 
countries. For details, see the website of Bangladesh Armed Forces Division, available at http://www.afd.gov.bd/?q=node/25,  
accessed on 10 July 2012.
14 According to Dany Quah, an academic from London School of Economics, the global centre of economic gravity that was 
once at a point deep in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean in the 1980s has shifted east over the past 30 years, and could well 
shift even further over the next 30 years clustering around the border between China and India (Quah 2011). 
15 “Need to Broaden the Scope of India-Bangladesh Engagement: Perspectives from Gangtok and Dhaka”, IDSA Comment, 
available at: 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomment/NeedtoBroadentheScopeofIndiaBangladeshEngagement_ShristiPukhrem_241011, accessed 
on April 30, 2012. 
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Centre and Pentagon attacks in America on September 11, 2001 (known as 9/11), issues concerning 
terrorism have received substantial attention from the global community. This shift in global 
attention also means that external influence in Bangladesh  especially from US and India are foused 
on ensuring that policymakers take sufficient measures to hinder the prospect of terrorist outfits 
within the country's geographical contours. 
On the whole, the nature of external influence that Bangladesh encounters is both dynamic and 
multifarious. The conditions that have created a scope for their emergence either demand side or 
supply side require in-depth scrutiny to evaluate whether and how they have shaped the political 
governance scenario in Bangladesh. 
That said, it is also imperative to understand the D&DPs' perspectives (to some extent proxy for 
external stakeholders) as far as aid conditionalities and policy ownership are concerned.  
In the conditionality-policy-ownership debate, which involves borrowers and lenders, the formers' 
(debtors) concern is policy independence, whereas the lenders' (D&DPs') concern is its little to no 
collateral when disbursing grants, loans, and other assistance to underdeveloped or developing 
countries. In the event of default, there is no court to which lenders can appeal or legal sanctions 
can be imposed. As some analysts observed, the lenders face a quandary best explained as 
'Samaritan's dilemma': 'penalties imposed in advance have limited credibility because they are 
unlikely to be enforced' (Mohsin and Sharma 2001). Secondly, the D&DPs are accountable to their 
own tax payers and, therefore, need to demonstrate concrete outcomes at the end of the day. Last 
but not least, theoretically a borrower intrinsically knows more about his/her intention, capacity 
and opportunities than the lender, a classic case of 'information asymmetry' (Stiglitz 2000). 
Nevertheless, given the less than expected outcome from donor-funded projects in various 
countries, it is now widely believed that heightened country ownership of D&DP-supported 
programmes is essential. In fact, "ownership" by aid-recipient countries is recognised as a 
fundamental tenet underpinning the Paris Declaration, which increasingly embodies the new aid 
16consensus.  The introduction of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) in 1999 was perhaps in 
17recognition of the importance of policy ownership of the borrowers.
The WB now emphasises the issue of policy ownership as a critical feature in any move to promote 
better governance (Sobhan 2003). Interestingly, the issue of country “ownership” itself has surfaced as 
a component of aid conditionality. However, while the PRSP allows the government a de jure 
ownership, its de facto ownership is contested by some experts. Thoroughly analysing the ownership 
agenda in Bangladesh PRSP, Rahman (2011), for instance, argued it as a 'guided ownership'. Even 
though there was participation from the stakeholders, he doubted that it lacks in credibility. 
Nonetheless, on the conditionality-ownership debate, Mahmud (2006) argued that there is a 
crucial difference between ownership of policy formulation (PRSP in this case) and its 
1.3 The conditionality - policy ownership debate 
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11
16 Remarks by Christine I. Wallich, Country Director, World Bank, Dhaka August 5, 2006, at a seminar on Monitoring Donor 
Support to Bangladesh's Poverty Reduction Strategy: Rethinking the Rules of Engagement, available at 
http://www.ergonline.org/cws/documents/comments/Christine.pdf, accessed on 11 June, 2012.
17 The five core principles that underlie the PRSP approach are: country-driven, result-oriented, comprehensive, 
partnership-oriented and long-term perspective for poverty reduction.
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implementation. The reason being little confidence in transparency and accountability of the 
government's monitoring policies even when they are home grown. So, ownership in terms of 
policy formulation may not necessarily result in concrete changes on the ground, given the 
government's lack of practical commitment, institutional capacity and governance constraints. 
The conditionality-policy ownership debate bears an important implication by bringing 
governance issues to the forefront of the development discourse.  
D&DPs' reform agenda is largely a governance agenda. For instance, according to ADB, 26% of its 
approved lending projects between 2008 and 2010 contained significant governance/public sector 
18
management components.  Yet it is crucial to note that the idea of governance is not static, and 
the consequences engenders have come under considerable scrutiny. 
In terms of governance's definition, various organisations have expressed their understanding of 
the concept in diverse ways. The WB defines governance as “the manner in which power is 
exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development” (WB 
2011). Others such as Department for International Development (DFID), UN etc offer their own set 
19
of definitions.  What remains common to them all, is the conviction that good governance requires 
the authority to exercise power in an effective, transparent and accountable manner.    
 
Thus, in this section, we focus on the D&DPs' governance agenda and its linkages with policy 
transfer, and how it has performed in the overall context. To be precise, the lenders' reform agenda 
targets a lengthy list of objectives: reducing corruption, improving the rule of law, increasing the 
accountability and effectiveness of public institutions and access to the voice of the citizenry, inter 
20alia.  Yet after nearly two decades of governance reform, it seems that the agenda remains far 
from attainable. 
Experts are beginning to assert that such a straight-jacket agenda was devoid of local realities and 
failed to account for the political landscape and available opportunities. Some even questioned the 
applicability of a market-enhancing governance agenda as far as developing countries are 
concerned (Khan 2009). In fact, the IMF's own experts believe that D&DPs engagement on 
strengthening governance may have been overly ambitious, as it tends to overload developing 
countries with commitments to change a large numbers of conditions at the same time' (Mohsin 
and Sharma 2001). 
In the context of Bangladesh, the recent Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) paper, devised by the 
21
WB, recognised that the earlier governance agenda set in CAS 2006-09  was an overly-ambitious 
one. Recognising this limitation in hindsight, the governance schema set in CAS 2010-14 is fairly 
conservative (WB2006, 2012). Similar thinking is also reflected in the academic discourse, as one of 
the leading governance experts (Rodrik 2008) observed that “instead of a broad-brush governance 
agenda, there should be governance in the small, tailored to the local context and not merely the 
1.4 The evolution of 'governance' and it's 'scope'
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18  See the website of ADB < http://beta.adb.org/themes/governance/main>, accessed on 12 June 2012. 
19 On this more is discussed in Chapter-2.  
20 For details see, Kaufmann-Kraay Governance Indicators Dataset, World Bank. 
21 Devised by World Bank, ADB, DFID and JICA.
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adoption of the best practice model” (Rodrik 2008). Along similar lines, the argument goes 'that 
trying to achieve the ever-increasing agenda for good governance (i.e. ideal conditions of 
governance) may be too challenging and overwhelming for developing countries. A more realistic 
and manageable option would be to reduce the extensive agenda and reformulate the objective of 
reformation activities to be that of good enough governance (Grindle 2002)'. 
Nevertheless, given Bangladesh's steady economic growth over the past two decades despite poor 
governance indicators, the country is widely seen as an outlier in cross-country experience of the 
growth-governance discourse (Khan 2009, Mahmud et al 2008). The latest global corruption 
perception index released by Transparency International, places Bangladesh in the 13th position 
22
from the bottom (out of 183 countries),  while it has also not fared well in the WB's governance 
indicators. 
Experts (Devarajan 2008) argued that the WB's governance benchmark did not possess adequate 
explanatory power to understand Bangladesh's economic and social discourse, whereas Pritchett 
and Frauke (2010) postulates that there simply is no relationship between growth and governance 
at low levels of economic development. Conversely a WB study observes that the state (notably 
politicians and bureaucrats) undertook major reforms in some key areas: the State created space for 
the emergence of a vibrant domestic private sector; it recognised the limitations of its service 
delivery and established partnerships with NGOs for providing public services; public expenditure 
was relatively 'pro-poor' compared to similar low-income countries; successive governments 
encouraged the migration of Bangladeshi workers; and the state has improved its capacity of 
disaster-management. According to some accounts, those measures were good enough for 
stimulating economic growth in Bangladesh (Khan 2012).  
That said, two specific governance issues are critical to this current study. First, whether the 
inclusion of governance in the D&DPs' agenda has allowed them to broaden their area of 
intervention into Bangladesh's policy discourse. Second, while governance agenda theoretically 
seems germane and a long-term nexus between governance and growth with some exceptions 
(Rodrik 2008) appears to exist, more recently it has been recognised that the agenda is not 
achievable given a plethora of constraints (CAS 2010-14). For instance, political interest in many 
cases incompatible with the D&DPs' governance agenda (Khan 2009). 
Referring to the PRSP, Mahmud (2006), however, observed the need to a continuous search for 
appropriate 'entry points' to bring about strategic but incremental changes in the governance 
system. Hence, expectations should be more conservative when assessing governance impact, 
keeping the two theoretical issues of 'governance in the small' and 'good enough governance', in 
the backdrop. 
Finally, while this report primarily reviews market-based reform and market-enhancing 
governance capabilities, it also introduces the discourse/literature on an alternative idea emerging 
in governance-growth discourse, which places greater emphasis on growth-enhancing governance 
capabilities within Bangladesh' context (Khan 2009).
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11
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That being said, there is a need for a discussion about 'policy transfer' literature underlying the 
roles of various actors in public policy making process as well as the circumstances that facilitate 
'policy transfer'.  
Although literature on policy transfer is still quite young, the concepts of 'lesson drawing' (Rose 
1991, 1993) and 'policy transfer' (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 2000) have become two dominant 
paradigms in public policy literature. However Dolowitz and Marsh's contribution has received 
wider recognition than Rose. This study will use the 'policy transfer' conceptual framework because 
it is not entirely 'voluntary', whereas 'lesson drawing' implies the borrower has an option. 
Dolowitz and Marsh explore reasons for 'policy transfer' as a central part of their research agenda, 
providing a conceptual framework for 'policy transfer' occurrence, and identifying the different 
actors  involved in the process. Though the framework does not capture many of the other  possible 
explanations of a given policy-making process, its wider scope of applying their theoretical work to 
the study, the Dolowitz et al framework is duly followed. 
The framework is organised around seven components: the reasons actors engage in policy 
transfer, the key actors involved in the policy transfer process, the policies being transferred, the 
lessons from policy transfer, the different degrees of policy transfer, the factors restricting or 
facilitating the policy transfer process; and the process of policy transfer relating to policy “success” 
or “failure”. 
This schema also focuses on two crucial issues: the distinction between voluntary, mixed and 
coercive transfer and the relationship between policy transfer and policy failure. 
The continuum that runs from lesson drawing to coercive transfer is illustrated in Figure-2. 
According to Dolowitz and Marsh 'Lesson Drawing' - perfect rationality, is an example of 
'voluntary' policy transfer. On the other hand, 'direct imposition' exemplifies 'coercive' policy 
transfer. However, when a consensus is drawn between the recipients (wanted to) and the actors 
(have to) involved in policy transfer dynamics, which may include elected officials/politicians, 
bureaucrats, nongovernmental and other institutions, ideologies, cultural values, consultants, think-
tanks, transnational corporations and supranational institutions, it is termed 'mixtures of policy 
transfer'- 'lesson drawing' (bounded rationality) and loans (conditions attached to business activity). 
Figure 2
1.5 The process of policy transfer 
From lesson drawing to coercive transfer
Chapter 1 : Introduction
 Obligated transfer
Conditionality
Lesson drawing
{Bounded rationality}
Lesson drawing
{Perfect rationality}
Voluntary
but driven by
perceived necessity
Coercive transfer
{Direct imposition}
Source: Dolowitz and Marsh 2000
10
These actors can also be a part of both 'voluntary' and 'coercive' policy transfer. Dolowitz and 
Marsh identified eight different categories of policy transfer: policy goals, policy content, policy 
instruments, policy programme s, institutions, ideologies, ideas and attitudes and negative lessons. 
The amplitude of policy transfer varies between wide frequencies. Among some are: 
copying: direct and complete transfer 
emulation: transfer of the ideas behind the policy or programme   
combinations: mixture of several different policies; and 
inspiration: policy in another jurisdiction may inspire a policy change; inter alia.
With this framework, several important observations and caveats are noted: 
I. Politicians generally look for 'quick-fix' solutions relying upon copying or emulation while the 
bureaucrats are more interested in mixtures; 
II. The state of polity and society greatly affect the degree of policy transfer: political, social and 
economic stability leads to voluntary policy transfer; policy transfer is likely to have some 
coercive elements if there is much instability, particularly in the polity.
III. Policy transfer may lead to policy failure instead of success under three circumstances: 
uninformed transfer, incomplete transfer and inappropriate transfer.
IV. Either the framework discussed above or the study, does not suggest that policy transfer is the 
sole explanation of any, let alone most, policy development.
V. While the world economy in particular has transformed through new modes of production and 
trade, and as transnational corporations and institutions have come to exercise more influence 
and power, the capacity of national policy-makers to frame their own agendas has also 
diminished in parallel. Public policy now takes place in a world system as well as in national 
political systems (Parson 1996).
Therefore, the framework and the literature discussed in these sections can be a useful guide, even 
though the focus should not necessarily be limited to this schema. The study accordingly identifies 
the actors involved in the process guiding policy transfer in Bangladesh. The individual studies that 
this report comprises, attempt to isolate the micro and macro conditions determining the relative 
capacity of external influence in shaping Bangladesh's governance journey.
Based on the report's rationales, the SOG's objectives are to analyse how external influence affects 
the following five critical areas of governance in Bangladesh, which constitute the scope of this 
study :  
1. Democracy and Good Governance (D&GG) Agenda
2. Public Sector governance
!
!
!
!
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3. Economic governance
4. Civil Society Organisation (CSO)/NGO's governance and 
5. Political governance
The policy making process generally involves these sectors with four primary local actors (1) 
Politicians (2) Bureaucrats  (3) Businesses (private sector), and (4) NGOs/ Civil society organisations/ 
citizens groups, etc. The external influence generally enters into Bangladesh's policy making 
process through these actors. The eventual impact on the quality of governance depends on the 
strategic interplay among all actors, considering the vested interests of each player and their 
respective strengths and weaknesses and the context under which external influence has emerged. 
Since it is neither feasible nor possible to exhaustively study each and every policy that Bangladesh 
has adopted owing to foreign influence from its very inception, the report focuses on some 
fundamental reforms and associated policy transfers that have defined Bangladesh's governance 
discourse in post 1990 period. The objective for each chapter is as follows:
Given that Bangladesh has offered an important avenue for donors to promote the democracy and 
good governance (D&GG) agenda, this chapter deconstructs the context and content for D&GG aid, 
while gauging their affects on domestic power and interests. Furthermore, it seeks to understand 
whether and how the donor community's reform efforts translate into interventions capable of 
changing the governance/institutional status quo. Concurrently, it also tries to identify the set of 
constraints that either undermines or facilitates donors' effective capacity to work within the 
economic and political domain of Bangladesh. 
This chapter assesses the influence of D&DPs in the country's policy-making process, by drawing on 
examples of interventions from the health and education sectors, with a particular focus on their 
sectoral impact. Given the limited 'policy ownership' in health and education policies, the chapter 
indentifies the factors that have had contrasting results on the respective sectors. It also tries to 
isolate the issues that D&DPs must pay attention to while operating within the policy making arena 
of these sectors, so that the prescribed reforms are effective and sustainable in enhancing the 
sectoral performance.      
This chapter appraises the trajectory of D&DP-driven economic reforms since the mid-1980s; 
particularly, how these reforms impacted the economy, and the roles of the corresponding actors. 
The study explores two cases of banking sector reform and energy price adjustment, wherein 
substantial interplay occurs between the D&DPs and domestic stakeholders. It seeks to disentangle 
elements that guided the reform process to pinpoint the conditions that generally determine what 
reform is accepted and when it is expected. As a whole, the chapter presents insights on how the 
Democracy and good governance agenda 
Public sector governance
Economic governance
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reform agenda has shaped the country's governance scenario in the Banking and Energy sectors 
and the economy in general.     
Civil society actors like NGOs have become important partners in governance over the years. With 
the shifting focus of development cooperation from a 'Needs-Based Approach' to a 'Rights-Based 
Approach', the NGO role graduated from erstwhile social and economic development agency to 
the broader governance-driven institution. This study identifies the extent to which NGOs operate 
as policy advocacy actors, and the degree of 'policy ownership' they avail while shaping the policy 
agenda in Bangladesh. 
In doing so, the study observes two policy fields- the Right to Information Act (RTI) and the National 
Human Rights Commission (NHRC), which have experienced major policy shifts in recent years and 
where NGOs have been engaged in policy advocacy. Moreover, the analysis intends to examine the 
extent of the civil society and NGO's role in the introduction of RTI and the establishment of the 
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and to what extent their ownership was secured in the 
process. 
The sixth chapter examines the political landscape of Bangladesh and the geo-political reality 
within which it operates, to deepen understanding of the political and strategic conditions that 
have created a demand for and supply of external influence within the nation's policymaking 
domain. The chapter scrutinises the political transitory phase that Bangladesh polity has 
experienced, attempting to locate the factors proving non-conducive to democratic consolidation. 
This chapter's study therefore undertakes to explain the very nature of the external influence 
emerging out of Bangladesh's democratic deficit. Lastly, the study examines the strategic geo-
political issues that engender a supply of external influence, to derive insights on the relative 
bargaining strength availed by the Bangladeshi policy making body, when encountering strategic 
external stakeholders.           
To conclude, the report offers a disaggregate analysis of external influence in Bangladesh, to 
acquire a better understanding of the possible cause and consequences of such influence. In 
studying a diverse set of sectors, it aims to explain if heterogeneity exists in the manner in which 
external influence shapes Bangladesh's governance scenario - and if so, then why? This, 
nonetheless, remains a colossal task, but the report does open up avenues for future research with 
the intention to provoke more informative debates on the subject. 
NGO/CSO governance 
Political governance
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2.1 Introduction
Bangladesh's impressive feat in economic growth and social indicators has surprised many who cast 
doubt on its potential 40 years ago. A young, fledging nation once heavily reliant on external 
assistance is today no longer aid-dependent. Indeed, immediately after independence, 
Bangladesh's Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product 
GDP was nearly 10 percent. Today, it accounts for approximately 2 percent of GDP, a figure which is 
well below the average of other Developing Countries (Ellmers 2011).
These statistics however mask an important aspect that foreign aid occupies in the development of 
this country. Although not aid-dependent, Bangladesh certainly carries a legacy of dependency, 
hosting one of the largest donor consortiums within South Asia and globally (Mathisen 2007).  
Every year the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) approves an ever burgeoning Annual 
Development Plan (ADP), roughly half of which continues to be financed by foreign aid (Khatun 
2011). As a result, the donor community's imprint on Bangladesh's trajectory of political, economic 
and social development is manifest. Foreign aid brings with it a set of values, norms, perspectives 
and ideas, which either conform to or confront Bangladesh's own vision of progress. This 
interaction between Bangladesh and the donor community is a reflection of the country's 
relationship with the global political and economic environment at large. 
This chapter is interested in analysing this interaction, specifically with regard to aid given for the 
purposes of promoting Democracy and Good Governance (D&GG). Bangladesh is a priority country 
for donors looking to promote the D&GG agenda (Mathisen 2007). The chapter will deconstruct the 
context and content of D&GG aid, in order to understand how such aid is shaped by political and 
economic forces both within the donor community and the GoB. The chapter's analysis is therefore 
arranged into trying to answer three broad questions:   
(1) How has the D&GG agenda emerged in the donor community 
(2) How is the donor community pursuing this agenda in Bangladesh and how are D&GG 
interventions prioritised, designed, negotiated and implemented in the country, and 
C H A P T E R
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(3) How does the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) respond and react to this agenda and to what 
extent does it converge or conflict with the GoB's own vision of D&GG reform in the country
The chapter finds that while the donor community is increasingly beginning to acknowledge the 
political challenges facing D&GG reform in Bangladesh, this does not always translate into 
interventions capable of changing the status quo. This largely owes to a set of constraints faced within 
the donors' institutional sphere as well as within Bangladesh's own political and economic context. 
The absence of an effective vision of D&GG from the GoB has opened up a space for donors to 
experiment with different governance reforms most of which is technocratic and executive driven, 
while cautiously engaging political actors and processes. The GoB is struggling to navigate this 
renewed interest of donors on a D&GG agenda with limited ownership of many projects, and an 
already marginalised parliament.
Bangladesh's foreign aid sector is massive in financial terms and complex in composition. In order to 
maximise the depth of analysis, this chapter focuses on the following three Donor agencies 
respective D&GG aid portfolios: The World Bank (WB); the Department for International 
Development (DFID), UK; and the United Nations Development Programme  (UNDP). 
The chapter makes some broad observations on each donor portfolio regarding 
Each donor's policy origins for its D&GG agenda 
The beliefs/histories that underline how each donor interprets the terms “democracy” and 
“good governance”; and the consequences of interpreting it a certain way, in terms of aid 
giving
The tools/approaches/methodologies used to allocate D&GG aid and how they reflect the 
donors' discourse on D&GG
The study then undertakes specific analysis of the following projects selected from each donor's 
D&GG portfolio:
(1) World Bank Public Procurement Reform Project (PPRP)
(2) World Bank Strengthening Parliamentary Oversight
(3) DFID Managing at the Top (MATT)
(4) UNDP Local Government Support Project- Learning and Innovation Component (LGSP-LIC)
Each project analysis takes an in-depth look at how the D&GG agenda is being transmitted in 
Bangladesh by asking the following questions:
The rationale behind launching the project and how this fits with the donor's discourse on 
good governance 
The government actors targeted through this programme and in what manner
How ownership of the reform is ensured
2.2 Methodology
!
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The nature of incentives being offered for reforms
The chances of and reasons for success of this project
The rationale behind selecting these donors is based on two criteria:  
1) the importance the D&GG agenda holds in the donors' portfolio, both financially and in 
terms of prioritising D&GG as an area of intervention in Bangladesh 
2) a need for a comparative analysis between donors with distinctly different approaches to 
D&GG reform in Bangladesh
The rationale behind selecting specific projects in each donors' portfolio is based on three criteria:
1) to analyse reform projects targeted at executive and legislative functions and central and 
local forms of government
2) all of them are either recently launched or on-going projects
3) these initiatives either partner with, or are implemented directly by the GoB and not 
through non-government organisations. Other reasons are predicated upon the 
availability or lack thereof, of primary and secondary information on each project. 
Both primary and secondary data have been employed to address these points with the former 
relying on donors' project documents, evaluation reports, country plans and other strategic 
documents available in the public domain. 
The emergence of the D&GG agenda was marked by two distinct events taking place during the 
1990s. First, the geopolitical context of foreign aid allocation changed dramatically with the end of 
the cold war. With communism's collapse and Eastern Europe's democratisation, western 
governments no longer had the justification nor need for foreign aid to further political and 
strategic interests (Crawford 2001). Foreign aid now found a more novel and worthy cause in 
consolidating and spreading the trend of political liberalisation.
Second, the new direction of foreign aid received widespread academic and scholarly 
endorsement. In 1993, the OECD's 'Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Orientations on 
Participatory Development and Good Governance' document stated that: 
there is a vital connection between open, democratic and accountable systems of 
governance and respect for human rights, and the ability to achieve sustained economic and 
social development… this connection is so fundamental that participatory development and 
good governance must be central concerns in the allocation and design of development 
assistance.
Whilst past wisdom had extolled the virtues of stable governments (authoritarian or otherwise) 
and economic growth, a new body of research substantiated this new direction of foreign aid, by 
2.2.1 Rationale
2.3 Setting the agenda on democracy and good governance
2.3.1 Origins 
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demonstrating clear linkages between the presence of good institutions and democratic 
governments, with/and economic growth (See Rodrik 2005; Kaufman and Kraay 2002; World Bank 
2000; Friedman, Johnson, Kauffman and Zoido 1999; Knack and Keefer 1995; World Bank 1997; 
Chong and Calderon 1997; Levine 1997).
As the turn of this millennium marked a decade of such knowledge being put into practice, another 
body of scholarly work was produced to evaluate foreign aid and its impact on D&GG. Papers by 
Svensson (1999) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) argued that foreign aid was utilised most 
effectively by countries having good policies and institutions in place. Another body of work 
attempted to establish direct links between foreign aid and its impact on democratisation and 
government institutions (See Heckelman 2010; Wright 2009; Rajan and Subramanian 2007; Ear 
2007; Wolf 2007; Johnson and Zajonc 2006; Remmer 2005; Boulding and Hyde 2005; Hout 2004; 
Burnell 2004; Knack 2004; Easterly et al. 2004; Brautigam 2000; Boone 1996).There is no unanimous 
agreement on whether the link is positive or negative and it is generally accepted that establishing 
causality between the two variables is riddled with difficulty (Green and Kohl 2007). Despite such 
methodological and empirical ambiguities, the importance of D&GG promotion has become 
conventional wisdom among donors and continues to occupy a seminal place in their agenda.
Democracy is a concept that is continuously debated, contested and re-envisioned in the realm of 
political theory. Yet in the political imagination, it has taken a shape and form with which many can 
identify, characterised by such basic inter-dependent features as  free and fair elections, a democratic 
society, open and accountable government and civil and political rights (Crawford 2001).
The term 'Good Governance' on the other hand, began gaining currency following the post-
Washington Consensus. Narrowly defined, it focuses on efficient and capable executive 
institutions, devoid of a concern for the nature of the political regime. In broad terms however, it 
encompasses strengthening external mechanisms of executive accountability such as political 
accountability to parliament; financial accountability to the national audit agencies; and legal 
accountability to an independent judiciary (Crawford 2001).
While the distinction between democracy and good governance is not always evident, there are 
certainly overlaps between the two. However the distinction assists in analysing why and how 
donors such as the WB, DFID and UNDP approach these concepts differently.
In the World Bank's Governance and Anti-corruption (GAC) strategy paper, governance is defined 
as 'the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape 
public policy and provide public goods and services'(World Bank 2007). From the outset of its 
establishment, the WB's mandate has explicitly disallowed it from being influenced by the political 
character or engaging in the political activities of its member states (World Bank 1991). Its strategy 
unambiguously states that it 'must conform to the purposes set out in the Articles of Agreement of 
2.3.2 Defining democracy and good governance
World Bank 
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each of the WB Group's institutions: broadly stated, to promote the economic development of 
members (World Bank 2007). The World  Bank states that good governance
includes the creation, protection and enforcement of property rights, without which the scope for market 
transactions is limited. It includes the provision of a regulatory regime that works with the market to promote 
competition. And it includes the provision of sound macroeconomic policies that create a stable environment 
for market activity. Good governance also means the absence of corruption, which can subvert the goals of 
policy and undermine the legitimacy of the public institutions that support markets (World Bank 2002). 
Having circumvented issues of political governance, social welfare or human rights, this 
characterisation of governance can thus be viewed as narrow and economic. Governments are 
therefore important only in as much as they complement markets or correct market failures. 
Aside from arguments about being curtailed by its mandate, this conceptualisation points to the 
WB's understanding that markets are the ultimate source of prosperity and development. 
Efficient and capable governments are necessary to protect the sanctity of the market, 
regardless of whether they are democratic or not. 
In what was considered  among the strongest donor rhetoric on D&GG promotion, the DFID's 
White Paper 2006 claimed that the understanding of D&GG had gone beyond the management 
of the economy, and beyond analysing and reforming public services and the public sector. The 
focus was now about how power is used, and on whose behalf. Good governance requires 
Capability-  the extent to which government possesses the requisite money, people, will and 
legitimacy to get things done; Responsiveness– the degree to which government listens to what 
people want and acts on it; and Accountability– the process by which people are able to hold 
government to account. The paper further stated that
'This is about politics. Politics determines how resources are used and policies are made. And 
politics determines who benefits. In short, good governance is about good politics.'(2006)
The paper further posits that the promotion of good governance is expected to ultimately lead 
to the realisation of the ideal of democracy. However, DFID does not define a particular model 
of democracy, and insists that democratic principles, values and institutions are determined by 
the local culture, society and history of each country. Consequently, the demand for democratic 
change must come from within (DFID 2007). 
DFID's definition of the term good governance can be seen as broad and attempting to 
encompass all aspects of government accountability. Its disposition as a bilateral donor under 
the auspices of the UK's own democratic system, also explains its understanding of democratic 
change as being indigenous in countries receiving D&GG aid. Overall, the White Paper 2006 
spearheaded the thinking amongst donor agencies that development challenges were 
inherently political and must be tackled accordingly.
The UNDP's characterisation of governance is very similar to the WB to the extent that it is 
defined as 'the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management 
of a country's affairs at all levels' (UNDP 1997). However, governance systems must be framed 
Department for International Development
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within the goals of human development and human rights (UNDP 2007). In its most recent 
'Guide to Democratic Governance Practice', the UNDP states that:
'…in order to achieve and sustain human development, both the ends and means of good 
governance should be 'democratized'. Democratic Governance (DG) requires efficient institutions 
and an economic and political environment that renders public services effective and makes 
economic growth possible; at the same time, DG for human development must be concerned with 
whether institutions and rules are fair and accountable, whether they protect human rights and 
political freedoms, and whether all people have a say in how they operate. So from the human 
development perspective, good governance is DG' (2008-2013)
Democracy and good governance are inextricable, because in the UNDP's thinking, a democratic 
system is the only system which ensures the twin goals of an economically efficient government, 
but also a government that nurtures civic and political freedoms, inclusive participation and 
accountability. The latter is prized by the UNDP as a 'development goal that is intrinsically 
valuable in its own right' (Guide to DGP 2008-13). The UNDP's mandate is predicated upon 
widely representative laws and instruments in the United Nations, such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. Consequently it propagates a very particular model of liberal 
democracy compared to other donors.
The differences in the interpretation of D&GG terms from the WB, DFID and the UNDP are 
important because they determine which policies, institutional forms and processes are 
prioritised in their operations. The UNDP takes an explicitly normative approach, paising 
democratic governments. The DFID attempts to remain neutral while the WB tries a positive, 
value-free definition.  
Until recently, the D&GG agenda had come under heavy criticism for being 'de-politicised' (Hout 
and Robinson 2009). Governance interventions were seen as working more with the executive 
branches of government, while avoiding engagement with legitimate political structures and 
processes, which shape the way politicians and policy makers make decisions about progressive 
changes in governance. New research reveals that technical and financial solutions to 
governance will not suffice and that D&GG initiatives need to navigate the complexities of 
power and politics in order to build the critical momentum to bring about lasting change 
(Thampi 2012). 
Notwithstanding differences in how they define D&GG, all the donors WB, DFID and UNDP  
have made the intellectual shift in acknowledging the importance of political context (See 
World Bank 2009; DFID 2009; UNDP 2011). As a result, D&GG aid today is informed by a far more 
mature and nuanced understanding of the political economy of the recipient country, which 
underlines the need to prioritise, sequence and time reform initiatives in a strategic way, rather 
than launch an overambitious governance agenda. 
Bangladesh is no exception to this and donors are acutely aware of the challenging yet 
unavoidable political context they face when promoting governance reforms. The question 
arising then is how are donors translating this newfound understanding of political structures, 
processes and actors into concrete strategies for governance reform in Bangladesh? Analysing 
the WB, DFID and UNDP's D&GG portfolio in Bangladesh is an attempt to answer these questions.
2.3.3 The role of politics in the contemporary D&GG agenda
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2.4 Translating the D&GG Agenda into Practice
2.4.1 World Bank
The WB's concern with governance is reflected in the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA), an exercise which scores and rewards various countries' performance in 
implementing policies promoting economic growth and poverty reduction. This consists of a set 
of 16 criteria grouped in the following four clusters: 
(a) economic management; 
(b) structural policies; 
(c) policies for social inclusion and equity; and 
(d) public sector management and institutions. 
These are the main factors determining resource allocations to a country, notwithstanding 
population and per capita income receiving some attention. The CPIA's composition has come 
under attack nonetheless, due to its marked emphasis on economic management and structural 
policies. The fourth cluster, public sector management and institutions, is WB's primary vehicle 
for assessing a country's governance and receives the greatest weight, making the IDA 
1allocation acutely sensitive to changes in the governance factor.  Yet it excludes generally 
accepted elements of governance such as public participation, accountability, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights. Consequently, countries receiving high aid allocations due to high 
CPIA scores are seen as being rewarded for adhering to neo-liberal economic policies (Hout 
2007; Van Waeyenberge 2009). 
Bangladesh's CPIA rating remains above average for IDA recipients, maintaining a score of 3.0 
out of a total 6 points in recent years. But its scores for the 'public sector management and 
institutions' cluster remain lower than other clusters' scores, while slightly below the South Asia 
region average. This has not however prevented the WB from making Bangladesh one of its 
largest recipients of support, with a dedicated funding of $6.55 billion for FYs  2011-14 from 
IDA (World Bank 2010a). 
On the contrary, the WB's Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) strategy justifies this deep 
engagement with Bangladesh, stating that the Bank should find ways to remain involved even 
in those countries with weak governance and a high incidence of corruption, so that 'the poor 
do not suffer twice' (World Bank 2007).  As a result, countries like Bangladesh are provided a 
Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) which features governance as a central theme tailored to the 
country context (World Bank 2007). 
Although the new CAS 2011-14 is already in place, it is worth briefly mentioning that the WB's 
strategy during the CAS 2006-09 saw a comparatively stronger focus on addressing 'core 
governance' issues. It was concerned that Bangladesh's increasingly confrontational politics and 
political instability were undermining its investment climate and offsetting the GoB's pro-
private sector stance. Core governance, according to the WB, consisted of the following (World 
Bank 2005): 
1  (24% Clusters A,B,C average) + (68% Cluster D average) + (8% Portfolio Rating). Source: BGD CPIA Scores
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An efficient, accountable, and transparent system of public financial management functioning at all 
levels of government and in all state-owned enterprises.
Transparent and competitive public procurement processes.
Revenue effort enhanced, and the tax administration  stronger, transparent, and more efficient.
Key guardians of accountability functioning as an effective check on the executive.
Performance of legal and judicial systems improved.
A transparent, open government conscious of its obligation to disclose information to the public, and 
citizens made conscious of their right to information.
A service-oriented, accountable, and efficient public service.
The WB recognised that “the roots of many of Bangladesh's current problems of governance lie in 
areas external to the World Bank's mandate  that is, political governance” and that it relied on 
other bilateral development partners to engage the GoB in these matters. Its own work on core 
governance would thus remain with Public Financial Management (PFM) and public procurement 
aspects (World Bank 2005). 
However, the entry of the caretaker government (CTG) into the political arena, headed by a former 
WB official, provided the WB some encouragement to veer into more political governance terrain. 
Aided by the CTG's enormous political will to fight corruption, the WB supported the CTG with 
high-profile investigations, prosecutions and sanctions (World Bank 2010a). Moreover, civil service 
and judicial reform went hand-in-hand during that period. The results however, as regrettably 
noted by the WB were insignificant, owing to a combination of factors, ranging from strong 
political opposition to reforms to the WB's own operational shortcomings in understanding and 
responding to the political environment:
The challenge in implementing these reforms was underestimated, especially in a politically 
unstable environment with frequent changes of government. High-profile prosecutions 
meant to signal zero tolerance for corruption served instead to create a perception that 
those in power will pursue those who are not for politically-motivated reasons, within a 
persistently corrupt environment. Moreover, the caretaker government's will to carry 
through with prosecutions subsided during the latter part of its tenure (World Bank 2010a) 
In the new CAS 2011-14, the WB retreats from an overambitious governance reform programme, 
stating that outside actors possess “limited ability to counter systemic facilitators of corruption in 
areas with limited government commitment to reforms.” (World Bank 2010a). As a result the WB 
has decided to be selective in working only in those areas where the current government has shown 
sufficient political will for reform and concrete results can be achieved. 
Its involvement in sectors characterised as high risk and consisting of little government 
commitment to address corruption, will take the form of conducting political economy and 
operational risk assessments to inform future project design (World Bank 2010b). This root problem 
of political governance then, only finds expression as an academic exercise in its current portfolio of 
D&GG activities in Bangladesh, which as explained in Table 1, is concentrated around fiscal and 
administrative reforms. The next section will take an in-depth look at two projects, namely the 
Public Procurement Reform Project (PPRP) and Strengthening Legislative Oversight.
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Table 1 
MTBF & Public Public expenditure, Ministry of $50 million 2009-14
Strengthening Administration financial Finance
Financial Finance management and
Oversight  procurement 
Strengthening Public Public expenditure, Office of the $16.6 million 2011
 Auditor Administration  financial Comptroller and 
General's Office Finance management and Auditor General
procurement
Strengthening Financial Public Parliament $5 million 2010-14
 Legislative Management Accountability Secretariat
 Oversight Institutions
Identification Public Other public sector Bangladesh $195 million 2011-16
System for Administration;  governance; Election 
Enhancing  Information Technology Commission
Access to Technology diffusion
Services (IDEA)
Public Central Public expenditure, Implementation $23.6 million 2007-13
Procurement Government  financial  Monitoring and 
Reform Project Administration management and Evaluation n
 (PPRP) II procurement; Other Division
 public sector 
governance; 
Administrative and
civil service reform;
Accountability/anti-
corruption; 
Participation and 
civic engagement
Local Sub-national Decentralisation; Ministry of Local $115.78 2006-11
Government Government Public expenditure,  Government, 
Support Administration  financial Rural 
Project management and Development and 
(LGSP) procurement; Cooperatives
Participation and 
civic engagement; 
Other 
accountability/anti-
corruption; Rural 
services and 
infrastructure
Source: Compiled from World Bank 2010a and the World Bank Bangladesh website
The Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (OCAG) notes that audit experience in the 
public sector reveals the most financial irregularities occurring in public procurement (Hakeem and 
Snapshot of key components of the WB governance portfolio in Bangladesh
PPRP II
Project Name Sector (s) Theme (s) Implementing Funding Year
Agency
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Uddin 2010), which is the process through which budgets materialise into public services (Ellmers 
2010). In Bangladesh, public procurement takes up 70 percent of the national development 
budget. Corruption in procurement can thus misdirect public spending, lower the quality of public 
assets and give rise to perverse incentives for the private sector (World Bank 2007a). 
As much as this is Bangladesh's concern it is also a concern for donors financing its development 
budget and thus holding an interest in ensuring their funds are efficiently and accountably used. 
From the WB's point of view, public procurement reform which comes under the rubric of Public 
Financial Management (PFM), is thus one of the best defenses against fund mismanagement . 
The WB has served as lead agency for procurement reforms in Bangladesh. Following an assessment 
of the country's procurement system back in 2002, the WB concluded that weak procurement 
processes were the single most important factor affecting public sector performance (World Bank 
2002a). The first round of PPRP thus focused on addressing key deficiencies in the legal and policy 
framework. This outcome was largely successful, with the GoB enacting Public Procurement 
Regulations (PPR) in 2003 and passing the Public Procurement Act (PPA) in parliament in 2006. The 
law and the regulations contain most features of international good public procurement practices 
(World Bank 2007a).
The effective and sustained implementation of such regulations however, as the expressed purpose of 
legislation to begin with, has been marred with difficulty. There has been significant non-compliance 
and weak enforcement of the regulations from most government quarters, crippled by fraud, 
corruption and political influence. The second round of reforms or PPRP II thus concentrates on: 
(1) building institutional capacity on procurement, 
(2) introducing e-government procurement to ensure more transparency and lower costs, and 
(3) building awareness among other non-government stakeholders to encourage 
procurement monitoring. These initiatives will be implemented in four sectors 
2infrastructure, power, urban and water  (World Bank 2007a). 
Since the project anticipates similar bureaucratic opposition to the reforms, the WB has tried to 
ensure a set of incentives for the officials. These include rewarding exceptionally performing 
procurement officials, awarding the target agency for best PPRP implementation, recognising 
procurement expertise in the form of accreditation and certification and exposure visits abroad.
Equally important, government ownership of this PPRP project, which began during the CTG and 
continued when the current government which came to power in early 2009., has experienced 
considerable political turbulence. By late 2009, the GoB passed an amendment to the PPA which 
allowed entities without past experience, production capacity or financial capability to acquire 
public work contracts worth up to 2 crore (The Daily Star 2009). The WB noted that this carried 
“serious implications for the bank's processing of future budget support operations and could 
restrict its ability to rely on the country system (PPA/PPR) in future operations” (The Daily Star 
2009a). 
2 The corresponding agencies are the Roads and Highways Department (RHD), Local Government Engineering 
Department (LGED), Rural Electrification Board (REB), and Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB).
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In response, the Finance Minister, AMA Muhith, apparently attempted to convince other ministers 
of the need for donor-GoB coordination. However, facing opposition, the amendments remained, 
and the WB reverted to using its own procurement guidelines. The entire spectacle highlighted the 
fledging ownership of procurement reforms by the GoB, with the Finance Minister stating “We 
were not in the government when the PPA was enacted following the WB advice” (The Daily Star 
2009b). 
In its defense, the GoB claimed to have potentially increased competition and made it easier for 
newly established businesses to access the procurement market. In particular, the procurement 
rules for the power sector were waived to speed up implementation of projects and address the 
crippling energy crisis in the country (Ellmers 2010). But the GoB's commitment to transparency in 
this public procurement process was compromised by the fact that proposals to seek public opinion 
on the Bill and then send it to a Select Committee for amendment were rejected by voice votes in 
Parliament. The amendments also drew criticism from the opposition party, stating that they would 
encourage tender manipulation and make room for inexperienced ruling party members to obtain 
tenders with ease. 
Media and CSOs in Bangladesh echoed similar sentiments (The Daily Star 2009c; 2010). However the 
opposition party boycotted parliament when the revised bill was passed and therefore were absent 
from raising possible objections to the amendments (Parliament Watch 2009). It should be noted 
that through the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the Public Undertakings Committee (PUC), 
the parliament can monitor financial irregularities in public offices and in procurement (Hoque 
2010).However both political and legal obstacles abound which undermine this kind of supervision. 
In ensuring the checks and balances in government, the parliament is as crucial an institution as the 
executive and judiciary. Engaging with parliaments in development work though has always been 
uncomfortable territory for donors, given the neo-patrimonial tendencies exhibited by many 
parliamentarians, which characterise the partisan and confrontational politics of Bangladesh. The 
WB however, soon came to the realisation that bypassing or marginalising parliamentarians 
created a legitimacy crisis for development reforms (Hatcher 2009). 
Parliamentarians as people's representatives and decision makers, hold the authority to veto 
reforms envisioned by donors. Very importantly, parliamentarians' purported financial oversight 
role mentioned in the previous section, can, if strengthened, aptly address donor's fiduciary 
concerns, since most donor aid is provided through budget support (Hudson and Wren 2007). 
The WB identified that despite their strong mandate, financial oversight committees in parliament 
make little impact due to outdated rules of procedure, a perpetual lack of adequate skills, resources 
and infrastructure and the executives' indifference to committees' work and a culture of defiance 
of legislative directives (World Bank 2010c). The SPO project would thus support parliament's three 
financial oversight committees : the Committee on Estimates (EC), the PAC and the PUC. 
This involves providing the three committees with technical support; capacity-building of the 
Parliament Secretariat to support them; bringing greater transparency to the committees' work 
through public outreach programmes; and supporting government-led e-parliament programmes 
Strengthening Parliamentary Oversight (SPO)
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and the use of modern technology in committees' operations (World Bank 2010c). Of the 
parliament's legislative, representative and oversight functions, the WB targets only the latter, as 
the 'power of the purse' (Johnston 2009). 
The SPO is designed to increase accountability and transparency on the use of public funds, 
focusing solely on the 'relatively technical aspects of financial oversight' (World Bank 2010c). 
Restrained by its mandate, the WB is working with other donors such as the USAID, UNDP and CIDA 
who are addressing the legislative and representative aspects of parliamentary reform in 
Bangladesh. 
The SPO seems to have enjoyed a positive beginning, with high-level commitment to reforms from 
the Speaker, Chief Whips and a large number of committee members. This is encouraging, since 
much parliamentary strengthening work in the past has tended to focus on piecemeal 
interventions targeting the parliament as a self-contained entity, detached from the wider political 
and social system. These interventions had little to no impact, instead fostering suspicion towards 
donors (Hudson and Wren 2007). 
But high-level ownership of the SPO has not equally resonated with the bureaucracy, particularly 
key stakeholders such as CAG and MoF, whose commitment is equally important to this project's 
success . After a period of relative political stability, confrontational politics is again heightening to 
alarming levels, with the opposition party's routine walkouts from parliament and escalating 
agitation (The Daily Star 2011). This may thwart the oversight committees' ability to function in a 
bipartisan manner, thus undermining the project's sustainability. 
Bangladesh is the fourth highest recipient of UK bilateral aid. In 2010-11, this aid rose to £150 
million, making the UK the country's largest bilateral donor (House of Commons 2010). Bangladesh 
has been characterised by DFID as a 'fragile state'  states that are under acute political stress, where 
institutions face serious contestation and are potentially unable to manage conflict and shocks 
(DFID 2011). Consequently it spends around £20 million a year on programmes dealing with 
governance and strengthening of institutions of accountability (House of Commons 2010).
As mentioned earlier, the White Paper 2006 firmly placed 'good politics' on the development 
agenda. For DFID, good politics ironically took shape in the operations of the non-elected CTG in 
Bangladesh. Despite the fact that the CTG had limited civil liberties and rights such as freedom of 
expression, it had “earned its legitimacy by responding to larger public demands around the right 
to life, security and demand for political reform” (DFID and FCO 2008). Like the WB then, DFID 
supported the CTG's anti-corruption drive by funding the Stolen Asset Recovery initiative and also 
aiding the Anti-Corruption Commission in its activities (ADFID and FCO 2008). 
It was keenly aware however, that post-CTG, confrontational politics may return to the country and 
that such overt support to weed out political corruption may not be entertained. Thus the current 
country plan 20011-15, based on the new White Paper 2009, consists of conventional governance 
programmes such as PFM and civil service capacity building as shown in Table 2. It also showcases 
new initiatives such as tax collection and safety and justice strengthening programmes which are 
meant to “build the political legitimacy of the state”(DFID 2011). 
2.4.2 DFID
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Table 2
Strengthening Public Expenditure Public Sector Financial £30,150,000 2009-14
 Management Management
Rights and Governance Challenge Democratic Participation and £30,000,000 2008-13
Fund  Civil Society
Strengthening Political Public Sector Policy and £19,700,000 2010-15
Participation (in coordination Administrative Management
with USAID) 
Public Service Capacity Building Economic and Development £15,205,000 2004-13
 (MATT) Policy/Planning
Tax Administration  Compliance Economic and Development £7,090,000 2007-15
 and Taxpayer Services (TACTS)  Policy/Planning
Safety and Justice Legal and Judicial N/A 2008-15
Development
WB-DFID Joint Technical Public Sector Policy and £5,500,000 2005-13
Assistance Programme Administrative Management
Source: Compiled from the DFID website
DFID's approach to D&GG reform in Bangladesh appears to prioritise interventions from the 
bottom-up, with a significant amount of funding going to the Rights and Governance Challenge 
Fund. In its Capability-Accountability-Responsiveness (CAR) approach, the civil society is being 
encouraged to adopt the confrontational role of demanding state accountability. 
DFID was criticised in the House of Commons report however, for inadequate engagement with the 
parliament as a guardian of accountability (2009-10). The reality as a bilateral agency is that DFID's 
operations are subject to pressures of domestic lobbies and legislatures with a range of security, 
commercial and diplomatic interests in mind (Unsworth 2009). DFID's new portfolio thus includes a 
programme me on Strengthening Political Participation (SPP), albeit implemented by the USAID. 
The SPP works with parliamentarians to improve their understanding and practice the basic 
principles of accountability and responsiveness.
DFID's bulk of funding concentrates on improving the executive's capability to govern effectively, 
thus displaying a rather de-politicised, technocratic agenda that is a far cry from the White Papers. 
DFID's rationale for this is that it is “anchoring public administration in the much broader context of 
public authority and political legitimacy” (DFID 2011). It claims that programmes such as TACTS is 
not simply technical, but a profoundly political activity that can enhance government 
accountability through encouraging interest groups to mobilise in supporting, resisting or 
proposing policies. Similarly, the Managing at the Top (MATT) II programme seeks to create a 
Snapshot of key components of DFID's governance portfolio in Bangladesh
Project Title Principal Sector Budget Year
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critical mass of high-level government officials who can subsequently champion wider civil service 
reform and drive change from within. 
MATT II programme's aim is to empower civil servants to generate and demand administrative 
reform, which is achieved through a two-fold approach: 
(1) Providing support to reform Human Resource Management (HRM) systems within the 
Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS); and 
(2) Facilitating a performance-oriented, management development programme . 
The first approach involves working with bodies such as the Career Planning & Training Wing (CPT-
W) and the Appointment, Promotion & Deputation Wing (APD-W) in the Ministry of Public 
Administration (MoPA). The second approach targets approximately 2000 officers from the BCS 
administrative cadre (from the post of Senior Assistant Secretary up to Additional Secretary level) to 
build citizen-centric leadership and managerial skills (MATT website). 
In design and concept, the MATT II attempts a more holistic approach to administrative reform, 
compared to the largely unsuccessful MATT I which addressed strictly policy-development skills of 
civil servants without considering the broader Human Resource Management (HRM) issues of 
Recruitment, Promotion and Performance Evaluation (Jacobs 2009). MATT II builds in positive 
incentives through a 2-stage process, whereby only the best performing officers progress onto the 
programme 's second stage. 
These best performing officers travel abroad for an overseas development programme , to design 
and implement reform projects with national impact, known as Super Performance Improvement 
Programmes (SPIPs). MATT graduates have given favourable reviews of the programme and it has 
been widely praised for its “ability to move civil servants from reactive and essentially passive 
administrators in the system to proactive, reform-minded individuals” (Jacobs 2009). According to 
the MATT II website which reveals synopsis reports by the government officials implementing SPIPs, 
a few SPIPs concerned with improving service delivery have been implemented with relative 
success.
It should be noted however that the administrative cadre is considered a “premier elite force” in 
Bangladesh, by virtue of its members being constantly placed in positions of authority across public 
enterprises and in districts and sub-districts. Their influence in formulating and implementing 
policy has led them to zealously guard this privileged position; and to be inimical towards reform 
and innovation efforts in the past, even by democratically-elected governments (Zafarullah 2007). 
This dominance of the central government frequently comes under criticism and it is unclear 
whether and how MATTII is addressing concerns regarding administrative and fiscal 
decentralisation within the designed SPIPs. Although laudable for working with a challenging 
echelon of civil servants, MATT II may not be challenging the status quo on the power of the central 
government.
MATT II
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More importantly, the crippling politicisation of the bureaucracy is an unavoidable reality in the 
face of larger HRM reforms. Historically, the independence, efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Public Service Commission (PSC) have been compromised much more during democratically elected 
governments than authoritarian or caretaker regimes (Jahan and Shahan 2008). This trend may 
persist, with the incumbent government introducing another batch of civil servants selected more 
for political leanings rather than merit. 
The CPT-W, which is considered the “engine for reform”, and the APD-Wing of MOPA are also 
marred with patronage and preferentialism, along with problems of few qualified and 
3
experienced professionals (Jacobs 2009). A few SPIPs have targeted reforms in HRM , such as 
replacing the Annual Confidential Report (ACR) with a Performance Based Evaluation System 
(PBES). However the final nod to mainstream these initiatives is yet to come from the Prime 
Minister's office (The Independent 2010). As a result, ownership for reform from the highest offices 
remains tenuous, ultimately bringing back the issue of engaging with political power players to 
push through progressive reforms. 
D&GG continues to be a national priority for UNDP operations in Bangladesh. Unlike WB and DFID, 
its 2006-10 portfolio targeted all branches of government and much of the persistent problems 
they face. Its strategy follows a logical progression of interventions. 
On the supply side, the portfolio first seeks an alignment of legal, policy and institutional 
frameworks with international standards to protect basic human rights. It then attempts to 
empower the Executive, Judiciary and Legislature to promote and implement these rights. On the 
demand side, the UNDP works to build partnerships between GoB and civil society, to encourage 
public scrutiny roles for the latter (UNDP and GoB 2005). A snapshot of its ongoing programmes is 
shown in Table 3. 
The UN's own large bureaucracy perhaps explains the ambitious nature of its Bangladesh portfolio, 
where the UNDP frequently joins hands with other UN agencies in implementing programmes. 
Historically, its involvement in the more political aspects of D&GG reform has proven more visible 
than other donors, and was not confined to the CTG regime's tenure. 
For example, in its earlier project 'Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy (SPD)' which ran for 
almost 10 years starting from 1997, the UNDP recommended changes in the parliamentary rules of 
procedure and worked with Parliamentary Committees to improve their legislative and 
representative functions. It has also been involved in supporting the establishment of the National 
Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and in promoting efforts to separate the Judiciary from the 
Executive (UNDP 2011a). 
The development community however, observes that UNDP's successes until now have largely been 
in electoral reform, institution building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and Union Parishad (UP) 
governance in Bangladesh (Constable et al 2009). It has also left its positive imprints on drafting 
legal, policy and institutional frameworks such as electoral laws and procedures, the draft Civil 
2.4.3 UNDP
3 See http://www.matt2.org/SPIP_Group_1_Team_C_Synopsis.php?c_id=progresstodate and 
http://www.matt2.org/PIP_Batch_10_B_Synopsis.php?c_id=progresstodate
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Service Act, Upazila Parishad (UZP) Rules and the ICT Act 2009 in Bangladesh. Despite its close 
relationship with the GoB and easy access to high levels of government, however the SPD project's 
impact on parliament's functioning proved minimal and other interventions in civil service reforms 
and the NHRC, continue to battle political realities (Constable et al. 2009).
Table 3
Police Reform Programme (Phase $ 29,000,000 Ministry of Home Affairs, 2009-14
 II) in cooperation with DFID  Bangladesh Police
Civil Service Change Management $ 5,500,000 Ministry of Public 2008-12
Programme (in cooperation with Administration
TRAC and ADB)
Construction of Server Stations for $ 30,887,757 Bangladesh Election 2008-11
 Electoral Database (CSSED) in Commission
cooperation with DFID, Govt of 
Netherlands and GoB 
Activating Village Courts Project (in $ 15,050,000 Local Government Division 2009-13
cooperation with GoB and EC)  (LGD); Ministry of Local 
Government, Rural 
Development and 
Cooperatives (MoLGRD&C)
Bangladesh National Human Rights $ 6,943,771 National Human Rights 2010-15
 Commission Capacity Development Commission
 (in cooperation with DANIDA, SIDA,
 SDC and KOREA) 
Promoting Access to Justice and $ 3,000,000 Ministry of Law, Justice and 2007-11
Human Rights (in cooperation with Parliamentary Affairs
 TRAC) 
Local Governance Support Project $ 18,118,000 Ministry of LGRD & 2007-11
 Learning and Innovation Component Cooperatives
 (LGSP-LIC) (in cooperation with 
DANIDA, European Commission & 
UNCDF) 
Strengthening Upazila Parishad $ 831,171 MoLGRD&C 2009-11
through Capacity Building Initiatives
 and Policy Advocacy
Source: Compiled from the UNDP website
Snapshot of key components of UNDP's governance portfolio in Bangladesh
Project Title Budget Implementing Partner Duration
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Local Government Support Project -Learning and Innovation Component (LGSP-LIC)
2.4.4 Good enough governance?
One of UNDP's success stories has been in fiscal decentralisation in Bangladesh. Originally piloted 
under the Sirajganj Local Governance Development Project (SLGDP), UNDP worked with the GoB in 
providing direct block grants to selected UPs, who enjoyed discretion in drawing up their budgets 
in a participatory manner. It also linked the grants to performance improvements and audit 
requirements, thereby creating positive incentives. 
UPs became more participatory, transparent and accountable under this pilot project, the success of 
which in large part led to its replication by the GoB into a nationwide Local Government Support 
Project (LGSP), funded by the WB. Under the LGSP, the government's fiscal transfers will be 
augmented with external funds which will be available to UPs based on pre-defined eligibility 
criteria. The LIC component supported by UNDP is meant to mainstream lessons from these “second 
generation” reforms into the LGSP rollout (GoB and UNDP 2007).
Early signs of progress are encouraging in this project, with LGSP UPs demonstrating increased 
community participation, transparent budgeting, and revenue collection compared to non-LGSP 
UPs. Rules and regulations have also been formed to activate the UP Act 2009 (UNDP 2011b). 
Bangladesh is fiscally very centralised with little doubt that efforts to increase UP authority and 
control over financial resources will improve local service delivery (Fox and Menon 2008). 
Yet fiscal decentralisation must be twinned with political and administrative decentralisation to 
ultimately be successful. Local governance and decentralisation are different processes, where the 
latter is often a key step in bringing government closer to people and thus institutionalising 
democracy (UNDP 2011b). Although there are local government acts, there is no comprehensive 
decentralisation policy and genuine implementation in the country. 
The reality in Bangladesh underlies a governance calculus tipped in favor of political 
decentralisation, which acts as a vehicle for distributing patronage among vote banks (Hassan 
2007). Administrative decentralisation on the other hand has been compromised, as evidenced by 
the recent amendments to the UP and UZP Acts, which allow MPs undue control over decision-
making at these levels. The success of the LGSP project may even invite the negative attention of 
UZP politicians, as the block grants bypass this tier to be deposited directly into UP accounts. Despite 
UNDP's and the larger donor community's cognisance of these risks, the project has enjoyed, 
perhaps most importantly, widespread support from the UPs participating in the programme . 
WB and DFID's D&GG agendas in Bangladesh are similar in many ways, beginning with ambitious 
governance reform during the CTG and eventually subsiding in scope with the incumbent 
government. This can be interpreted as a positive step since many governance practitioners now 
warn against reform strategies advocating direct attacks on corruption when weak governance 
systems persist in a country. Caution is advised against launching anti-corruption agencies, enacting 
stricter laws, “frying big fish” or establishing whistle-blowing provisions (Johnston 2010). 
Rather, there should be a long-term vision for good governance, that starts with building social and 
political trust and earning basic credibility for the government, through delivering urgently 
30
needed basic services, public security and stability to its citizens. This will begin to create the 
foundation for more aggressive reforms. This strategy of prioritising and targeting a few areas for 
reform, even if suboptimal in the short term, is termed 'good enough governance' (Grindle 2007). 
The argument sits comfortably with the WB and DFID's current strategies, which seem to have 
reverted back to more technical, economic governance reforms, with restrained engagement with 
politicians and political processes. As mentioned before, in the face of Bangladesh's enormous 
challenges in political governance, this strategy can be approached with cautious optimism.
Conversely, the UNDP's comprehensive D&GG agenda, which carries a history of working with 
political actors, has also left little legacy in Bangladesh. Notable achievements have been made in 
its electoral reform and pushing through certain key legislation, but sustainability of such 
progressive reforms have been thwarted by the GoB's lack of ownership and political will. In this 
puzzling playground of Bangladesh, arguments advocating either 'good enough governance' or 
increased engagement with politics have both been tried and tested yielding modest results. The 
question then arises as to how much change can be affected by external actors vis-à-vis the 
domestic efforts of Bangladesh's own government and people. 
Does Bangladesh have its own D&GG agenda? The answer in theory of course is affirmative. From a 
national development perspective, the GOB's National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction 
(NSAPR II) situates social and economic progress within the context of broad governance reforms 
(GoB 2009). 
Yet no specific institutional or procedural framework exists to translate these reform priorities into 
action with linkages to the yearly budget. Nor is there an acknowledgement that confrontational 
politics and politicisation lie at the heart of governance reform. By all accounts, the NSAPR is an 
executive-driven process with negligible involvement of parliament (Mahmud 2006). 
The two largest political parties however, have not been silent in outlining their own agenda for 
governance reform in election manifestoes. In 2001, the four-party coalition led by the Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP) took office with a two-thirds parliamentary majority based on a campaign 
that stressed good governance. However, progress on reforms was obstructed broadly due to two 
reasons. First, a few ministries pursued reforms led by technocrats but failed to rally political 
consensus around those reforms, leading to slow progress. Second, reforms aimed at preventing 
rent-seeking were heavily opposed due to the bureaucracy's increasing politicisation. 
Many civil servants focused on collecting rents to cover their incurred debts from securing their 
positions and lobbying costs (senior posts were rumored to have sold for up to Tk. 8 lakhs and 
ministerial positions for 10 times that amount) (Wescott et al 2007). Similar to the donors, the 
government discounted the impact of the entrenched politicisation within the country's 
institutions that eventually thwarted reform efforts. 
More recently, the election manifestos for the last elections from both the BNP and the Awami 
League (AL) outline surprisingly similar D&GG agendas. Both advocate strengthening parliamentary 
2.5 The Government of Bangladesh's vision of D&GG 
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democracy, separation of the judiciary from the executive, the establishment of an independent 
Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) and an Ombudsman (AL &BNP election manifestoes 2008). 
Some such promises have materialised, starting with successive governments demonstrating a fair 
amount of political will in holding transparent and credible elections at the national and local 
levels. The incumbent government has amended the Representation of the People's Order (RPO) to 
ensure objective criteria in determining participation in elections to public offices; make public 
disclosure of wealth statements of electoral candidates mandatory; and to strengthen the Election 
Commission. Parliamentary standing committees were formed in parliament's first session with 
opposition party members chairing two such committees. The separation of the judiciary from the 
executive has also been completed (Hasan et al 2011).
However, judging from the regressive reforms afflicting several key accountability processes and 
institutions over the past year, the GoB's genuine commitment to its own agenda appears doubtful. 
Politics remains deeply confrontational; the ACC has been termed a “toothless tiger” by its own 
Chairman; ample opportunity persists for the Executive to interfere in the judiciary, with the latter 
remaining highly politicised, and an Ombudsman yet to be appointed (Hossain 2011; Liton 2011). 
Even local government, as the designated vehicle for building grassroots democracy and delivering 
basic services to people, is overshadowed by political expediency. Since it is politically too risky for 
the central government to cede much power and authority to urban and rural centers, especially to 
opposition members, the perpetual hoarding of political authority in Dhaka prevails. 
Parliament, as the central institution of democracy to hold the executive accountable, needs special 
mention here. Aside from parliament's well-known weaknesses in its legislative and budget 
making roles along with other structural constraints inhibiting its performance, there have been 
some positive changes. Committee meetings and their reports are now more regular, the number 
of bills passed per session and per year has increased with parliamentarians showing more activism 
in submitting questions and motions (Jahan and Amundsen 2012). 
An interesting and significant development has been the influx of businessmen into Bangladeshi 
politics. The number has increased from 30 percent in the 1970s to 56 percent in the current year, 
earning the parliament the moniker of a 'rich man's club' (CMI Brief 2012). This has important 
implications for the policy-making process, since a parliament dominated by businessmen would 
try to enact or obstruct laws to protect their sources of legal or illegal income, and gain preferential 
access to government contracts. 
On the other hand, this new breed of lawmakers could collectively promote the business sector's 
interests by prioritising better infrastructure, power supply and port facilities. However the latter 
motive will only override the former if the conflict of interest between law-making and pursuit of 
personal business is regulated through legal safeguards, which are currently weak (Mahmud et al  
2009). 
Parliamentarians are inclined to prioritise development work over their legislative and oversight 
role. They become lobbyists for procuring projects for their respective constituencies, which 
ultimately becomes the vehicle to distribute patronage, build personal and party support and 
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indulge in corruption. Although the local communities eventually benefit from these projects, the 
scale of leakage and wastage in public resources is undeniably enormous. This phenomenon 
partially illustrates the 'Bangladesh paradox' of economic and social progress going hand-in-hand 
with political corruption and instability. The convergence of public welfare and political incentives 
thus proves half-hearted. 
It would not be an overstatement to mention that much of the progressive reform efforts seen 
recently are spillover effects from the CTG's rule and donor pressure. Furthermore, free and fair 
elections as the most basic element of democracy are now jeopardised by the CTG system's 
annulment (The Daily Star 2012d). In the face of these developments the proposition that donors 
compel us to hold free and fair elections, in lieu of the GoB's own precarious commitment, becomes 
more credible. A former mayor of Chittagong commented “in the long run, we are hostages to 
democracy…we're poor and need aid and so are required to hold elections” (Kaplan 2010). 
This cynicism is not entirely unwarranted. Bangladesh is at an interesting stage in its development, 
where it is neither foreign aid dependent nor completely extricated from its need. This reality has 
come to dominate the landscape of GoB  donor relations. In the public realm, the GoB oscillates 
from an image of complete authority over its development priorities to one of compromise and 
partnership with donors. 
For example, in early 2011 the WB decided to withhold $500 million in budget support, primarily 
due to the GOB's slow progress in anti-corruption reforms. In response, the Prime Minister asked tax 
officials to step up their revenue collection efforts so that “the government can reduce interference 
of development partners into its day to day affair” (The Daily Star 2011a). The Finance Minister on 
the other hand, downplayed the significance of this loss of funds, claiming there was nothing out of 
the ordinary with it. A few months later however, he placed a request for additional budget 
support from the WB (The Daily Star 2011b). 
WB Funds for the Padma Bridge construction amounting to $1.2 billion, were cancelled on 
corruption allegations in the construction process (Byron 2012). The Finance Minister called the 
corruption allegations 'frivolous', but admitted that domestic resources could not compensate for 
WB financing.  
Funding initiatives such as the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) for which the Prime Minister 
recently sought assistance, are also disbursed only in countries with a pre-defined level of good 
governance (The Daily Star 2012b). These developments reveal that good governance is 
increasingly becoming the donor community's new conditionality, with the GoB struggling to 
respond and navigate through this new terrain.
Moreover, donors, do not always speak unanimously nor act in a coordinated manner in their 
respective strategies to roll out Bangladesh's D&GG reforms. For example, different DFID, UNDP 
and ADB civil service reform programmes with the government, are running in parallel, while WB, 
ADB and CIDA PFM reforms also proceed separately (Wood and Landell-Mills 2010). 
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In addition, smaller, bilateral donors such as Denmark and EC adopt confrontational stances with 
the GoB while other larger donors such as WB, DFID and Netherlands take a collaborative approach 
(Mathisen 2007). The Local Consultative Group (LCG) on governance, which is a platform for 
coordination and dialogue between the GoB and donors on aid-sponsored D&GG reforms in the 
country, are not very productive. They meet infrequently and have poor representation from, and 
access to, the highest levels of government (Green and Curtis 2005; Wood and Landell-Mills 2008; 
Mathisen 2007; NRP 2010; ERD 2011). 
These issues coupled allow the GoB to pay lip service to serious changes. A consistent GoB feature 
is to project a progressive image of itself globally while regressing on reforms  domestically. One 
glaring instance is the GoB enacting key laws or establishing key institutions to conform/comply 
with international standards, while in reality thwarting or deferring their implementation and 
consolidation. 
This holds true for the Right to Information (RTI) law, decentralisation acts, the PPA, the ACC and 
the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). In reality, a serious, practical and nationally-driven 
agenda striking at the very heart of Bangladesh's governance problems, is egregiously absent. If an 
homegrown indigenous agenda proves half-hearted, it opens up opportunities for the donor 
community to spearhead one for the country.
The global D&GG agenda has found increasing relevance in weak institutional environments like 
Bangladesh. While the donor community has demonstrated its closer attention to the role of 
politics in governance reform in Bangladesh, this has mostly been an academic exercise. Some 
programme and project designs have been influenced with the new thinking, but the mainstream 
operational agenda still remains unable to make a dent on the status quo. 
This is largely the case for two reasons. First, some donors are restrained by their institutional 
mandate to engage heavily in political matters. Second, a contextual analysis of Bangladesh reveals 
that the GoB has fledging ownership of D&GG reforms that are sponsored by donors. Previous 
donor experiences with aggressive anti-corruption interventions and involvement with political 
processes have not been beneficial or pleasant. 
Consequently the response, in the case of WB and DFID, has been to move back to promoting 'good 
enough governance', which implements targeted but largely depoliticised reforms. The projects 
work largely with the executive branch of government, consolidating its existing power vis-à-vis 
the other branches of government. The UNDP on the other hand, has retained its focus on an all-
encompassing agenda continuing to cautiously engage with political actors, albeit with a less than 
inspiring track record. There is also a rising trend in funding civil society movements to inspire a 
homegrown, bottom-up change process.
Bangladesh thus serves as a D&GG laboratory where multiple approaches to governance reforms 
are being experimented, much of which is still without conclusive evidence of success. The absence 
of the GoB's own national vision of D&GG has created a vacuum in which the donor community 
articulate its priorities more vocally. The GoB is at the receiving end of the donors' agenda, now 
struggling to navigate a new type of aid conditionality - D&GG.
2.6 Conclusion
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However the nascent entry of new bilateral actors onto Bangladesh's aid landscape, for whom 
D&GG does not assume importance, such as China, India and Malaysia, are also challenging 
traditional aid arrangements. Furthermore, the GoB is attempting to work with donors whose 
development priorities are more closely aligned with it (Tusher 2010). But it is naive to believe that 
D&GG in principle is not a priority for Bangladesh's people. Even if the GoB desists from answering 
to the donor community, it will ultimately have to answer to its own people. 
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3.1 Introduction
Burdened with the twin tasks of building democratic institutions and addressing pressing concerns 
of poverty and underdevelopment, the public management system in Bangladesh has been 
overstretched and expected to deliver development outcomes far beyond its capacity. Realising this 
challenge quite early, the state has redefined its frontiers, especially in the delivery of services, by 
creating space for other entities like Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the private 
sector. It has also allowed the international Development Partners (DPs) to play important roles in 
certain sectors, such as health and education. 
In addition to being important goals, strong education and health systems are vital to economic 
growth and prosperity (Sen 1999). Furthermore, the paradoxical relationship between ineffective 
governance and the impressive gains in Bangladesh's social development (e.g. health and 
education) indicators have been well documented. This has further highlighted the importance of 
these social sectors. 
This chapter focuses on the Health and Education sectors, assessing the external stakeholders' 
influence in the policy-making process; the role of various domestic stakeholders, including 
politicians, bureaucrats, professional practitioners, NGOs amd civil society in policy making; 
challenges to public sector governance; and impacts on public service delivery as a result of policy 
influence by different stakeholders. The remainder of the chapter discusses each sector separately. 
While this chapter analyses the governance-related reasons for weak policy ownership and 
subsequent implications for DP interventions and service delivery, it does not claim to provide an 
exhaustive assessment of governance problems in the sectors.
The rationale for selecting the Health and Education sectors includes: 
i) Historically, external influence/ engagement in these sectors has been relatively more visible. 
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ii) Efficiency, effectiveness and equity in delivering these services are critical to overall human, 
social and economic development according to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP),  
the Five Year Plans of the country and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
iii) The government bears the responsibility for providing basic health and education services to 
the people. 
The Health sector analysis is based on: 
i) review of published literature; 
ii) background study undertaken by Institute of Governance Studies (IGS) on the health policy 
formulation process for the report, Bangladesh Health Watch Report 2009: How Healthy is Health 
Sector Governance?, involving interviews with sector specialists; and
iii)  interviews of academics and various members of the health policy formulation committees formed 
during the regimes of the last caretaker government (CTG) and the current government.
The Education sector analysis is based on:
i) secondary literature review;
ii) interviews with sector specialists, primary education executives and former consultants to the DPs; 
and,
iii) visits to primary schools. 
There is widespread perception that conditionality clauses tied to international aid packages   
often reflect an apparent lack of understanding of local realities and the state's implementing 
capacities. Critics have argued that, “aid has held back Bangladesh's development by disem 
powering the country's policymakers because they were subservient to external policy 
prescriptions” (Lewis 2011, p.39). However, this section puts forward the argument that the state's 
weak capacity in policy-making itself created the space for DPs to influence health policies in the 
first place. 
The section begins with a general overview of the health sector. Secondly, it examines how DP-
initiated health sector reforms have not always improved effectiveness and efficiency of service 
delivery. This is demonstrated with the examples of two DP-backed policies which the government 
tried to implement. Thirdly, it identifies the important stakeholders and their politics in the 
National Health Policy making process, showing that their lack of consensus and the frequent policy 
revisions have eroded policy ownership and disrupted service delivery. Fourthly, it presents selected 
challenges in governance that has weakened policy ownership at the national level. Lastly, the 
section proposes some recommendations for improving governance. 
3.2 Methodology 
3.3 Health sector
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3.3.1  Health sector overview 
i. National health goals
ii. Health service provision
iii. Health programmes supported by DPs
The budget for DP supported health programmes
According to the Constitution of Bangladesh, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) is obligated to 
ensure provision of the basic necessities of life, including medical care, to its citizens [Article 15(a)]; and 
to raise the level of nutrition and improve public health [Article 18(1)]. These provisions have 
positioned health as a basic human right, and these broader constitutional goals are supported by 
national strategy and planning documents, such as the Five Year Plans, the PRSPs and the Vision 2021.
The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) is responsible for ensuring basic health care. It 
provides health, nutrition and population services while also coordinating and regulating the 
services of NGOs and private sector providers. Its management structure follows the general 
administrative setting of Bangladesh. MoHFW, which is also responsible for public health policy 
planning, monitoring, budget reform management and decision making at macro-level, is divided 
into the two general directorates of Health Services and Family Planning (FP), each managing 
different types of health facilities at administrative levels. 
Foreign assistance has played an important role in initiating and financing many key reforms in 
Bangladesh's health sector. In absence of an agreed national health policy, public health sector 
initiatives have been guided by DP supported programmes.
A key transition occurred in 1998, when DPs introduced a programme-based approach (PBA) to the 
sector, thus replacing its earlier fragmented, project-driven health sector activities. Programmes 
that have been in place since then are the Health and Population Sector Programme (HPSP); Health, 
Nutrition and Population Sector Programme (HNPSP); and, Health, Population and Nutrition Sector 
Development Programme (HPNSDP). 
From 1971 to 30th June 2009, cumulative disbursement of foreign aid funds for the sector stood at 
US$2,965 million (Choudhury 2010, p. 53). Table 4 shows that DPs funded about one-third of the 
HNPSP, the recently closed health programme. The estimated share of DP contribution to HPNSDP, 
the current health programme, has fallen to 23%, while GoB contribution has risen significantly, 
indicating GoB's growing ability to finance its health programme (MoHFW/GoB n.d.). 
Table 4
Government Contribution US $ 2.2 billion (76%) US $ 2.7 billion (63%) US $ 5.9  billion (77%)
DP Contribution US $ 0.7 billion (24%) US $1.3 billion (31%) US $ 1.8 billion (23%)
Total Budget Estimate  US $ 2.9 billion US $ 4.3 billion US $ 7.7 billion
Source:  GoB 2011; Vaillancourt 2009; MoHFW/GoB n.d.
Cost Bearer HPSP (1998-2003) HNPSP (2005-2011) HPNSDP (2011-2016)
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iv. Health financing
v. Achievements and challenges
3.3.2 External influence in policy making
i. Nature of external involvement
According to the World Bank (WB) (World Development Indicators Online), Total Health 
Expenditure (THE) in Bangladesh in 2010 was estimated at US$3.4 billion or 3.5% of its GDP, 
increasing from 2.7% in 1997. Per capita spending on health was US$23, one of the lowest in 
South Asia. Households are the largest source of healthcare financing, comprising 64.6% of THE 
in 2007, which is financed mostly through out-of-pocket payments. GoB is the second largest 
financing agent at 21.2%, considerably lower than 36%in 1997. DPs financed 12.2% of THE, of 
which 56.1% went to MoHFW and 43.9% to NGOs. The remaining 1.9% of THE was funded 
mostly by private firms (WB 2010d, p.27). 
Bangladesh has made significant strides in the health sector since the 1970s, attributed to the 
persistent, long term government commitment to sectoral goals, the work of countless NGOs and 
the private sector, and partnership with DPs over several decades. Life expectancy has increased 
from 45 years in the early 1970s to over 65 years (Bangladesh Health Watch [BHW] 2012). The infant 
mortality rate has decreased from 92 per 1,000 live births in 1990, to 39 in 2009, while the maternal 
mortality ratio has declined from 574 per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 194 in 2010 (Government of 
Bangladesh [GoB] 2012). After stabilising in the 1990s, the total fertility rate (TFR) is again declining 
(WB  2010d). 
However, formidable challenges remain. Only one-fifth of deliveries is assisted by skilled birth 
attendants and nearly half of the children aged between 6 months and 5 years of age are 
chronically malnourished. Significant rural-urban divides also exist in healthcare service 
provision, with the majority of qualified providers located in urban areas (BHW 2010). 
Furthermore, those seeking medical assistance end up paying 60% of the total expenses as out-
of-pocket-payments (OOP), when globally, OOP accounts for 19% of the total health 
expenditures. Bangladesh also has one of the highest rates of catastrophic illnesses in the world, 
pushing about 3.8% of the county's population or 5.7 million into poverty every year (ibid). 
This section provides a brief description of the nature and history of external engagement in the 
health sector, followed by an assessment of the impact and experience of implementing two major 
DP supported reform policies:  (1) unification of the previously separate health and FP wings in the 
MOHFW; and (2) introduction of Community Clinics (CCs). These policies' stated intentions were to 
promote efficiency and better governance. However, the pursuit of a DP driven health sector 
agenda, without adequate national commitment and understanding of the local context, actually 
eroded the continuity and effectiveness of service delivery.
External influence in Bangladesh's health policy environment has come about in two notable ways. 
First, major health sector goals and policy directions have been determined largely by various 
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international agreements and commitments taken on by GoB, e.g. the Alma Ata Declaration in 
1978 underlined the importance of primary health care as the key to achieving the goal of “Health 
for All”; and, the UN's MDGs (Osman 2004). Second, external influence is evidenced in the form of 
direct interventions by DPs, who have co-financed sectoral programmes and projects and initiated 
reforms since the 1970s.
While actual policy content is influenced by DPs or global commitments, external influence in the 
National Health Policy (NHP) formulation process has been limited to providing feedback on the 
draft policy. A member of the 2008 policy formulation committee observed that there was a sense 
among DPs that the policy document was more an inspirational document and that their primary 
concerns lay with the continuity of their own programmes and funding requirements (BHW  2010).
DP activity in the health sector began in the 1970s, when Bangladesh faced severe resource 
shortage, and the GoB began encouraging assistance in the country's development process. In the 
early years, DPs were primarily involved in FP programmes aimed at taming the high population 
growth (Buse 1999). By the 1980s, most DPs had broadened their engagement to encompass health 
related activities, particularly maternal and child health care (Robinson 1999). By the late 1980s, DPs 
realised that the core constraint with the economic development process was the public sector 
itself. Despite DPs' large fund transfers, there seemed to be little political commitment to address 
key reform issues. In a major shift in strategy, DPs began to concentrate on specific sector-type 
adjustment operations with clearer, quantifiable targets (Buse 1999). In the 1990s, as public sector 
governance became a part of the global development agenda, the DP portfolio reflected global 
concern for health sector reforms that included human resource planning, institutional 
reorganisation, and resource allocation vis-a-vis evidence based analysis. Despite the GoB's 
growing capacity to generate revenues in recent years, sector reforms and policy continue to be 
influenced by DPs.
Healthcare reform in Bangladesh started with the formulation of the country's first Health and 
Population Sector Strategy (HPSS) in 1997 (Osman 2004).The first sector programme, Health and 
Population Sector Programme (HPSP), prepared in line with the HPSS, was undertaken in 1998 by 
the Awami League (AL) government. Both the HPSS and HPSP were heavily influenced by the DPs 
(Sundewall 2006). 
HPSP marked a shift from the multiple project approach to a single sector programme known as the 
Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp). It called for programme financing from a common pool of funds 
provided by both the GoB and DPs and aimed to strengthen national ownership of the health sector 
agenda. This DP-induced shift was a dramatic change for the country's health sector. Since its 
introduction, the SWAp has gained increased popularity among DPs as a preferred model of 
cooperation (ibid).
ii. A history of DP engagement
iii. Health sector reform
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a) Integration of health and FP wings–two key policy changes
b) Introduction of CCs
iv. Resistance to reform
Two salient reform features, introduced by the HPSP, are discussed below:  
In 1995, a mid-term review of the Fourth Population and Health Project (FPHP), which was in 
operation at the time, raised concerns regarding the slow progress in reducing maternal mortality 
and morbidity. The MoHFW was structured into two general directorates: Health Services (DGHS) 
and Family Planning (DGFP), with services provided by separate cadres of civil servants. MoHFW 
identified the separate health and FP directorates as the primary constraint to its capability to 
increase the quality, range, resources and effectiveness of service delivery. Maintaining two 
separate institutions was also leading to duplication and rivalry between the Health and FP cadres 
(Martinez 2008). 
Based on the FPHP review and suggestions made by DPs, the GoB decided to unify the two wings in 
stages, a move supported by the HPSS and the HPSP (Sundewall 2006). The intended benefits from 
unification included reduced project duplication; reduced wastage and administrative cost; 
improved monitoring; and joint planning and budgeting between DGHS and DGFP. By early 2000, 
the two wings were unified at the upazila level and below.
CCs were expected to improve the efficiency of health service delivery at the end-user level. The 
health system at the village level prior to the HPSP included domiciliary services provided by FP 
workers, and both health and FP services provided at satellite clinics during scheduled sessions. The 
service delivery system at the grassroots level was costly, labour-intensive, and offered only a 
limited range of services. CCs were expected to replace outreach services with more cost-effective, 
extensive health and FP services at one location. The idea was to build one clinic for every 6,000 
people at the village/ ward level, to be operated jointly by the GoB and the local community 
(Normand 2002). CCs would provide a range of essential health services free of charge, bringing FP, 
preventive health and limited curative services closer to the people. Out of a targeted 13,500 clinics, 
11,159 were built between 1999-2001.
From the outset, there was little ownership and acceptance of the two policies by some key 
stakeholders. Implementation efforts were unsuccessful, for both political and non-political reasons. 
The unification process of the two wings was met with severe resistance from within the MoHFW, 
particularly from the FP wing. Contentious points included (Sundewall 2006; Osman 2004; BHW 2010): 
a) FP officials refusing to suddenly become accountable to health officials, thereby diminishing 
their own authority over FP services.
b) The differing choice of birth control products preferred by the two wings, with FP programmes 
promoting oral contraception but the health wing emphasising clinical contraception.
c) Disagreement stemming over the control of cash flow within the FP sector intended for various 
FP incentive schemes, which created opportunities in skimming money. 
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Thus, while DPs pushed for implementation, MoHFW struggled to overcome its own internal 
resistance. Interviews revealed that the FP officers' deteriorating morale disrupted FP service 
delivery, which in turn led to a stagnation of TFR during this period.
The case for CCs proved no different. Due to major opposition from various interest groups, CCs' 
intended benefits never fully materialised. Interviews with sector specialists provided various 
reasons as to why CCs did not function well (BHW 2010):
a) The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the main political party in opposition to the Awami 
League (AL), complained that CCs were introduced with a motive to distribute AL's political 
influence.
b) A concern was that CCs would further enhance doctors' role and influence, when it was critical 
to increase the supply and capacity of other important service providers in the health system, 
such as nurses, medical technicians and administrators, among others.
c) The wisdom of investing in village-level clinics was questioned, since health centre at the upper 
tier of union levels were not fully functioning.
d) CCs threatened to limit door-to-door service provision and GoB's contact with people.
e) Actual service delivery was hampered in many CCs due to shortage of medical supplies and 
equipment and absence of staff.
f) Actual use of CCs by local people was low in some rural areas, since many women were reluctant 
to step out of their homes to visit the clinics.
The unification process and CCs were abruptly discontinued with the change of government in 
2001, when BNP won the general election. The BNP government reversed the implementation 
process without any consultation with the DPs. In addition to the implementation constraints listed 
earlier, there was strong political opposition against HPSP, which was viewed as a “product agreed 
upon only between DPs and the AL Prime Minister at the time” (Sundewall 2006, p.3). 
On top of the enormous suffering brought to healthcare recipients, policy reversal held serious 
implications for co-operation between the GoB and DPs, given that unification and CCs were two 
major conditions of DP support for HPSP (Sundewall 2006). DPs were taken by surprise at the 
sudden reversal of decisions and immediately raised their concerns. Their main objection was that 
the decisions had been taken without consulting them, and that the GoB lacked a clear basis for 
reversal (ibid). Consequently, there was a deadlock in dialogues between the DPs and GoB in 2003 
and a temporary suspension of funds by certain DPs, including the WB, causing a 20% drop in the 
2004/05 development budget, between the close of HPSP and initial disbursement under the next 
programme (WB 2010d). 
The DPs promised to resume the credit as soon as the GoB presented an alternative reform agenda. 
The interim arrangement was to implement projects on an ad hoc basis, to fulfill essential sector 
needs with funding from the unspent HPSP balance (BHW  2010).
The DP community was itself in disagreement regarding what the next steps should be leading to 
incoherence in their dialogue with GoB. While some thought that tough action should be taken 
v. Impact of policy reversal
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against the government, others were more concerned about restoring the decline in confidence of 
DPs on the GoB. After almost three months, the credit suspension was lifted and confidence 
between the two parties was somewhat restored, when the MoHFW presented a comprehensive 
plan to carry forward reforms in order to achieve some of HPSP's main objectives (Sundewall 2006). 
However, the Ministry remained firm in its decision not to continue the two policies. 
The 2008 election was won by AL, which once again took up the initiative to resume CC services. The 
new DP-backed programme, HPNSDP, launched for the period 2011-2016, again supports the 
government-initiated policy to introduce health and FP services in 18,000 facilities (GoB 2011). In 
addition to repairing the 10,723 clinics that had been established earlier, a new set of 2,876 CCs is 
planned for construction (ibid, p.26). CCs will be staffed with three different service providers the 
Health Assistant and the Family Welfare Assistant, posts which existed when CCs were first 
introduced, as well as the new post of a Community Healthcare Provider (CHCP) that has been 
created to strengthen service delivery and generate employment. The recruitment of CHCPs is 
1under a separate project  implemented outside of HPNSDP, with a budget financed by both the 
GoB and DPs. According to a MoHFW official, 13,000 CHCPs have been newly recruited and trained. 
It is envisioned that over time the domiciliary services will be replaced by fixed site services, 
although mobile healthcare will remain where necessary. Whether CCs can attain greater success 
this time around remains to be seen. 
DPs have repeatedly identified the critical need for governments to strengthen ownership of their 
development policies as well as the need for greater inter donor coordination (Choudhury 2010; 
Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 2008).However, DPs have continued to support policies 
even in the absence of strong political commitments at the national level. This has led to whimsical 
policy revisions to the detriment of the people, especially the poor (Martinez 2008). 
Bangladesh's health policy agenda has been driven largely by DPs, due to the lack of domestic 
consensus over the NHP. Attempts were undertaken to adopt an acceptable NHP in 1990, 2000, 
2006, 2008 and 2011, based on constitutional obligations, global commitments and the needs of 
grassroots end users. To date, only the NHP 2000 and 2011 were formally approved. The policy 
approval process has invariably constituted a major political challenge, involving protracted 
controversies and debates that became an integral part of bitter traditions of bipartisan politics of 
Bangladesh. Conflicts of interest, among and within powerful interest groups have resulted in 
delaying, revising and blocking the NHP formulation process and its implementation (BHW 2010). 
Frequent policy revisions have disrupted the delivery system, indicating GoB's poor stewardship 
role in providing clear policy directions with pragmatic and sustainable strategies.
This section focuses on various attempts at revising the NHP to show how principal stakeholders - 
bureaucrats, politicians, medical professionals and civil society - have captured the policy making 
process to further their own vested interests. This section accordingly analyses the role of these 
vi. Recent developments
3.3.3 Politics, players and policy making
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stakeholders, the manner in which they wielded their power, the nature of politics and the 
mechanisms of their participation. 
In 2000, almost three decades after independence, Bangladesh approved its first NHP, formulated 
32by the AL government  (Osman 2004) . NHP 2000 was prepared in support of the HPSP, (which was 
also prepared by the AL government) and incorporated DP-initiated reforms that included the 
following: 
a) managing health and FP activities through SWAp
b) introducing CCs
c) unifying the health and FP wings of MoHFW.
However, NHP 2000 was never fully implemented and subsequent governments either revised or 
abandoned various parts of the policy. In 2001, after the change of government, the BNP regime 
reversed the integration process and discontinued CCs. The following shows the stand taken by 
4various stakeholders toward the reversal of NHP 2000 :
Bureaucrats - In the BNP regime's early years, the bureaucracy held considerable sway over NHP 
2000's implementation. Ministry officials, involved in the planning and implementation of HPSP 
and NHP 2000, during the 1996-2001 AL regime, were replaced by officials aligned with the BNP. 
They believed that integration marginalised the health sector's FP segment, when it was critical to 
uphold their responsibilities and independence. Successive health secretaries in the BNP 
administration were either explicitly against or passive to programme implementation, resulting in 
weak bureaucratic leadership within the ministry. 
Politicians - Partial rejection of NHP 2000 can be attributed to the general culture of 
confrontational politics and intolerance, rather than any substantive ideological difference 
between the political parties. Ruling BNP leaders were firm in disowning NHP 2000 simply because 
it was formulated by the preceding AL government. 
Medical professionals - The medical profession, represented by the Bangladesh Medical 
Association (BMA), favoured implementation of NHP 2000. There were two other major medical 
professional associations, which were aligned with each political party  the Doctors' Association of 
Bangladesh (DAB), which supported BNP, and the Shawdhinata Chikitshak Parishad (SCP), which 
supported AL. 
Despite the fractious nature of health politics, BMA, DAB and SCP commonly stood to benefit from 
integration and the establishment of CCs, as both enhanced the role of doctors in health sector 
development. Their support was reflected in a policy document prepared in 2004 by BMA, which 
later influenced the preparation of NHP 2006. However, the politicians and bureaucrats, who 
dominated the policy formulation process at the time, overrode their interest. 
i. National Health Policy (NHP) 2000
2 The first NHP prepared during General Ershad's military regime in 1990 was not approved.
3 Before 2000, health sector guidance came from the Five Year Plans. 
4 Adapted from Osman (2004) and Bangladesh Health Watch (2010)
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ii. National Health Policy (NHP) 20065
Given the BNP government's fallout with DPs over the HPSP implementation, and the ongoing 
preparation for HNPSP, NHP 2000 was no longer a relevant policy document. At the initiative of 
MoHFW, in July 2003, a 58-member core NHP formulation committee was formed to redraft the 
health policy. In August 2006, three years after the revision process started, the Ministry approved 
the draft policy, but it never reached the cabinet level for approval. Because of the upcoming 
general elections, the government had other priorities, and the draft fell by the wayside.
The little ideological difference between the BNP and AL governments was reflected in the similar 
policy proposals within the two respective documents. In terms of policy directions, NHP 2000 was 
more generic than the NHP 2006 draft, but variations between the two regarding major policy 
issues were quite negligible, such as the continuation of SWAp. Ironically, NHP 2006 contained the 
very policies that the BNP government had previously rejected - it proposed unification of the 
health and FP wings as a key health sector target and contained similar provisions for establishing 
CCs. Without mentioning “community clinics” and facilities “for every 6,000 people”, NHP 2006 
proposed the establishment of ward level “first contact centers”, which would serve the same 
purpose as CCs (BHW 2010). This highlighted a major contradiction between the BNP government's 
policy proposal and its practice, given that the government had earlier abandoned the very same 
policies it later recommended. 
Stakeholder participation in the NHP 2006 preparation included:
Politicians - BNP politicians were committed to reversing NHP 2000,which led to the redrafting of 
the health policy. Eventually, NHP 2006 was not approved because, according to a bureaucrat, 
health policy formulation had ceased to be a political priority.
Medical profession - The NHP 2006 formulation process was strongly influenced by the medical 
profession, which grew in influence in the latter half of the BNP regime. According to various 
former bureaucrats and doctors interviewed, the BNP-backed DAB emerged as a powerful body 
influencing important Ministry decisions and holding pervasive partisan control over 
appointments, transfers and promotions within the MoHFW. NHP 2006 drew heavily from BMA's 
2004 policy document. Moreover, both documents were prepared by a common group of BMA 
representatives. 
Bureaucrats - By the second half of the BNP regime, when the policy revision exercise started, the 
influence of bureaucrats in the policy making process had declined considerably. They were no 
longer as active during the 2006 process, as they had been with the preparation as well as the 
reversal of NHP 2000. 
Civil society - The 1990s witnessed the gradual emergence of a civil society movement in 
Bangladesh, but their influence was not evident in the NHP 2006 formulation process. The steering 
committee for NHP 2006 included some NGO representation, such as Gonoshasthya Kendra and 
Heart Foundation, but their role was limited. 
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iii. National Health Policy (NHP) 2008
iv. National Health Policy (NHP)  2011
6
An interim CTG installed in 2007 with the mandate to hold parliamentary elections decided to 
update NHP 2000, late into its administration. The policy formulation process began in August 
2008, with a draft prepared in October 2008. Explaining the necessity for the update, a member of 
the policy formulation process stated that since NHP 2000, significant contextual changes had 
taken place that needed to be incorporated in the policy. The main features of NHP 2008 was the 
continuity of certain elements of NHP 2000, with some new additions such as climate change 
related health risks and mitigation measures, medical waste management and a stewardship role 
for the government. 
The NHP 2008 formulation committee aimed at securing policy acceptance by all groups so that 
implementation could continue regardless of which political party formed the future government. 
It therefore, excluded controversial issues, such as the merger of health and FP wings and CCs. It was 
decided that specific strategies could be dealt with at a later stage. However, since NHP 2008 was 
primarily prepared by bureaucrats, representing a nonparty interim government, the document 
did not carry much credibility with some of the other important stakeholders, and it was not placed 
for cabinet approval.
Stakeholder participation in the 2008 policy preparation included:
Bureaucrats -  This time the revision exercise was led and initiated by bureaucrats. 
Civil society -  For the first time, the civil society played an active role in NHP preparation. 
Workshops with NGO participation were held and the draft NHP was made accessible to the 
general people, facilitating deeper engagement by the civil society. 
Medical profession - BMA strongly rejected the draft, issuing press statements and holding 
consultations with various organisations to express their dissatisfaction. There was no BMA 
representation in the advisory committee although the acting president of BMA was included in 
the steering committee. BMA as an association was mainly concerned that it was not made a more 
integral part of the process and questioned the CTG's legitimacy in formulating a health policy. 
Politicians - Involvement of politicians aligned with the BNP and the AL in the formulation process 
appeared to be almost non-existent, due to the banning of all forms of overt political activities 
during the CTG regime.
The general election in 2008 once again brought AL to power with the pledge to update NHP 2000 
(Election Manifesto of Bangladesh Awami League 2008). Three years into the government's tenure 
and nine months after cabinet approval, a revised NHP was formally presented in the Parliament in 
May 2012 (BDNews24 2012). 
According to a MoHFW official, NHP 2011 formulation was considered the completion of a process 
that was started with the CTG, although the AL government had created a new formulation 
6 Adapted from Osman (2004) and Bangladesh Health Watch (2010)
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committee to prepare the NHP. Similar to NHP 2008, NHP 2011 was prepared with extensive 
stakeholder consultations at various stages, including district level workshops, consultations with 
related ministries, and online posting of draft for feedback. 
The policy once again included the revival of CCs. CCs has already started operating under HPNSDP, 
the new sector programme, and with the introduction of a new CHCP post, service delivery is 
slightly different from that originally envisioned in HPSP.
In another major development, the NHP recommended the introduction of a compulsory two-year 
internship for medical graduates, with a year spent in a rural facility, albeit in phases and subject to 
available resources. Executing this policy, however, will be a major challenge for the GoB.
Stakeholder participation in the formulation of NHP 2011 included: 
Bureaucrats -  The MoHFW bureaucrats led the policy formulation process. 
Medical professional - According to media reports, the main opposition to NHP 2011 came from 
BMA, particularly to the policy advocating compulsory rural internship of medical graduates 
(BDNews24 2012). BMA's opposition was overturned by the Prime Minister's personal insistence on 
this issue when the draft was placed for approval. However, due to hard and persistent bargaining 
by BMA, the policy was softened such that internships would be subject to available funding. 
Negotiation with BMA delayed the formal presentation of the document in the Parliament
Civil society - There was considerable effort to engage the civil society, who welcomed the new 
policy. Workshops held across the country, included representatives of various civil society groups, 
the media and the NGOs. Moreover, the general public was invited to provide feedback on the 
draft policy posted on the Ministry website.
Politicians -  Although members of the opposition were included in the larger national committee, 
they did not participate in the policy formulation process itself, nor provide any formal feedback. 
Since the policy was not debated in the Parliament, there was also no other scope for active 
engagement by the political parties in opposition.
What are the chances that NHP 2011 will be continued without interruption, should the next 
general elections bring the opposition political party to power? According to a ministry official, this 
time round there had been no substantial opposition to the introduction of CCs. However, past 
trends have shown that policy sustainability depends on the lifespan of the government that 
introduced it and therefore, the future of CCs may be uncertain yet. Whether the policy for 
compulsory internship of medical graduates can be implemented at all depends on the political will 
to overcome the strength of BMA. 
A former bureaucrat was of the opinion that the GoB, accepting its limitations in managing the 
health sector, has “played smartly” to allow DPs, as well as NGOs and the private sector to take the 
responsibility in areas where GoB lacks capacity, be it service delivery or stewardship and 
coordination of health programmes. Unfortunately, confrontational politics and anti-incumbency 
responses have dominated Bangladesh's health sector policy arena, an area where the GoB does 
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take responsibility. The GoB's leadership and commitment to policy and reform are vital for health 
sector development. However, frequent policy revisions have weakened ownership and the 
capacity for implementation and public service delivery. In the absence of a health policy endorsed 
by key stakeholders, the health sector is run without a consistent strategic direction and service 
delivery is subject to disruptions as the government changes. Unless these issues are addressed, 
reliance on DP guidance will continue in future health policy planning and implementation.
Good governance requires the commitment and capacity to formulate health policies and 
implement stated policy objectives, which has been traditionally missing in Bangladesh's health 
sector. Improving governance to ensure policy continuity and stronger ownership is a continued as 
yet, the most serious challenges for the health sector. This section identifies four major areas of 
misgovernance preventing the GoB from assuming a more dominant role in policy management; 
bringing greater consensus to strategy formulation, implementation and monitoring; and building 
capacity to improve service delivery. 
A highly centralised and bureaucratic public administrative system, where policy ownership is tied 
to a few senior cadres of civil servants with little accountability, has made it easy to revise policy and 
halt or restart the implementation, whenever a new government takes over (Buse 1999). According 
to academicians and former bureaucrats interviewed, DPs have increasingly engaged with very 
senior cadres of civil servants in matters of policy. This reflects the concentration of decision-making 
power among a few and the diminishing capacity at other levels of the bureaucracy. Planning 
capabilities of the bureaucracy are further affected by an excessive emphasis on project 
formulation and approval; and not enough on sector wide planning. An academician stated that 
the mindset of the present day bureaucracy is such that they do not want to negotiate with DPs and 
would rather accept plans and strategies prepared by them. Weaknesses in governance in the 
public administration can also be attributed to partisan political influence; nepotism; widespread 
corruption and, an unfavourable incentive system, among others (Kim and Mobasser 2008; Buse 
1999). 
The nascent nature of political institutions, absolute power of the ruling party, confrontational 
nature of politics, lack of political commitment and the absence of an environment of trust among 
political parties have impaired the quality of governance in health policy making. Policies are 
neither approved nor discussed in the Parliament, allowing the executive a predominant influence 
over the policy making process. Ownership over the development process varies according to the 
discretionary will of the political party in power. Moreover there is little effort made in developing 
matured, bi-partisan approaches to policy making. Thus, policies are never owned or accepted by 
the opposition political party.
3.3.4 Governance weaknesses affecting policy ownership
i. Public administration deficiencies 
ii. Lack of consistent political support
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iii. Absence of feedback mechanism
iv. Civil society as watchdog
3.3.5 Way forward
i. Political will 
Absence of an effective system for stakeholders and the community to ensure greater 
accountability from public officials has contributed to governance failings. The feedback 
mechanism is weakened by a top-down approach prevalent in public service delivery. Therefore, 
accessing a health service may depend on the local standing and connections of the service 
recipient.
A former bureaucrat observed that if service providers have any accountability at all, then it is to 
DPs financing health programmes. Currently, there is little the DPs can do to ensure accountability, 
other than carry out audits designed to capture leakages. At most they can penalise the 
government by withdrawing project funds or by seeking compensation for the misuse. The WB's 
temporary suspension of funds, following GoB's halting of policy implementation was one instance 
to hold GoB accountable. However, this did not ensure a return to DP supported policies. 
The civil society, represented by NGOs, academics, former civil servants, etc., is slowly emerging as a 
pressure group. However, health activism in Bangladesh has not fully matured because of the 
following reasons (Osman 2004): 
a) NGOs as a key constituent of civil society are mostly project based and less active in the macro 
policy level. 
b) Absence of a participatory political culture prevents NGOs from being a powerful aid to the 
policy. The government's policy reversal on integration was facilitated by the lack of public 
information on the 2006 policy process and on the shortfalls of HPSP. 
c) NGOs tend to consider themselves more as government's partner in development than its 
watchdog.
To achieve policy continuity, faster implementation, better institutional coordination, and 
ultimately more citizen-focused service delivery, the governance challenges discussed in the 
previous section need to be addressed. Although DPs have initiated sectoral reforms, 
unfortunately, there has not been substantive and systematic governance reform that was badly 
needed in the health sector. The way forward is not easy and will involve long-term, persistent 
effort by all stakeholders to improve the quality of governance, based on an understanding of the 
political context. Taking these into consideration, the chapter offers the following recommen-
dations to strengthen health sector governance:
To free the health policy formulation process from politics and vested interests will require strong 
political commitment to enforce necessary governance reforms. Important steps to create a common 
political will would include: (i) political leaders regularly and actively participating in health policy 
debate within and outside the parliament; (ii) developing understanding amongst political leaders of 
credible health indicators to demonstrate the extent of the problem; (iii) organising large scale focus 
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events to mobilise support for health related issues; and (iv) presenting clear, alternative solutions to 
the problem (Overseas Development Institute 2007; Kim and Mobasser 2008).
Building stakeholders' political consensus is critical for ensuring health policy continuity. Currently, 
there is little space for all stakeholders to get actively involved in policy dialogue. There are no 
parliamentary discussions over a proposed policy, making it easy for the political opposition to 
disown or revise health policy. What is needed is a concerted, ongoing effort for a joint stakeholder 
dialogue, with adequate representation from the political opposition, and an understanding of the 
division of labour among the different groups. The role of DPs and terms of external financing 
should be a key part of stakeholder discussion. 
It is important for citizens, social groups and media to hold public officials accountable for health 
service delivery. Collective action by civil society groups, which include service beneficiaries, and 
particularly the poor, might play the necessary role in offsetting the arbitrary actions of ruling parties 
and pressurising health service providers and policy makers to address their concerns and improve 
service delivery (BHW  2010).
Civil service reform, to create a more accountable, depoliticised administration, is urgently needed 
to improve health service delivery. Reform focus should include: (i) retaining institutional memory 
for better health sector planning, monitoring and coordinating; (ii) effective functioning of the 
sectoral regulatory bodies; and (iii) building motivation through performance based pay, 
promotions and posting. 
The GoB does not undertake regular health policy analysis, and therefore, there is little recognition 
or assessment of policy failure or success. The government's policy formulation typically involves 
outlining broad thematic areas, but not strategic planning. The GoB should establish a separate 
wing assigned for policy research to ensure that health policy formulation or revisions are based on 
technical evidence and to improve the quality of engagement between the DPs and GoB. In 
addition to establishing goals and targets, health policy planners should devise strategies and 
design institutional arrangements to manage interest group pressure e.g. creating alternative 
options to build a common ground, making strategic use of the media, creating coalitions, engaging 
the opposition in technical debate, etc.
DPs' development strategy in Bangladesh has not introduced sufficient political consideration in 
policy discourse. DPs should undertake regular political analyses to generate knowledge and 
provide a shared language and understanding of the impact of political and institutional context. 
As a routine practice before all major investment decisions are taken, this would improve aid 
effectiveness by highlighting risks of alternative strategies and investments, thereby helping set a 
realistic approach to implementing reforms (Ahmed 2008).
ii. Consensus building 
iii. Stronger civil society 
iv. Civil service reform 
V. Policy analysis 
vi. Role of DPs 
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3.4 Education sector
3.4.1 Sector overview
i. Primary education structure in Bangladesh
Providers of primary education in Bangladesh
This section looks into the education sector to examine the dynamics of external stakeholders' 
influences. To establish a sense of history and context of the sector, the analysis commences with a 
brief sector overview profiling the primary education structure, its national vision and achievements 
and challenges towards ensuring universal primary education for all children in Bangladesh. 
The section then proceeds to identify national players and explain the underlying politics involved 
in the education policy process. A detailed analysis of development partners' influence in the 
primary education policy process and the resultant implications then follow. We conclude the 
analysis with suggestions on how policy ownership can be ensured for a sustainable quality of 
primary education for every child in Bangladesh. 
The provision of primary education in Bangladesh is carried out through five years of schooling from 
class 1 to class 5, with the official schooling age for primary education being 6 - 11 years. There are 
78,685 schools in total, comprising ten types of formal primary schools and  madrasahs (GoB 2011a).
While the government assumes the fundamental responsibility for primary education, the 
educational needs of the marginalised are largely catered to by NGOs through the non-formal 
primary education (NFPE) (see Figure 3).
Figure 3
Source: Consortium for Research on Educational Access, Transitions and Equity (CREATE) 2011
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The Ministry of Primary and Mass Education (MoPME) and its attached Directorate of Primary 
Education (DPE), are responsible for four types of formal primary schools, while the Ministry of 
Education (MoE) oversees certain primary schools like ibtedaye madrasahs and primary schools 
attached to high schools. 
Other schools including kindergarten, and non-registered and non-government schools with large 
enrollment, operate outside the government institutional framework. The National Curriculum 
and Textbook Board, under the MoE, develops curriculum and produces textbooks for primary 
education (Asian Development Bank [ADB] 2008). However, according to a well known expert on 
the subject, this parallel operation of two ministries without any effective mechanism for 
coordination has had a considerably adverse impact on the administration and management of 
primary education in Bangladesh. 
The founding Constitution of Bangladesh of 1972 envisioned the provision of free and compulsory 
primary education for all eligible children [Article 17 (a) (b) (c)]. In order to reflect the constitutional 
aspiration and thus open up primary education for the masses, a number of acts and executive 
orders were passed by successive governments. 
In addition, some international goals have also had an impact in defining the vision and setting 
agendas for ensuring universal primary education for all children in Bangladesh. For instance, the 
international goals set at the World Education Forum (WEF)'s Education for All (EFA) conferences 
held in Jomtien in 1990, in Dakar in 2000 and at the United Nations (UN) millennium gathering in 
New York in 2000, were reflected in national plans of GoB. 
Bangladesh has achieved significant progress in primary school enrollment, including gender 
parity. The country has already met the Dakar and the MDG targets of achieving gender parity by 
2005 (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation [UNESCO] 2009). Female 
students enrolled in primary education institutions made up about half of the total students in 2005 
compared to around 35% in the early 1980s (WB 2008). 
The number of children enrolled practically doubled from about 8.9 million to over 16 million 
between 1985 and 2005 (see Figure 4). The average rate of enrollment increase was 1.4 % per year 
between 1998 (77%) and 2005 (86.8%). Thereafter, the net enrollment slightly fell to 86.4 % in 
2008 and remained stagnant (Ahmed and Haque 2011); a fall attributed to the decline in the 
primary school age population between 2000 and 2005. Significantly, the proportion of out of 
school children declined from 23% in 1998 to 13.6% in 2008. One striking achievement of the sector 
concerns the elimination of the gender gap in primary education enrollment. 
ii. The vision for primary education 
iii. Major achievements and challenges in primary education
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Figure 4
      Source: WB 2008
Despite these relative success stories, the primary education sector's overall performance was 
compromised by poor education quality and high drop-out rates. These setbacks are especially 
acute among children of poor families (ibid). Additionally, poor retention rates, widening social 
inequities and a weak human and financial resource base for primary education development 
highlight systemic and institutional gaps, highlighting disconcerting faultlines that threaten to 
derail a promising future. Bangladesh is currently ranked 112 out of 127 countries in the 2011 EFA 
Development Index (UNESCO 2011).
Even from a cursory observation, class and political dynamics are evident in the primary education 
sector. The co-existence of three separate curriculum streams illustrates these class dynamics. A 
vernacular based secular education carried over from the colonial past accommodates children of 
lower-middle and middle class families. A religion-based education draws the poor families' kids 
who are provided free food, education and lodging. Finally, an English medium stream attracts 
children from affluent families primarily from urban areas. The diverse streams of primary 
education provided by diverse actors are likely to have different impacts on individuals and society 
(Ahmed and Haque 2011).
It is critical to reiterate that these multiple providers basically emerged as a response to major 
deficits in democratic political governance in Bangladesh. Their continuing existence and influence 
have created enduring legacies, which are difficult to wish away in the short run. In the words of a 
primary education sector expert, the time has come to reduce discrimination gradually among the 
different streams of primary education. 
Trend in primary education in Bangladesh
3.4.2 Politics, players and policy making
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Furthermore, the secular educational curriculum, which is designed for the majority of children in 
the country, is manipulated by the pervasive influence of party politics. The two leading political 
parties have consistently tried to revisit the social science curriculum to prove the significance of 
their role in the Liberation War. This political bias has led to distortions of historical facts and 
presentation of inaccurate information in the curriculum. Furthermore, it teaches children two 
competing histories and thus, induces future generations to particular party lines, to the detriment 
of national interest and solidarity. 
Party politics has further created a continuing stalemate on national policy in the education sector. 
For instance, the AL government prepared a National Education Policy (NEP) in 2000, which was 
scrapped with a change of government following the elections in 2001.The NEP 2010 was again 
adopted in the parliament in December 2010, but in the absence of the principal opposition party 
(The Daily Star 2010).
Along with these internal political actors, the bureaucrats and the school teachers are very active in 
the primary education policy domain in Bangladesh. Reforms in primary education have faced 
resistance from them (Haque 2009). They emerged as powerful interest groups in the aftermath of 
nationalising all existing primary schools by the government in early post independence years 
which bureaucratised the sector and created a massive corps of teachers as public employees.
Resistance of these interest groups and the long-standing vacuum and uncertainty of national 
education policy open the floor for other players, most likely the development partners, to 
intervene in the education policy domain. The following sections examine their influence in the 
Primary Education policy process in Bangladesh. 
This analysis is organise around three simple themes: the rationale for external intervention; the 
key DP actors involved; and the mode and nature of the influence. 
The rationale for external involvement in the education sector stems from both national priorities 
and international perspectives. The emphasis on primary education as a means to tackle 
widespread illiteracy during the formative period after independence called for additional 
resources. Since the government had to spend 96.7% of the education budget for paying salaries of 
the teachers in government primary schools and grants for salary subvention for non-government 
primary schools (Behrman et al 2002), very little resource remains to finance primary education 
development which entails national dependency for external financial support.
This created a legacy of dependency on external funding in the primary education system, through 
aid, loans, and grants, which accounted for around 30% to around 80% of the total development 
cost during the last two decades (see Table 5). 
3.4.3 Dynamics of external influence
i. The rationale for external intervention  
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Table 5
General Education Project (GEP) US $ 335.51 million US $ 68.89 million US $ 266.62 million
(20.53%) (79.47%)
First Primary Education Development US $ 2762.78 million US $ 2010.78 million US $ 752.00 million
 Programme (PEDP 1) (72.22%) (27.78%)
Second Primary Education US $ 1815.00 million US $ 1161.00 million US $ 654.00 million
 Development Programme (PEDP2 ) (64%) (36%)
Third Primary Education Development US $ 7357.93 million US $ 6302.43 million US $ 1055.50 million
Programme (PEDP 3) (excluding discrete (85.65%) (14.35%)
project costs  BNFE)
Source: GoB 1996; GoB 2003; ADB 2011; GoB 2011b
Although, ostensibly about 70% of development financing of the PEDP 1 and PEDP 2 came from the 
7government, its counterpart funds  are less than that of DPs. A comparison of counterpart funding 
between the government and the DPs of PEDP 1 & 2 is illustrated in Figure 5. 
Figure 5
              Source: GoB 2003 and ADB 2011
In addition to funding requirement, DPs have been providing the government with technical 
assistance to tide over capacity gaps. For instance, ADB granted the GoB technical assistance costing 
US $ 9.9 million for the period from February to July 2009, to prepare the primary education sector 
development programme (ADB 2008).
The primary education system's need for external support received a boost because of international 
financial institutions' shift in focus to support for education in the early 1980s. To quote an 
example: during 1963 - 1980, the rationale for the World Bank's lending in education was 
Sharing programme/project cost by the government and the DPs
Counterpart funding between government and DPs in PEDP 1& 2
Name of the programme/project Total cost GoB Development
Partners (DPs)
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manpower planning, which had no reference to primary education. The 1980 Education Policy 
Paper drafted by an external advisory panel,  led the Bank to shift focus away from higher to basic 
education as a strategy to protect the poor (Heyneman 1999). 
Since then, primary schooling has been acknowledged as providing better access to formal and 
informal sector employment for poor households and encouraging behavioural change, 
particularly in the areas of health, nutrition and fertility. This realignment made a significant 
impact on aid policy (Colclough and De 2010). For instance, the WB, in the aftermath of the EFA 
Conference in Jomtien, increased lending for primary education by 360% from the 1986 to 1990 
period to the 1991 to 1998 period ($809 million annually) and the percentage of bilateral education 
grants devoted to basic education tripled between 1989-90 and 1994-95 (Alexander 2001). 
The shift of international support towards primary education made Bangladesh a principal 
candidate for external support. Of the global total of 145 million children of primary-school age out 
of school in the late 1980s, about 60% were from four countries  India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and 
Nigeria (Colclough and De 2010).
A wide range of DPs, including both bilateral countries and multilateral financial institutions have 
been involved in Bangladesh's primary education sector since the early 1980s (see Table 6) and 
across the administrative levels from central to sub-cluster level (see Table 7). 
The inception of their involvement was marked by the International Development Agency (IDA)'s 
'Universal Primary Education (UPE)' project during the Second Five-Year Plan period (1980 - 85). 
Simultaneously, GoB undertook the 'Universal Primary Education (National)' project with its own 
finances. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNESCO also provided financial 
assistance to these projects which targeted to improve the infrastructural facilities, distribution of 
textbooks and training of teachers for primary schools (Rabbi 2006; Ahmed 2012). 
Table 6
1981 - 85 Universalisation of Primary WB, UNESCO, United Nations Children's Fund
Education (UPE) project (UNICEF)
1985 - 90 The Second Primary Education WB, UNICEF, Swedish International Development
 Project (SPEP)  Agency (SIDA), UNDP, UNESCO
1991 - 96 General Education Project IDA, ADB, Norway, SIDA, UNDP, United Nations
(GEP)  Population Fund (UNFPA), UNICEF, Norwegian 
Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), 
German, Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation
 (JDRF), Canadian International Development
 Agency (CIDA)
1993 - 2000 Food for Education (FFE) World Food Programme (WFP)
ii. Key development partners involved 
Involvement of development partners in last three decades
Period Name of the project/ Donor involvement (singly/jointly)
programme
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Period Name of the project/ Donor involvement (singly/jointly)
programme
Level Development partners Main Activity
1997 -  2002 First Primary Education ADB, Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Germany,Norway, 
 Development Programme (PEDP 1) Sweden, United Kingdom, UNFPA, UNICEF, World Bank 
2004 - 11 Second Primary Education ADB, IDA, Department for International Development
 Development Programme (DFID), European Commission (EC), the Netherlands, 
(PEDP 2) Norway, SIDA, Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA)  CIDA, UNICEF, Australian Agency for International
Development (AusAID)
2011/12  - Third Primary Education ADB, WB, DFID, European Union (EU), AusAID
2015/16 Development Programme (PEDP 3) SIDA, CIDA, JICA, UNICEF, the Netherlands
 
Source: Based on information provided by DPE, MoPME
DPs also joined hands with the GoB's innovative FFE programmes, which were designed to 
encourage low-income household parents to send their children to schools, increase school 
enrolment, promote school attendance and reduce the drop-out rate. 
The WFP financed a National School Feeding Programme jointly with the government, which was 
introduced in the 87 highest poverty prone upazilas selected, based on the poverty map from Fiscal 
Year 2009-10. Two similar programmes namely, FFE Programme (2007-2010) and School Feeding 
Programme (January 2009 to June 2013) were also undertaken in certain poverty prone and remote 
areas of Bangladesh, with the assistance from the WFP and the EC respectively (Centre for Policy 
Dialogue [CPD] 2010). 
DPs also played a major role in designing and implementing primary education strategic 
programmes. The PEDP 1 was highly influenced by the WB and the PEDP 2 by ADB, mainly in the 
form of Technical Assistance (TA). In an interview with this study's authors, a mid-level primary 
education executive working at DPE, opined that the use of DPs' TA in designing and preparing 
primary education programmes would diminish national ownership. 
Table 7
DPE/central ADB, IDA, NORAD,  DFID Management, Management Information System
 (MIS), Human Resource Development (HRD)
Division ADB, IDA Access, quality
District UNICEF,  German Development Teaching training
Cooperation (GIZ)
Upazila NORAD, UNICEF, GIZ, ADB In-service teacher training, Upazilla 
Resource Centres (URCs)
Sub-cluster NORAD, ADB and IDA, through DPE Sub-cluster in-service teacher training
Source: USAID 2002
DPs activities across the administrative levels of primary education
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iii.  The mode and nature of external influence 
External influence in primary education policy process and its impacts
8The mode and nature of the DPs' influence has taken the form of emulation  in the primary education 
system (see Figure 6) which transfers DPs' funds and policy agenda through the consecutive primary 
education development programmes. Two development programmes such as PEDP 1 and PEDP 2 have 
 already been implemented and the PEDP 3 is being carried out at present. The engagement of DPs, 
more specifically multilateral development banks such as the WB and the ADB, in the preparation and 
implementation of programmes significantly impacts the policy domain. 
A prominent avenue for the multilateral agencies to push the policy agenda in primary education is 
international conferences; and three such international gatherings have proved to be the most 
influential in shaping the country's policies for Primary Education (see table 8). 
Figure 6
 
  
8 Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) identified four different degrees of policy transfer: copying, which involves direct and 
complete transfer; emulation, which involves transfer of the ideas behind the policy or programme; combinations, which 
involve mixtures of several different policies; and inspiration, where policy in another jurisdiction may inspire a policy 
change, but where the final outcome does not actually draw upon the original.
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Table 8
Influence of international declarations on national policies
a) Finding a common cooperation modality
DP involvement in the education sector in post independent Bangladesh broadly took two forms, 
namely the project-based approach and the programme-based approach (PBA). The project-based 
approach aimed to achieve quick gains and was dominant until 1997. However, this approach fell 
out of favour due to two reasons (Ahmed 2011). 
Firstly, though short-term impacts were often generated from these projects, this approach did not 
create local ownership, which hampered the longer-term effectiveness of the projects. Secondly, 
the sheer magnitude of coordinating and monitoring large numbers of individual projects through 
donor imposed disbursement and accounting procedures created parallel channels and weakened 
the government's own procedures. Furthermore, projects created considerable duplication in an 
uncoordinated and crowded development landscape (Save the Children 2009). 
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International Goals/Targets 
World Conference on EFA (Jomtien, 1990)
EFA Goals:
Goal 1: Universal access to learning
Goal 2: A focus on equity
Goal 3: Emphasis on learning outcomes
Goal 4: Broadening the means and the scope of 
basic education
Goal 5: Enhancing the environment for learning
Goal 6: Strengthening partnerships by 2000
World Education Forum  (Dakar, 2000)
Dakar Framework of Action
Goal 1: Expand early childhood care and education
Goal 2: Provide free and compulsory primary 
education for all
Goal 3: Promote learning and life skills for young 
people and adults
Goal 4: Increase adult literacy by 50%
Goal 5: Achieve gender parity by 2005, gender 
equality by 2015
Goal 6: Improve the quality of education
The Millennium Declaration (UN, 2000)
MDGs
Goal 1: Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger
Goal 2: Achieving universal primary education
Goal 3: Promoting gender equality and 
empowering women
Goal 8: Developing a global partnership for 
development
Their imitation in national policies
Compulsory Primary Education Act 1990: 
Compulsory primary education programme 
introduced in 68 Upazilas in 1992 and was 
expanded all over the country in 1993. 
A separate Primary and Mass Education Division 
(PMED) was created in 1992 
National Plan of Action (NPA) I 1991-2000: The aim 
of the NPA I was “to enhance both their 
quantitative and qualitative dimensions and also 
take up other feasible supportive programmes to 
attain the EFA 2000 targets” successfully. The 
actions proposed in the NPA I would “be dealt with 
two broad programme categories, (a) Primary 
Education and (b) Mass Education”.
NPA II 2003-2015: The aim of the NPA II is to “all 
primary school-age children (6-10 years), boys and 
girls, including ethnic minorities, disadvantaged 
and disabled, should be enrolled and successfully 
completing the primary cycle and achieving quality 
education by considering the gender equality. 
PMED was upgraded into a full-fledged ministry in 
2003.
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) October, 
2005:
It was an eight point strategic agenda where the 
third point was on Quality Education (particularly in 
primary, secondary and vocational levels with 
strong emphasis on girls' education).
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These developments led to the creation of the Primary Education Development Programme in 
1997, now known as PEDP 1, as a PBA. PBA consists of an umbrella of myriad projects that are 
formally coordinated to deal with multiple issues involving multiple DPs. However, lack of donor 
coordination and unclear operational arrangements with the government created a new set of 
challenges. Each development partner had its mandate to set goals, disburse funds, and show 
progress and achievements working with or around government. Furthermore, PEDP 1 did not 
operate as a management unit having no forum of government and DPs for advising or making 
decisions or ever for regular consideration of issues. DPs used to participate in a regular 
information-sharing group without the government (United States Agency for International 
Development [USAID] 2002).
To mitigate this issue, sector-wide approaches (SWAps) in Health and Education were mooted as a 
strategy to achieve greater coherence in their approaches to providing development assistance. 
The defining rationale for SWAp was that “all significant funding for the sector supports a single 
sector policy and expenditures programme, under Government leadership, adopting common 
approaches across the sector, and progressing towards relying on Government procedures to 
disburse and account for all funds” (Brown et al. 2001,  cited by Smith 2003). 
On the SWAp premise, PEDP 2 was designed and implemented to overcome the weak coordination 
and duplication that impeded the PEDP 1 implementation. A macro plan for PEDP 2 was prepared with 
the involvement of the concerned ministries, directorates and DPs (Ahmed 2011), intending to 
integrate the PEDP two programme within the MoPME and DPE's organisational and operational 
systems.  
This would ensure that policy, procedures, processes and resources were harmonised to support 
project activities and also facilitate institutionalisation and sustainability. Participating DPs of PEDP 
2 created a Project Liaison Unit within the ADB to manage the programme, while the Government 
created a single Programme Management Unit (PMU).  For monitoring the progress made under 
SWAp, JRMs were held biennially. 
Civil society advocates, primary education functionaries and donor consultants expressed a 
common view to the authors that SWAp has been the right modality for primary education 
development in the country. Due to SWAp, no donor can push individual agendas; rather they are 
compelled to fit their individual agendas into the overarching programme. 
Nevertheless, SWAp has been a sub-sector approach in reality (Ahmed 2011), as it could not 
effectively address the total Education sector's diversity and complexity at the national level. For 
instance, PEDP 2 included four types of schools, namely, government primary schools (GPS), 
registered non-government primary schools (RNPS), non-registered non-government primary 
schools and some other schools (ADB 2011). The remaining six types including NGO schools, 
remained out of the programme coverage. The reasons, according to a key informant, were the 
dominance of foreign consultants and the non- consultation with the civil society members at the 
programme design stage.
Furthermore, DPs have had room to influence the policy process. Analysts point to the gaps 
between the existing national capacity and the SWAp's required capacity to design policy and 
programme. SWAp calls for a higher level of capacity in decision making  especially relating to 
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planning, prioritising and performance monitoring. It also calls for capacity for high-level policy 
dialogue with the DP, which the government lacked.
Hence, there is a need for building capacity within state representatives to negotiate with the DPs. 
This capacity would also need to be backed up by departmental ownership and sector specialisation 
by staffing the Ministry and the Directorate with strictly career primary education bureaucrats.   
However, it was not just financial support that the DPs brought on board, as they were also 
instrumental in influencing certain policy directives with reaching consequences. We now proceed 
to examine one such key agenda promoted by DPs  decentralisation.
A decentralisation framework has been developed under PEDP-2 for effective and efficient service 
delivery and community involvement. Within this framework, the planning function was 
decentralised at the school level with the implementation of the school-level improvement plan 
SLIP (ADB 2008).This framework also planned to introduce Upazila Primary Education Plan (UPEP) 
at each Upazila; however, it was not implemented within the PEDP 2 implementation period. A 
UPEP was supposed to be prepared by an eight member UPEP committee led by the Upazila Nirbahi 
Officer (UNO) as president and the Upazila Education Officer (UEO) as member secretary and based 
on the SLIPs of a particular Upazila.
Under SLIP, a three-year development plan including budgets and specific time-frames for 
implementation are prepared for the concerned school, by the school itself and submitted to the 
UEO who evaluates the plan and recommends funding support under PEDP 2. 
A SLIP school receives a grant of BDT 20,000 from the government and explores community 
subventions to implement the plan and thereby create a platform for a collective initiative for 
school development. The concerned UEO and Assistant Thana Education Officers (ATEOs) regularly 
monitor implementation of SLIPs of a particular Upazila.
The decision on how to spend the block grant (SLIPs fund) and the community subvention to 
implement activities agreed by the SLIP committee is made at the school level.  The committee is 
comprised of the School Management Committee (SMC) president as convener, the head teacher as 
member secretary, two teachers' representatives, the concerned woman ward councilor, a member 
nominated by the concerned Union Parishad Chairman and two representatives from Parent 
Teacher Association (PTA) as members. Within the SLIP Committee, the President, the member 
secretary and a women member received SLIP training. 
Giving an emphasis on teaching and learning, SLIP incorporates achievement awards for students, 
strengthening class room management, teaching and learning aids, school dress for poor students, 
small-scale infrastructure repairing (electrical wiring, fitting fans, etc.), sports equipments, and 
9extra-care of weaker students through appointing para-teachers  and providing specialised 
teaching materials. 
b) Decentralised planning and implementation
School-level improvement plan (SLIP)
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9 Para-teachers are generaly appointed in a more remote area for disadvantageous childrens of lower wage rate compare 
to government teachers to ensure quality education (Kingdon et al. 2012; Fyle 2007).
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The member secretaries of two SLIP committees and the concerned UEO told the authors while 
visiting schools, that these heads of expenditures have altogether contributed to creating a school 
environment more attractive than the children's homes, leading to an increase in school 
attendance and an improvement in quality of learning.
The introduction of SLIP has brought about two substantive changes. Firstly, the concept of 
planning for the first time, has evolved at the school level thereby providing each school a platform 
to identify its needs and address them on priority basis to enhance teaching and learning. Secondly, 
SLIP encourages school managers to explore community subvention in addition to SLIP grants to 
meet the planned expenditures. 
These changes have led to a bottom-up approach to planning and development, replacing previous 
top-down approaches; the results of such planning were reflected in need based expenditures at 
school level and an institutionalised community involvement for school development. A 
Programme Completion Report of PEDP 2 prepared by the ADB (2011) clearly records 
improvements made on these fronts. 
However, some factors have stood in the way of realising SLIP's full potential. As a DPE official and a 
former ADB consultant pointed out, these factors include a lack of understanding among the 
stakeholders regarding SLIP's preparation and implementation, inadequate training, corruption 
and large scale programme roll-outs without any piloting. 
The ADB consultant further added that a bulk amount of allocations was cancelled due to the 
misappropriation of funds, revealed in audit report. Furthermore, the SLIP committee members 
and the education managers label SLIP grants as very small and inadequate for effectively 
implementing the plan.
SLIP funding was heavily dependent on DPs' support. A visit of the research team to Savar Upazila, 
just 24 kilometers northwest of Dhaka, found that SLIP could not be implemented in 2011 and 2012 
due to a non-release of funds from the government. 
In order to overcome these weaknesses and make SLIP more effective, the Head Teachers (member 
secretaries of SLIP) and the Upazila education managers emphasise interventions such as regular 
refreshers' training, regular monitoring and counter monitoring, payment of SLIP grants in 
advance, an increase of grants amount, and need-based allocation rather than a fixed and common 
amount. Furthermore, at the end of a fiscal year, the SLIP committee can present all activities under 
SLIP before the larger community, to bring in an element of transparency and accountability.
Three reasons can broadly be identified for evolving this successful decentralisation at the school 
level. Firstly, community's own interest and its previous experience have induced them to support 
the primary schools under the auspices of SLIP. These schools serve the community's children and 
historically, primary schools were local or community based institutions, even when receiving 
government funding (Sobhan 1998).
Secondly, the standard resistance to reforms from the teacher community and/or bureaucrats did not 
occur, since the introduction of SLIP did not curtail their existing authority. Rather, SLIP involved them 
in the planning process by redefining their roles, as, the Head Teacher was made SLIP Committee's 
Member Secretary and the UEO  was made SLIP's approving authority.  
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Thirdly, since 1997, a sequence in undertaking development pragrammes was maintained in the 
education sector, leading to a better understanding of carrying out reforms between the 
government and the DPs.
The other noticeable engagement by DPs came through their support to NGOs involved in the field of 
education, with DPs providing US$147.1 million to nine NGOs from 1998-99 to 2002-03 (see Table 9). 
However, such NGO support was also not immune to policy prescriptions. In an interview with the 
authors, a national education sector advocate claimed that DPs imposed their own education agenda on 
the NGOs, since the latter were fully dependent on the former; and acutely in the case of small NGOs. 
Moreover, complete reliance on DP financing leads to concerns about sustainability. For instance, 
most of the Proshika schools were closed down following a government clampdown on Proshika's 
DP funding in 2002. In an effort to forge stronger relationships with the government, BRAC 
adopted a complementary approach by setting up pre-primary schools in localities where the 
government had little presence. Children that graduated from BRAC pre-primary schools were then 
enrolled into government primary schools. 
Table 9
Village Education Resource 0.7 1.8 1.0 1.1 0.8 5.5 0.1
Centre (VERC)
Friends in Village 37.5 33.5 27.2 - - 98.3 1.6
Development Bangladesh
(FIVDB)
BRAC 902.4 2,226.9 854.5 1,052.6 1,394.2 6,6430.6 107.2
Campaign for Popular - 5.0 7.7 35.8 47.9 96.3 1.6
Education (CAMPE)
PLAN - - 212.9 245.9 274.0 732.8 12.2
Rangpur Dinajpur Rural 9.8 6.0 4.9 - - 20.6 0.3
Service (RDRS)
Proshika 468.3 627.4 - - - 1,095.7 18.3
CMES 44.2 45.3 94.1 48.3 50.2 282.2 4.7
Dhaka Ahsania Mission (DAM) 16.5 3.4 16.8 8.4 19.4 64.5 1.1
Total 1,479.5 2,949.3 1,219.0 1,392.1 1,786.6 8,826.5 147.1
US$ Millions 24.7 49.2 20.3 23.2 29.8 147.1 -
Source: WB 2006a
c) NGO provisioning of primary schooling 
DP financing of education programmes of big NGOs
Name of the NGO 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-1 2001-2 2002-3 Total  (BDT US$ in
in millions) millions
(US $ 1 = 
BDT 77.02)
63
3.4.4 Governance impact of public service delivery in education sector
i. Quality of learning
ii. Performance of NGO provisioning of primary education
iii. Policy ownership
3.4.5 The way forward 
The DPs' emulative mode and nature of influence have produced mixed results in the education 
sector. Some critical themes to consider in this regard include:
It was expected that the decentralised framework at school level would result in an improvement in 
the quality of learning outcomes for students. The Annual Sector Performance Report 2011 of DPE 
reveals that organisational capacity improved, student absenteeism reduced (23% in 2005 to 16.6% 
in 2010), and students' contact hours with teachers increased due to the SLIP activities. Broad multi 
stakeholder forums, increased capacities of school managers including teachers and community 
representatives and building local ownership are several tangible outcomes from this 
decentralisation strategy. 
NGO provisioning of primary education demonstrated a superior performance with respects to 
efficiency and higher quality. BRAC is a case in point as BRAC-operated schools, through community 
involvement and innovations in the area of instruction and pedagogy, provide the full five-years of 
primary education within four years. The drop-out rate in BRAC administered schools is 6.13% 
compared to as high as 39.8% in government primary schools (Khan and Samadder 2010; GoB 2011a). 
In respects of quality aspects, the students of BRAC non-formal schools achieved, on average, 19.9 
competencies in 2008 compared to 18.6 competencies achieved by the students of government 
primary schools in the same year (Nath 2012).
From a gender equity perspective, NGO non-formal education programmes have helped to 
improve the educational prospects of poor girls in Bangladesh, contributing to reducing the gender 
gap at the primary level. This non-formal system has also provided access of these poor children to 
formal schooling, in BRAC's case, approximately 90% of the 2.6 million BRAC school graduates are 
believed to have entered the formal system, subsequently leading to renaming BRAC's NFPE 
programme as BRAC Primary School (BPS) in 2004  (WB 2006). 
Though triggered more by a lack of government capacity to design policy and programmes for the 
primary education sector, DP influence in the education policy space has weakened national 
ownership. Taking cognisance of this low capacity issue, DPs have actively provided technical 
assistance to the sector, a recent example being the ADB's technical assistance of US$ 9.9 million in 
2009, for preparing the primary education sector development programme. Most TA interventions 
generally involve foreign consultants who may fail to comprehend the ground reality and other 
contextual factors that have a strong bearing on implementation.
Based on the preceding discussions, the following recommendations are forwarded to build a more 
cohesive, coherent and home-grown strategy for the Bangladesh's primary education sector.
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i. Initiative and ownership in designing policies and programmes
ii. Decentralisation for improving governance at school level 
iii. Policy continuity to demonstrate national policy ownership
iv. Partnership for enhancing quality of primary education
A central recommendation put forward in reviewing DPs' role and influence in the education sector 
is that the GoB should take primary and sole responsibility of designing policies and programmes. 
The three divisions of Planning and Development, Policy and Operations, and Monitoring and 
Evaluation within the DPE can form a core team under the leadership of a government Joint 
Secretary to draft such policies and programmes. 
Furthermore, the government's demonstrated capacity to design its own policy agendas should be 
the basis for accessing aid. This does not however limit the government from receiving technical 
assistance for building ministerial capacity on how to plan and prioritise activities and to implement 
programmes. 
Access to aid is not solely linked to policy capacity, depending also on the governance of that sector. 
Therefore, a key recommendation is to continue the decentralisation framework of PEDP 2, 
especially SLIP with adequate budget support and authority. 
Continuation of reforms across political regimes requires broader consensus on national education 
policy. Key recommendations in this regard include undertaking steps for full-fledged implementation  
of the education policy and avoiding policy reversal in future. 
Avoiding policy reversal requires that the policy content be developed by those whose professional 
competence of policy framing is well established and universally acceptable across party lines and who 
are well versed in analytic techniques of education sector's diversity and complexity. Additionally, 
inter-party dialogue on policy should be organised inside and outside of the Parliament.
In addition, the National Education Policy 2010 should be the basis for all educational plans and 
programmes, as exemplified by the PEDP 3, which embodies four policy directions for primary 
education described in NEP 2010 - establishing an integrated school system; improving quality; 
decentralising primary education administration and management; and engaging in partnerships 
with NGOs and the private sector (GoB 2011b).   
Bangladesh is home of many development innovations and models developed by NGOs and there is 
much to gain by leveraging the learnings and experiences of this vibrant sector. For the effective 
roll-out of PEDP 3, a partnership framework relating to quality improvement functions at the 
school level between the public sector and NGOs needs to be devised. 
However, it is essential that the framework spells out key actors' roles and responsibilities and lays 
out the terms of contracting in a transparent manner. Furthermore, consultation among the key 
stakeholders is another way forward in such a partnership framework.
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3.5 Conclusion
External assistance has undoubtedly led to significant achievements in the health and education 
sectors in Bangladesh. However, as various goals turn into specific programmes and strategies in 
these sectors, how they fit into national priorities, operational capabilities and political 
circumstances, have now become critical. To improve aid effectiveness, the key challenge is to 
strengthen country ownership of policy, implementation capacity and leadership in aid 
management. 
The health section has tried to show how major governance lapses have undermined GoB's 
ownership of policies, leading to a situation of external dependency. Ultimately, it is the public 
health service recipients who suffer the most from frequent policy changes. Ensuring good 
governance is an essential part of sector reform, and without identifying and removing existing 
governance bottlenecks, investment or donor financing alone cannot effectively redress these 
challenges. 
The chapter proposes the following recommendations for better governance of the health sector: 
strong political commitment that supports policies and their implementation
 consensus building among stakeholders transcending the barriers of a political divide 
strong civil society participation in policy making and implementation
civil service reforms
regular and rigorous policy analysis and greater focus on strategy by the GoB 
 regular political-economy analyses by the DPs
The primary education section has tried to demonstrate how DPs have influenced the governance 
and policy processes of the primary education sector significantly in context of resistance of the 
domestic interest groups and the long-standing vacuum and uncertainty of national education 
policy. Their working partnership has notably contributed towards achievements in school 
enrolment and improvements in the quality of learning. However, sustainability of these 
achievements is questionable due to the absence of national policy ownership. Therefore, this 
section recommends that the GoB undertake greater responsibility for planning and prioritising in 
order to promote national ownership. While formulating national policy, setting national vision 
and preparing plans and programmes, national expertise needs to be explored and capitalised. 
Finally, the existing decentralisation process in the education sector should be continued for 
improving governance at school levels.
Providing health and education for all is a challenging mission for any government, especially for 
Bangladesh. Despite the varying interests and political differences amongst the numerous 
stakeholders associated with the policy making process, the ultimate goal for everyone is to provide 
citizens with better healthcare and education. This can very well become a common starting point 
for aligning the different and apparently conflicting stakeholder interests.
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Chapter 4: External Influence and Economic Governance
4.1 Introduction
When Bangladesh emerged as an independent nation in 1971, its economic possibilities were not 
considered favourable. Economic performance was proved extremely volatile in its first decade 
with negative growth in GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita (see Figure 7). Higher incidence of 
poverty, vulnerable fiscal position owing to massive losses from State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 
along with fragile politics led the country to the brink of failure. 
This prompted many observers to refer to the country as a “test case of development” (Faaland and 
1
Parkinson 1976). Limited domestic resources rendered Bangladesh dependant on foreign aid . 
2External resources however have yielded limited impact on the economy , an issue widely discussed 
in aid effectiveness literature (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Ahmed 1992; Islam 1992; Quibria 2010). 
More importantly, post-liberation Bangladesh had experienced a secular deterioration in its terms 
3of trade . Thus leading to a realisation that the economy had to undergo reforms. Given the 
involvement of a large number of Donors and Development partners (D&DPs) in Bangladesh's 
development process, external pressures to undertake various reform measures existed.
The economy adopted a series of market-based reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, largely influenced 
by the Bretton Wood institutions– the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(Task forces 1991). The main objective of the reform agenda was to remove “excess” government 
controls, to promote market competition and to bring macroeconomic stability.  
Partly owing to those reforms, alongside Bangladesh's own innovation in provisioning social 
services and concurrent favourable political changes during the 1990s, the economy transformed 
C H A P T E R
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1 Nevertheless, aid dependency is not entirely a post-liberation phenomenon (Sobhan 1982).
2 However, from the late 1970s to the beginning of the 1980s, there was a short-lived investment boom in both public and 
private sectors, owing, among others, to increasing flow of foreign aid, adopting a privatisation strategy based on lavish 
dispensation of cheap credit, and provision of other incentives such as highly protected markets for domestic industries 
(Mahmud 2001).
3 Bangladesh's terms of trade has deteriorated from a high of 155 in 1960 to 100 in 1970 and then continued downwards to 
74 in 1978. And in 1981/82 its terms of trade was at its lowest points in two decades (Sobhan 1982).
68
from a state-owned (quasi-socialist) to a more market driven system. The post-reform era has seen 
steady GDP per capita growth with macroeconomic stability attained. Furthermore, the private 
sector has played a pivotal role in economic expansion, domestic resource mobilisation has 
increased and the country's social sector performed better than comparable income groups. 
Dependence on foreign aid has declined drastically and the economy is now near self-sufficient in 
many areas, including food production (See Figure 7, Also see Mahmud et al, 2008). 
Figure 7
         Source: Based on World Development Indicators, World Bank
Nevertheless, Bangladesh still faces many economic and social challenges and it remains a least 
developed country with 31.5% of its population living below the poverty line (Household 
Income & Expenditure Survey [HIES] 2010) and lagging behind in achieving some of the 
4Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) . As discussed in subsequent sections, growth has not 
translated into concomitant changes in the country's governance and institutional qualities, 
scoring poorly in WB governance indicators and faring disappointingly in cross-country 
comparisons of institutional quality benchmarks, reflected in the 'Ease of Doing Business' 
5indicators  (See Table 10). 
Nevertheless, this exercise does not address how Bangladesh's development outcomes fare 
better than those of other countries with “better” governance (Devarajan 2008). As a result, 
many experts see Bangladesh as an outlier in the growth-governance discourse (Mahmud et al 
2008d; World Bank 2007b). 
Growth and volatilities of GDP per capita: 1971-2010
4 In absolute numbers, over 45 million people in the country still lives below the upper poverty line and 26 million people 
are extreme poor (HIES 2010). 
5 Although some micro indicators of Doing Business have witnesses some improvements in recent years. 
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Table 10
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank Source: Doing Business, World Bank
Moreover, despite achieving economic independence in many areas, the country's external 
dependence on policy formation has not declined (de facto) in tandem. While the recent reform 
programmes (such as PRSP) allowed greater autonomy in the government adopting its own 
policies, influences are still owing to, according to some accounts, lack of policy ownership and 
internal capacity constraints, inter alia. 
Rahman (2011), for instance, argued that policy ownership that the country has secured through 
PRSP is a 'guided ownership'. Choudhury (2010) observed that 'insufficient capacity to plan and 
manage development projects continues to remain a major challenge to improve aid effectiveness'. 
Due to GoB's capacity constraint and bottlenecks in project implementation and with lengthy and 
cumbersome donor procedures, on average 20% of annual external aid remain undisbursed which 
results an accumulation of over US$16 billion aid money in the pipeline (Choudhury 2010; The Daily 
Star 2012).
Is it due to lack of or limited policy ownership, or to the state's capacity constraints to implement 
various reforms? Or perhaps the very nature of political economy of reform that various reform 
measures have unleashed the scope for higher economic growth but at the same time they have 
had facilitated more avenues for corruption, thus deteriorating the country's economic 
6governance indicators . Other experts believe there is a mismatch between the D&DPs' market 
reform agenda and their governance expectations, given the political structure in developing 
countries (Khan 2009). 
An economic inquiry could help understanding some of these concerns. There are numerous studies 
quantifying the reasons behind the relative success or failure of these economic reforms. However, 
The state of governance and institutions in Bangladesh
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Percentile Governance
Governance Year Rank Score
Indicators  
(0-100) (-2.5 to +2.5)
Government 2010 21.5 -0.84
Effectiveness 2000 32.2 -0.56
1996 24.9 -0.73
Regulatory 2010 21.5 -0.86
Quality 2000 18.6 -0.87
1996 16.2 -1.05
Control of 2010 16.3 -0.99
Corruption 2000 12.7 -0.96
1996 27.3 -0.74
Indicators 2012
Ease of Doing Business Rank 122
Starting a Business - Rank 86
Getting Electricity - Rank 182
Getting Electricity - Time (days) 372
Registering Property - Rank 173
Registering Property - Time (days) 245
Protecting Investors - Rank 24
Enforcing Contracts - Rank 180
Enforcing Contracts - Time (days) 1442
Resolving Insolvency - Rank 107
Resolving Insolvency - Time (days) 1460
6 As Mahmud (2001) observed that economic liberalisation has undoubtedly reduced the scope for rent-seeking, for 
instance in the import licensing system, such behaviour has been increasingly replaced by other means of patronage 
politics. Financial extortion, including illegal collections of tolls and protection money, under political patronage has 
proved a growing phenomenon contributing heavily to the cost of doing business. 
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very little focus has been placed on the particular interplay between the D&DPs and national 
stakeholders within these reforms. Against this backdrop, this study attempts to disentangle 
elements that guided the economic reform process and pinpoint the conditions that generally 
determines what reform is acceptable and when it is expected. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section II concerns the methodology of the chapter. 
Section III offers a broader perspective of reforms, identifying the process and actors of various 
reform programmes and their impacts. Given the mixed outcomes of these reform initiatives, the 
study intends to explore two cases based on their sectoral performance where the interplay among 
the government, politicians, D&DPs and other stakeholders is substantial. Accordingly, in section IV 
two case studies on banking sector reform and energy price adjustment are presented. The final 
section concludes drawing, among others, some key points on the implication of economic reforms 
on the country's governance structure. 
The research follows a case study methodology since a holistic and in-depth investigation is needed 
(Feagin et al 1991). Literature on case study methodology generally specifies three types of cases: 
exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive (Yin 1993). The explanatory case study evaluates whether 
programmes and projects are implemented as intended or designed, while also determining their 
outcomes and the reasons behind their ultimate success or failure (World Bank 1999). Secondary 
literature was extensively reviewed while key informants including policymakers, D&DPs, private 
sector stakeholders, regulators and academics were interviewed. 
It is imperative to understand not only the trajectory of economic reforms and their impact, but also 
to identify the actors and process of reforms. As sectoral reforms impacts are captured in numerous 
studies (Akram 1999; Bhattacharya and Chowdhury 2003; Asian Development Bank 2005), here we 
focus more on the actors and their interplay in the process. One predominant feature of 
Bangladesh's economic reform (probably other countries as well for that matter) is that until a 
particular sector is hit by a crisis, the state apparatus, notably the politicians and bureaucrats, are 
generally reluctant to pursue reforms. 
The context of wider economic reforms was set by severe terms of trade and macroeconomic crises 
7in 1970s and 1980s  as well as declining trends in aid flows (Mahmud 2003, Sobhan 1982). The 
context and some salient features of D&DP-influenced economic reform are discussed in Box 1. 
The remainder of the section briefly discusses the key reform measures undertaken since the 
country's independence in a number of priority sectors and areas. The literature on the various 
issues under this rubric is vast, so our discussion should be seen as nothing more than a birds eye 
view. This section is derived from secondary literature as well as insights drawn from key informant 
interviews. 
4.2  Methodology of the study
4.3  Reform and economic transformation: context, actors, process and impact
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11
7 Domestic savings that averaged 8 percentage of GDP during 1960-70 collapsed to -0.25 during 1972-76. The terms of trade 
had deteriorated from  100 in 1970  to 74 in 1978 (Sobhan 1982).
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Box 1
Given the scarcity of domestic resources, reflected in the savings-investment (S-I) gap, external 
resources were required immediately after independence (See Figure 8). 
Figure 8
                  Source: Based on World Development Indicators, World Bank
A 'Bangladesh aid consortium' was formed with the World Bank soon after independence 
(Sobhan 1982). Conditionalities were tagged with aid by the D&DPs from the very beginning as 
reflected in World Bank (1975): “the willingness of donors to continue providing aid in generous 
amounts to Bangladesh will no doubt depend on the implementation of satisfactory economic 
policies and measures”. Given the continued pressure on its economy, particularly on its 
exchange rate, owing among others to the first oil shock, Bangladesh first used the 
compensatory financing facility of the IMF in fiscal year 1974. The then government was initially 
reluctant to meet the IMF's conditions on monetary and fiscal stances. However, in May 1975 it 
revised its position devaluing the Bangladesh Taka by 56% (Muhammad 2005). 
After the regime change in the mid 1970's, there was a policy shift in favour of private sector 
development. The reforms were supported by resources from the WB and other bilateral 
donors. The initial phase witnessed four key reforms: reduction of restrictions on investment; 
momentum of denationalisation of SoEs; limited reduction of tariffs and non tariff barriers; and 
incentive packages for the emerging ready-made garments sector.
However, a major set of reforms emerged through implementation of a package of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAP) in the 1980s and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) 
External influence and economic reform
Saving- investment gap and Official Development Assistance (ODA) share of investment in 
Bangladesh: 1971-2010
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in the 1990s. Bangladesh is one of the first 35 countries which adopted the Bretton Woods 
institutions' guided SAP (1986-89) and ESAF (1990-93). Tied to loans, SAP was designed to 
encourage borrowers to remove “excess” government controls and promote market 
competition while the ESAF was devised to support macroeconomic policies. In fact, Bangladesh 
was not the only country that experienced terms of trade shocks during the 1970s, as a large 
number of countries that were severely affected by two oil shocks in 1970s also adopted similar 
policies, influenced by the IMF and the WB.
Apart from the WB and IMF, reforms in Bangladesh have been influenced by other D&DPs. ADB 
is another key player in the reform process, with a strong focus on numerous areas such as 
agriculture, energy, capital market, transport, urban development, private sector development 
and governance. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) financed a 
number of key reform projects, including the Financial Sector Reform Project and the institution 
of the Rural Electrification Board. The Department for International Development's (DFID) (now 
known as UKAID) focus has been on basic social services, private sector growth, and governance 
and strengthening institutional accountability. Japan International Cooperation Agency's 
(JICA) major projects include agriculture and rural development, transport, power and energy, 
private sector development and governance.
Aid Paradigms, development assistance and policy reforms shifted markedly in the past 40 years. 
The role of bilateral donors has declined but multilateral ones remain an important component 
of external influence upon the country.
The policy reforms in the 1980s were mainly directed towards withdrawal of food and 
agricultural subsidies, SOE privatisation, financial liberalisation and withdrawal of quantitative 
import restrictions. The early 1990s saw the launching of a more comprehensive program of 
macroeconomic reforms aimed at transitioning to an open economy (Mahmud et al 2008). 
In the 1980s, D&DPs' focus was policy reform to create room for private sector development. In 
the 1990s, more stringent conditions were tagged to address the governance issues. However, 
there has been a major shift in reform programmes following the formulation of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in the early 2000s. PRSP provides the crucial link between 
national public actions, donor support, and the development outcomes needed to meet the 
United Nations' MDGs. 
Global norms and best practices have also played a certain role in influencing Bangladesh's 
economic reforms and policies. The country's external sector reform and policies with respect to 
trade reform is largely influenced by the World Trade Organization's (WTO) rules and 
regulations. Moreover, banking sector reform has been heavily influenced by BASEL norms that 
have a goal of maintaining financial stability by setting common standards for banking 
regulations. Global development agendas such as the MDGs have exerted significant influence 
on the reform and policy-making process in Bangladesh.
Global norms and best practices 
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11
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4.3.1 Privatisation
The economic inefficiency of public enterprises nationalised during the 1972-75 periods placed a 
fiscal burden for the state, diverted limited resources from growth-enhancing public spending 
to unproductive subsidies, and affected the country's industrial competitiveness (Akram 1999). 
Influenced by the WB and IMF, the government embarked upon privatisation programmes and 
public sector reforms. In the first phase of privatisation (during 1975-1981), 255 public 
enterprises were divested. During the second phase of privatisation (during the early 1980s), 261 
public enterprises were denationalised (Akram 1999). 
Although there was a brief reversal in the privatisation policy in the early 1980s when 27 textile 
mills and 33 jute mills were returned to their original Bangladeshi owners under the industrial 
policy of 1982 (Uddin 2001). Since the inception of the Privatisation Board which was upgraded 
to the Privatisation Commission in 1993, 74 public enterprises have been privatised (Sobhan 
2002). However, in an apparent shift from the earlier industrial policy, the current government 
in its new plan stressed on strengthening SoEs in order to both supplement and compete with 
the private sector (The Daily Star 2010). 
Politicians faced a dilemma when embarking upon privatisation, since the process benefited 
their allies in terms of resource transfer from public to private hands, but encountered 
significant resistance from organised labours. Moreover, business people often linked to the 
incumbent government supported SoE reform, often deriving commercial benefits in their 
favour. 
The results of privatisation are at best mixed. Humpery (1987) observed that the privatisation 
policy and related regulatory liberalisation have had a beneficial effect on industrial growth 
and have encouraged private investment. Other studies reveal that instead of augmenting new 
investments, higher industrial growth and generating additional employment opportunities, 
privatised units run at losses or are diverted resources to other use. In many instances, the new 
owners engage in speculative businesses or develop project land commercially for housing and 
shopping complexes (Ahmed 2000). A leading economist of Bangladesh called them 'invisible 
privateers' (Sobhan 2002a). Although the privatisation process slowly began to reduce asset 
stripping from enterprises, the privatised entities proved only marginally better in terms of 
efficiency, due to the deficiency of regulatory agencies and property rights. Nevertheless, the 
separation of economic from political rents reduced the most damaging types of predatory 
rents in the economy (Khan 2010). 
Figure 9 shows that privatisation has had modest effect on the country's manufacturing 
activities, with the sector's growth largely due to Ready-Made Garments (RMG) manufacturing 
(which has little to do with privatisation of SoEs). However, the paradigm shift in economic 
philosophy which was influenced by D&DPs and coupled with the state's commitments for 
private sector led growth, allowed for this sector's (RMG) emergence where the state was 
8
directly involved . 
8 A favourable international rent environment facilitated by Multi Fiber Agreement in technology transfer overcoming 
various market failures to this to happen (Khan 2012).
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Figure 9
Source: Based on World Development Indicators, World Bank
Agriculture sector reforms were introduced against the backdrop of food shortage and the 
country's increasing dependence on food aid. Pressure from the main aid donors USAID and WB, 
domestic concern over subsidy and awareness of the ineffectiveness and inefficiencies of public 
interventions propelled reforms in the 1980s (Cabral et al 2006). By the late 1970s, about one third 
of the entire development budget was being consumed by agricultural input subsidies (Mahmud et 
al 2008). In the first phase of reform in the early to mid 1980s, agriculture input subsidies were cut 
back and domestic trading of inputs were liberalised. The second phase in the late 1980s to early 
1990s of reforms saw agriculture inputs imports liberalised and private trading of agriculture 
introduced. 
There was broad political support for such reforms, as high population density and land scarcity left 
Bangladesh with little option but to augment food production, which also proved a key political 
issue both in rural and urban areas. Although the subsequent abolition of the food rationing 
system was a politically difficult decision in light of the politically vocal urban middle class being its 
main beneficiary (Mahmud et al 2008). Nevertheless, the military and police, too powerful a group 
to alienate, continue to get subsidised food (Cabral et al 2006). 
Agricultural reforms in the 1980s were successful in at least two dimensions. First, there were clear 
savings for the government from cutting subsidies on agricultural inputs. Second, input dealers and 
farmers responded by increasing usage of fertiliser and augmenting the ground water irrigation, 
rapidly outstripping the area under surface irrigation. These combined effects allowed the green 
revolution varieties of rice to be adopted, and for land to be cropped more than once a year (Cabral 
et al 2006). Food grain production in Bangladesh has increased from around 10 million tons in 1971 
to 34.5 million tons in Fiscal Year 2011/12 (World Food Programme [WFP] 2012) (also see Figure 10). 
The country is now nearly self-sufficient in rice production.  
Share of manufacturing value added in GDP: 1980-2011
4.3.2 Agriculture sector reform 
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Figure 10
Source: Based on World Development Indicators, World Bank
Nevertheless, Bangladesh as a least developed country is not required to fully liberalise the 
agriculture sector. The experience of this sectoral overhauling shows that the country benefited 
from phased implementation of reforms which allowed for learning, monitoring and adjustment 
to developments in the markets (Cabral et al 2006).    
The external sector development in Bangladesh was suppressed during the 1970s, owing to the 
reign of the 'license raj' and the dominance of SOEs. The industrial policies were developed on the 
basis of 'import-substitution industrialisation' to protect domestic industries from external 
competition. Consequently, trade and investment policies were also inward looking. 
The external sector reforms in Bangladesh started with a moderate liberalisation in 1980s by 
abolishing the import licensing system. Since 1985, export policy reforms were implemented in 
trade, exchange rate, along with monetary and fiscal policy incentives aimed at increasing effective 
assistance to exports (Raihan 2008). Bangladesh followed a 'fixed exchange rate' system until 1979 
when the Central Bank, Bangladesh Bank (BB), pursued a managed floating exchange rate regime. 
The currency underwent a large scale devaluation to make export competitive and to discourage 
imports, thus gradually erasing the premium on import licenses. 
Reforms towards trade liberalisation in fact followed a logical sequence: the relaxation and 
withdrawal of import quota restrictions along with the unification of the exchange rate and 
Food production index of Bangladesh: 1972-2010
4.3.3 External sector reform
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devaluation of the domestic currency during the late 1980s, followed by large reductions in import 
tariffs in the first half of the 1990s (Mahmud et al 2008).
As a result of reforms, between 1991-1992 and 2004-2005, the unweighted average tariff rate fell 
from 70% to 13.5%. Similarly, the import-weighted average tariff rate declined from 42.1% to 
11.48 % in 2003-04 (Raihan 2008). The revenue effects of tariff reductions have been more than 
offset by the growth of imports (Mahmud 2004). Nevertheless, Bangladesh still has protective tariff 
rates for a number of sectors, notably agriculture. Largely owing to reforms, the country's trade to 
GDP ratio increased from less than 20% in 1980s to 50% in 2011 (Figure 11).
Figure 11
Source: Based on World Development Indicators, World Bank
Prior to the initiation of structural reforms in the 1990s, Bangladesh's financial system constituted 
typical examples of what McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) dubbed “financial repression”. The 
sector, both the market and institutions, in the two decades of post independence period faced 
major structural problems, evident both in banking and other components of money markets as 
well as capital markets.
To overcome these problems, financial sector reform was initiated in 1982 with the de-
nationalisation of commercial banks, followed by the establishment of the “National Commission 
on Money, Banking and Credit” in 1984. However, major reforms in the sector were launched in the 
early 1990s. 
Trade to GDP ratio of Bangladesh: 1972-2011
4.3.4 Financial sector reform 
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The WB Consultative Mission provided a Financial Sector Adjustment Credit (FSAC) under which the 
Financial Sector Reform Programme (FSRP) was initiated. In line with these reform initiatives, the 
ADB formed the Capital Market Development Programme (CMDP) following the stock market crisis 
in 1996. The second round of reforms begun in late 2001 aiming to strengthen the central banking 
functions, with the Central Bank Strengthening Project in 2003 jointly funded by the WB and GOB. 
More recent reforms in the financial sector were undertaken in 2004 with WB funding and 
guidance under the 'Enterprise Growth and Bank Modernization Project'. Aside from donor 
influenced reforms, global financial norms and best practices, notably BASEL Norms on capital 
adequacy, have influenced the financial sector's policy reform (Nachane and Islam 2010). 
Figure 12
Source: Based on Financial Sector Database, World Bank
The financial sector reform, notably bank denationalisation, faced severe hurdles from organised 
labours but gained political support as the process benefited business allies of political parties. 
While various market based reforms were initiated in the capital market, regulatory reforms in this 
segment of financial sector proved more difficult, due to the 'insider trading' often involving the 
regulators and politically-affiliated investors.
Financial sector reforms offer a mixed bag of results. The capital market remains weak with 
regulatory failure was apparent in the stock market crash of 2010-11 (Ibrahim Khaled Committee 
Report 2011 as cited in Alam n.d.) and virtually no corporate debt market (Nachane and Islam 2009). 
The banking sector has performed far better, particularly in the past decade. The sector fares well 
vis-a-vis its South Asian peers in many key indicators (See Figure 12, BB annual reports and section 
IV). Nevertheless, the impact of reforms on the state owned banks has been less than satisfactory, 
largely due to the lack of consistent political commitments. 
Key financial sector indicators of selected countries, 2009
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4.3.5 Public resource mobilisation and fiscal reform
Revenue mobilisation (% of GDP) in Bangladesh: 1973-2010
As a continuation of structural reform, Bangladesh adopted D&DP-led programmes (policy 
framework paper (PFP), which asked for, among other things, efficiency of resource use and raised 
rates of domestic savings and investment. The reforms were introduced in different areas along 
with public expenditure polices and public resource mobilisation.
To increase government revenue, different reforms were proposed including expansion of value 
added tax, reforming direct tax, strengthening the tax administration, pricing adjustment of public 
goods and services. Simultaneously, the public expenditure policies sought budget deficit 
reduction along with government expenditure rationalisation. These asked for reforms aimed to 
reduce the growth of current expenditure and subsidies, while along with cutting down 
administrative costs, and improving project aid utilisation and reducing the SOE's operating deficits 
(Bhattachariya and Titumir 2001).
As a result of public resource mobilisation efforts, the tax-GDP ratio showed some improvement 
during the 1990s (Figure 13), but until now remains very low compared to other developing 
countries. Mahmud et al (2008) observed that tax reform is politically expensive and political actors 
are reluctant to choose hard measures against tax evasion. In fact, political settlements determine 
patterns of resource mobilisation lying at the heart of economic development (John and Putzel 
2009). Exorbitant tax evasion arises from collusion between political and business elites and the top 
levels of government and this also channeled to fund political stability in developing countries 
(Khan 2004). Mahmud et al (2008) pointed out that the public expenditure reforms were somewhat 
successful but high wastage and inefficiency in the delivery of public services occurred. 
Figure 13
th
Source: Based on the 6  Five Year Plan, Government of Bangladesh
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4.3.6 Infrastructure, energy and utilities reforms
Comparison of Bangladesh's infrastructure quality with key selected economies and regions
Nexus between access to electricity and per capita income: Bangladesh vis-à-vis low similar income group 
(left panel) and South Asia (right panel)
Bangladesh's reform experience in infrastructure and utility has been less pronounced. D&DPs have 
been keen to reform these sectors, in which the ADB was a key player, with other actors including 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the WB and bilateral donors (Norway, 
Netherlands, Kuwait). Reforms in these sectors were introduced much latter compared to other 
sectors, which is not uncommon as state control in infrastructure and energy often occurs in 
developing economies. While opening up the telecommunications sector has helped penetrate the 
service rapidly, the coverage levels of electricity, water and transportation and other services in 
Bangladesh are among the lowest in South Asia. In fact, Bangladesh has one of the worst 
infrastructure facilities in Asia (See Table 11). However, it should be noted that there is a high 
correlation between access to utilities and level of income (Figure 14). 
Prices for some utility services- particularly electricity, gas and water- are set below the costs of 
provision. While successive governments had reformed various aspects of energy and utility 
services, notably generation and distribution in the power sector, they had been reluctant to 
reform energy prices until recently, previously fearing a possible backlash from the voters and 
consumer rights groups. 
Table 11
Bangladesh 2.2 2.8 2.3 2.6 3.4 1.9
India 2.9 2.9 4.4 3.3 4.7 3.2
Pakistan 3.1 3.5 3.0 3.7 4.2 2.5
South Asia average 2.9 3.1 2.8 3.4 4.2 2.8
Asia Average 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.6 4.1
Source: ADB 2009.
Figure 14
Source: Based on World Development Indicators, World Bank 
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- 9Moreover, investors do not show long term interest in investing in these sectors  due to two main 
reasons. First, the GoB exhibits capacity constraints related to procurement management skills and 
subsequent implementation of projects (Choudhury et al 2010). The key informant interview also 
suggests that energy and infrastructure sectors suffer from gross governance problems. Second, 
there is a political uncertainty given the shorter time horizon of incumbent governments. Thus the 
risk premium for private sector financing for power generation is high. Khan (2012) observed that 
good governance reforms in many developing countries that have tried to directly tackle these 
characteristics have generally failed to reduce risk premiums.
To sum-up, although sectoral performance has been mixed, the economic reform has helped 
stabilise the Bangladesh economy. In fact, the most defining feature of reforms is probably 
attaining macroeconomic stability (see Figure 15). 
Figure 15
Source: Based on World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund
As far as sectoral performance is concerned, SOE privatisation did not facilitate manufacturing 
sector take-off in a significant way.  However, the paradigm shift to private sector-led development 
has helped in the emergence of dynamic growth sectors such as RMG. The supporting reform in the 
external sector through a number of incentives such as undervalued currency (which also helped 
remittance flow growth), bonded warehouse facilities, helped the export sector significantly. 
Agricultural sector reforms have been instrumental in achieving near self-reliance in food 
production. The banking sector's key indicators have performed better. However, utility, energy 
and infrastructure reforms have been politically challenging to pursue. 
Given the mixed outcome of D&DP influenced reforms, we study two areas  banking sector reform 
and energy price adjustment in the next section. 
Trends in key macroeconomic variables: 1980-2010
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11
9 An estimate shows that the sector is in need of US$9 billion investment to increase power generation to 11,500 MW by 
2015. The GOB plans to invest about US$1 billion and expects about US$8 billion investment from the private sector 
(Choudhury et al 2010).
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4.4  Case study
4.4.1 Banking sector reform in Bangladesh
Selected banking indicators of key economies of South Asia, 2009-10
Trends in broad money, credit and real interest rate in Bangladesh: 1975-2011
Financial sector reform was one of the key elements of the D&DP-guided Structural Adjustment 
Programme with banking is a dominant sub-sector of the country's financial system undergoing 
massive reforms. It is widely recognised that banking reforms have largely been successful 
compared to other segments of the financial sector (Ahmed 2012a; Nachane and Islam 2009). 
Key banking sector indicators such as share of non-performing loan (NPL), capital to risk weighted 
assets ratio (CRAR) and broad money to GDP ratio (also known as financial depth) have seen steady 
improvement over the past decade. In fact, the sector fares well vis-à-vis its South Asian 
counterparts. (See Table 12 and Figure 16) 
Table 12
India 69 70 1.3 20.2 8.75
Bangladesh 52 74 1.8 21.7 8.2
Pakistan 35 70 0.2 1 5.28
Sri Lanka 31 98 0.1 14.5 14.5
Source: Financial Sector Database, World Bank and Annual Report 2010-11, Bangladesh Bank
Figure 16
Bank Deposits/ Bank Credit/ Bank ROA Bank ROE Bank Z-Score
GDP Bank Deposits
Source: Based on World Development Indicators, World Bank
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However, the financial health and governance structure of state-owned/public sector commercial 
banks (NCBs/SCBs) remains a threat to the sector given that they still constitute more than a quarter 
of the industry. Moreover, the creation of the Banking and Financial Institution Division (BFID) at 
the Ministry of Finance in 2009 poses a serious risk to the sector, inducing the central bank's 
independence (Ahmed 2012). The government with the politicians in particular generally adhered 
to the key reforms that resulted in a win-win situation for those concerned. 
At the same time, given the sector's immense importance in achieving political objectives (a 
mechanism for automatic monetisation of fiscal deficit, among others), political interventions 
remains the key challenge in sustaining success in this sector. That said, it is imperative to 
understand the political economy of reform in the banking sector drawing some lessons for other 
segments of the financial system. 
Economic historians observed that the most successful economies tend to be those that developed 
sophisticated financial systems at an early stage (Patrick 1966). Therefore success in this sector will 
largely define the shape of financial architecture that could emerge in the economy in the near 
future. The specific rationales behind the study of this sector are: 1) External influence has been 
relatively higher in this sector; and 2) Political economy of reform in the banking sector is critical to 
understanding the emergence of the overall architecture of the country's financial system. 
As discussed in preceding sections, while the reforms in various segments of the economy were 
undertaken owing to external influence as well as domestic realisation, the key objective here is to 
understand under what circumstances reform worked in the banking sector through the interplay 
between D&DPs and the local actors. 
The financial system of Bangladesh comprises the Bangladesh Bank (BB) at the apex regulatory 
10body for the country's monetary and financial system, numerous financial intermediaries , money,  
debt, and stock markets. The system is heavily dominated by banks, with the banking sector 
constituting four State Owned Commercial bank (SCBs), 30 private commercial banks (PCBs), nine 
foreign commercial banks (FCBs) and four development finance institutions (DFIs). 
These 47 banks operate throughout the country with 8522 branches (Bangladesh Bank 2011). Prior 
to reforms the sector was overwhelmingly dominated by SCBs. Even in the early 2000s the 
NCBs/SCBs constituted 47% of industry assets and half of the industry deposits. However, over the 
years the PCBs emerged as a dominant player in the sector constituting 58.8% of industry assets 
(See Table 13). Given the country's underdeveloped equity and debt markets, banking is the key 
source of credit and investment for the economy. 
Rationale and objective of the case study
Sectoral overview: Banking sector 
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11
10  Financial intermediaries include commercial banks, specialised banks, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), and 
microfinance institutions (MFIs), the last constituting a very special feature of the Bangladesh financial system. For 
details see Nachane and Islam (2009).
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Table 13
Bank Types 2001 2010 2001 2010
NCBs/SCBs 46.5 28.5 50.93 28.1
DFIs 9.5 6.1 5.64 4.9
PCBs 37.2 58.8 36.58 60.9
FCBs 7.8 6.6 6.85 6.1
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report 2011
The reform programmes initiated under various auspices focused on several dimensions, most 
notably SCB privatisation, entry of new private and foreign banks, recovery of NPLs, interest rate 
deregulations, BB's increased autonomy, enhancing prudential regulation and supervision, 
rationalisation and merger of bank branches, and improvements to the money market. 
The banking system operated until the end of the 1980s with the aim to achieve the fiscal objectives 
of supplying cheap money to the SOEs and a number of priority sectors (Raquib 1999). However, 
given the changing perspective towards denationalisation and private participation, the initial 
phase of banking reform (1980-90) focused on the promotion of private ownership of commercial 
banks and denationalisation of NCBs. 
While donors supported denationalisation from the very beginning, the compulsion to adopt 
reform measures was not strong until the mid-1980s. This was largely due to inappropriate 
accounting and reporting systems, which delayed the adoption of reform measures (Task Forces 
1991). As the weakness of the system exposed, the government transferred three NCBs in the 
11 12private sector during 1984-86  and four PCBs were granted licenses in the early 1980s . This two 
pronged approaches of denationalisation and private banks licensing was an acceptable 
equilibrium for the concerned stakeholders, i.e, D&DPs, politicians, private sector bar organised 
labours (who opposed banking sector liberalisation). 
This round of reform from 1982-1990, however, was largely unsuccessful due to the unprecedented 
influence of vested PCBs and NCBs interest groups, which resulted in a loan default culture. 
Moreover, the pervasive political patronage of the military government in allocation of resources 
choked the banking sector (Bhattacharya and Titumir 2001). Nearly 30% of NCB loans became non-
performing in 1986 (Watanagase 1990). Although the National Commission on Money, Banking 
and Credit which was constituted in 1984 submitted a long list of recommendations to the 
Industry asset and deposit shares of various types of banks in Bangladesh
Political economy of banking sector reforms
a) First phase of reform (1980-90): denationalisation and private participation 
     % of industry assets % of industry deposits
11 Uttara Bank, Pubali Bank and Rupali Bank.
12 Arab Bangladesh Bank, National Bank, Islami Bank and IFIC Bank.
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government in 1986 for which subsequent a number of steps were taken such as fixation of 
recovery targets for NCBs, prohibiting defaulters from getting new loans, the deterioration in 
banking efficiency could not be stemmed (Task Forces 1991). 
Given the poor outcome of earlier reforms, wide ranging banking reform measures were 
undertaken under the aegis of the WB's Financial Sector Reform Project (FSRP) in the 1990s. The 
focus of reforms, among others, have been on gradual deregulations of the interest rate structure, 
providing market oriented incentives for priority sector lending and improvement in the debt 
recovery environment (Task Forces 1991). 
Moreover, a large number of private commercial banks were awarded licenses in the second phase 
of reform. Although second generation banks have addressed many demand side issues, such as, 
13development of a wide range of financial products and services , the measures have not been 
successful in addressing the banking sector's key problems. These include high NPL ratios both in 
14SCBs and PCBs, the deterioration of credit allocation index , and lack of enforcement of the capital 
15adequacy and other regulatory requirements . Furthermore, changes in the interest rate flexibility 
were unable to create the kind of competition desirable among NCBs and PCBs. Thus FRSAC/SAP did 
not bring about the desired outcome in the sector (Bhattacharya and Titumir 2001) with the WB 
itself admitting that the project was unsuccessful. However, the WB alone was not to blame for the 
poor outcome of the FSAC as a lack of government ownership and political will to make the reform 
16successful were observed .
Thus the reform agenda emphasised economic deregulations rather than broadening prudential 
regulation and supervision (Bhattacharya and Titumir 2001). Moreover, after the expiry of FSRP in 
1996, the government formed a Bank Reform Committee (BRC), which submitted its recommen-
dations in 1999. While the then government partially acted on some of the recommendations of the 
BRC, a large part of them went unaddressed (Bhattacharya and Chowdhury 2003). 
     
Since denationalisation, greater private participation and market based pricing of financial 
products did not generate the anticipated results even until the late 1990s, largely due to the 
absence of firm supervision and effective economic regulations of BB, the focus had shifted to risk-
based regulations and supervisions in early 2000s. The BRC observed that the supervisory and 
regulatory forbearance of BB has been one of the main reasons for the accumulated banking 
b) Second phase of reform (1990-2000): market based pricing of financial products and 
private participation
c) Third phase of reform (2000s onwards): risk-based regulations and supervisions, private 
participation 
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 13 That includes commercial banking through both conventional and Islamic mode, merchant and investment banking, 
SME and retail banking, credit card and off-shore banking. The second generation banks also played leading role in 
syndicated and structured financing (Rahman 2012).
14  The flow of credit to national priority sectors (such as agriculture, small and cottage industries) also declined during 
1990-1999. Moreover, the relative share of rural banking has declined after the adoption of banking reform measures 
(Task Forces 2001).
15 Minimum capital requirement of the banks was also fixed at 8 percent of risk weighted assets since 1996 according to 
international standard practice and till 1998, both NCBs and PCBs were suffering from capital inadequacy (Task Forces 2001).
16 There was a law put in place to improve bank supervision, bank operating practices and method of debt recovery but 
commitment to enforce these laws has been dilatory and lacked resolved (Bhattacharya and Titumir 2001).
85
problems. While the issue of regulation and supervision was spelled out in FSRP and the banks 
adopted BASEL I norms in 1996, it was indeed the reforms in post 2000 that had a de facto focus on 
risk-based banking supervision including strengthening of the Central Bank. 
The most important development in 2000s has been the banks, notably PCB and FCB commitments 
towards the implementation of Basel II, in which banks are required to maintain a CRAR of 10%. 
While the SCBs struggled to maintain the ratio, in the past few years they have shown some 
progress. The overall banking sector success in following the adoption of international best 
17practices, has led to the BB's strong commitment to implement the BASEL-III norms . 
Moreover, there has also been a strong public opinion including civil society against the defaulters, 
which along with political commitments facilitated enactment of a number of new laws, 
regulations and instruments to curb NPLs.
Moreover, the Central Bank Strengthening Project (CBSP) initiated in 2003 focused on effective 
regulatory and supervisory system for the banking sector, particularly strengthening the legal 
framework, automation and human resource development and capacity building of BB by 
strengthening the research department, prudential regulations and bank supervision, accounting 
and auditing. 
The Enterprise Growth and Bank Modernisation Project was adopted in 2004 by WB to help the 
government achieve a competitive private banking system through a staged withdrawal through 
divestment and corporatisation of a substantial shareholding in the three public sector banks 
(Rupali bank, Agrani bank and Janata bank), and divestment of a minority shareholding in the 
largest SCB Sonali Bank. 
However, owing to the nexus between the politicians and businesses these banks' performance has 
not improved in line with reform objectives. The recent SCB scams indicate that the reforms have 
not been able to disentangle the state from direct controlling over those banks to achieve their 
political objectives (see box 3). Private participation in the banking sector continued during this 
phase. However, a number of leading experts on banking opposed the granting of new private 
bank licenses in 2012, as the BB decision was widely believed to be influenced by the political 
interest of the current government rather than economic need (Ahmed 2012a; Mohiuddin 2012). 
Banking sector reform, notably denationalisation, faced a strong resistance from trade 
union/organised labours, but political support favoured various reforms in the sector as the entry of 
private players provided them with considerable incentives, irrespective of military or political 
governments. This has also led to the growing nexus between private businesses and politicians.
 
However, in the absence of an effective regulatory mechanism, the banking sector reform had 
limited impact on its key indicators including competition and loan default until mid-1990s. With 
Assessment/ Impact of reform
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 17 BASEL III is the third installment of the Basel Accords (after Basel I and Basel II) that was developed in response to the 
deficiencies in financial regulation revealed by the late-2000s financial crisis.
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both public and private sector banks failed to improve their financial health, the reform focus 
shifted to risk-based regulations and supervisions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, thus allowing 
the sector to perform better (See Figure 16, Figure 17 and Table 12).
Figure 17
Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report, various years.
A relatively well functioning banking system has helped the Bangladesh economy to maintain its 
macroeconomic stability in the post-reform era. Micro indicators show that loan classification 
systems and capital adequacy standard have a favourable impact in improving the banking sector 
(Figure 17). This is largely due to BB's adoption of the BASEL regime, with 40 out of 47 banks in 
compliance with Basel-II consistent requirements by the end of June 2011 (IMF 2011).  
Nevertheless, problems still persist in SCBs/NCBs where implementation of reform has been 
difficult, largely owing to political reasons (See Box 2). Moreover, certain areas of the banking 
sector are still consistent regarding problems. High interest spreads, money market volatility, 
balance sheet problems of SCBs, central bank's limited autonomy, political interference in 
allocation of credit and overall governance problems are some of the key drawbacks to the 
country's banking system.
Box 2
The Banking and Financial Institution Division (BFID) has been created under the Ministry of 
Finance to ensure financial sector development. This decision of creating a separate division 
was taken by the Cabinet in 2009 giving BFID the responsibility to deal local banks and other 
financial institutions, particularly the state-owned ones. The major functions of BFID include, 
Performance of two key indicators- NPL and CRAR- of banking sector during 1997-2010 
Institution of Banking and Financial Institution Division (BFID): Hijacking the success of banking reforms?
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formulation and updating of laws, rules, and policies relating to banking, insurance and the 
development of capital markets and future markets. 
Experts however fear that the creation of BFID could open an avenue for greater government 
intervention in the financial sector, especially in the banking sector (Ahmed 2012b). The 
successive governments have already delegated autonomy to state banks, and more autonomy 
was given to the BB over the years in line with D&DP influenced reform with several committees 
formed by the government in the post 1980s favouring greater autonomy of the Central Bank. 
There is however genuine concern that interference in the banking sector could escalate 
through BFID. A majority of the interviewees felt that it could impede the banks' 
independence, including that of the Central Bank- one of the hard-earned successes of the 
three-decade long banking reforms.  
SCBs are generally used as an important channel for automatic monetisation of fiscal deficits. 
Higher fiscal deficits are partly responsible for incumbent's politically motivated projects. While 
the government faces opposition from both the D&DPs and the local actors such as the 
opposition party, civil society, etc to augment fiscal deficits, greater autonomy to the banks has 
been a bar to automatic financing of deficits. Thanks to the BFID, the government now faces 
little resistance to borrow from the banking system. For instance, four SCBs have faced severe 
fund crises as a result of large loans to Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation (BPC), the country's 
lone fuel importer. The fuel import rise in recent years is to support controversial rental power 
plants. BPC's accumulated losses have also resulted in higher NPLs for SCBs, forcing the 
government to issue special recapitalisation bonds to allow write-down of some of these NPLs 
(IMF 2011). The government borrowed an unprecedented average of Tk 1.24 billion a day from 
the banking channel during the first 120 days of the 2011-12 year, totaling Tk 225 billion (New 
Age 2011). 
During the current government's tenure, a growing stress on the country's financial system has 
taken place thereby subverting the BFID stated objectives. The entity did little to arrest the 
regulatory failure in several segments of the financial sector, including the stock market 
manipulation in 2010-11, sucking-up millions from small savers by the multi-level marketing 
companies and the misappropriation of over Tk 3,500 crore through fictitious loans by a little 
known private business outfit from a SCB. The interviewees of this research believe that in each 
of these instances the perpetrators have either given the opportunity to misappropriate funds 
or been kept above the law due to their political affiliations.
As discussed in the preceding sections, while the banking sector started to witness the benefits 
of reforms, the creation of BFID threatens to undo some of the hard earned gains of the over 
three decade long reforms in this sector. This has particular implications for the SCBs, which are 
still not fully compliant with risk based regulations, reflected in shortfalls of CRAR and the 
higher share of NPLs vis-à-vis PCBs and FCBs.
As the public banks are not within the de facto purview of the supervision of the BB, their weak 
compliance with prudential regulations is a serious risk to the stability of the banking system 
Chapter 4: External Influence and Economic Governance
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with experts recommending immediate and drastic correction. In addition to efforts to improve 
their performance, these banks should be brought under the central bank's regulatory 
supervision and must be required to comply with all prudential norms in a time-bound manner 
(Ahmed 2012b). IMF also stressed that there is a need for timely finalisation of the draft 
amendments to the Bank Companies Act, aiming at strengthening bank governance and 
oversight, thus allowing BB sole authority of prudential regulations (IMF 2011).
Like most other sectors, accumulated problems in the banking sector led to a wide range of 
reforms. However, political will has been the key to proceed with reforms which, in turn, is a 
function of economic incentives. While the denationalisation process faced significant roadblocks, 
particularly from organised labours, entry of private sector players in almost all phases of reforms in 
the sector helped overhaul the sector. However, the first two phases of reforms did not bring any 
measurable outcomes, highlighting the fact that wholesale liberalisation without instituting an 
effective regulatory structure is not the answer to the cumulative problems of bank nationalisation. 
Nevertheless, the sector turned around in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the D&DPs shifted 
their focus to risk-based regulations and supervisions. International best practices such as BASEL 
norms have also played a critical role in bringing order to the sector. 
However, the experience of SCBs indicates that the success of reform could be reversed if politicians 
and their aligned business groups find room to channel the outcome entirely in their favour, 
overlooking the national interest. The sector remains critical for the incumbent government for 
automatic monetisation of fiscal deficit financing politically favoured risky lending. 
The banking sector is arguably one of the most important avenues to create rent, an essential 
element of political settlements, politicians therefore unlikely to loosen their grip over it. Going 
forward, the challenge for the D&DPs along with steady focus on risk-based regulations and 
supervisions is to find a way to dismantle the state machineries directly controlling the finance. 
The reform experience in the banking sector also offers a broad lesson for other segments of the 
financial system that without instituting an effective regulatory architecture, market based 
reforms could do more harm than good, the lesson thousands of investors learnt, albeit painfully, 
during the two episodes of stock market crashes (during 1996 and 2011). 
The adjustment of energy prices is a contentious issue owing substantially to political economy 
considerations. The service provision of electricity and other utilities is institutionally embedded 
within the state, particularly in developing countries. This has led to extensive politicisation of such 
18service provisions, also known as clientelism , leading to artificially depressed prices, over-
employment, political manipulation of investment priorities, as well as a lack of managerial 
autonomy and technical competence (Foster et al 2006). 
Case conclusion
4.4.2 Case study: Energy price adjustment in Bangladesh 
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11
 18 Narrowly defined, clientelism is a social order which depends on relations of patronage. Political clientelism describes the 
distribution of selective benefits to individuals or clearly defined groups in exchange for political support (Hopkin 2006).
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Bangladesh's power sector has proven no exception. In fact, despite having experienced significant 
reforms since the mid-1990s, the sector is still marred with a plethora of economic and governance  
problems (Khan, F. 2010). More importantly, successive governments' have hesitated to undertake 
any major reforms in energy pricing, in fear of becoming unpopular with their electorate and losing 
their vote bank (Mahmud et al 2008). 
However, faced with severe fiscal and macroeconomic constraints as well as pressure from D&DPs, 
the current government started to adjust oil and electricity prices since assuming power in 2009, 
with electricity tariffs being adjusted upward five times in the past three years. 
In fact, the government pledged to the D&DPs to introduce an automatic pricing formula, 
eventually a full pass-through of fuel prices in line with international markets and reduce fuel and 
electricity subsidies. These commitments were made to comply with the conditions tagged with the 
recent IMF's credit (IMF 2012). Moreover, the ADB's loan on infrastructure for power transmission 
was linked to the power tariff adjustment (Rahman 2012).  
Figure 18 shows that the supply cost of electricity has increased sharply in recent years owing, 
primarily, to changes in fuel mix in electricity production. This has a direct link to the current 
19 government's ambitious plan to augment the supply of electricity to bridge the marked gap 
between the sector's supply and demand. While the government's energy road map targets 
electricity production from various fuel sources, in recent years the sector's dependence on fuel oil 
increased sharply from 5% in 2008-09 to over 20% in 2011-12. 
Increasing reliance on fuel oil has inflated the supply cost of electricity thereby forcing an upward 
adjustment of power tariffs. The average cost of electricity generation shot up to Tk. 6.42 per unit 
20from Tk 2.63, after fuel oil-run plants began electricity generation from the end of 2010 . As a 
result, the oil import bill is expected to be around 5% of GDP in FY12- roughly doubling as a share of 
GDP over the past two years (IMF 2011). 
Figure 18
Source: Based on BPDB
Fuel mix of electricity production (left panel) and supply cost and tariff of electricity (right panel)  
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19 Under the yearly power generation plan, the GoB has taken initiatives to produce 9426 MW of electricity between 2010-
15 (MOF 2010).
20 While gas supply shortfall has forced some power plants to operate at a suboptimal capacity (only 68 percent of its 
capacity can be used), this primary fuel still constitutes nearly 70 percent of fuel source of electricity. Electricity tariff in 
Bangladesh would have been much higher than the current level had gas prices been not heavily subsidised- weighted 
average gas prices are set at less than half their economic value. The other sources, hydroelectric and coal power, 
comprise approximately 5% of total power generation.
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This ad hoc price adjustment has caused severe distortions in the electricity market. While the 
government and the D&DPs are in favour of fuel price rationalisation, the other actors notably the 
consumer right groups, strongly oppose this ad hoc price adjustment. 
Given the fiscally un-sustainable fuel mix at present, loom as to whether the government will be 
able to diversify its fuel sources of electricity by attracting large investment in gas production and 
developing indigenous coal resources or importing coal resources from overseas. 
Against this backdrop, this section studies energy price adjustment by focusing on the trajectory of 
reform in the sector and understanding the interplay among various actors. Despite higher 
generation capacity, there remains considerable uncertainty as to whether the D&DP-influenced 
reforms would be able to supply cost-effective electricity. This is largely due to the inherent 
problems of the country's political and governance structures, which some scholars analysed in the 
framework of 'political settlements' (Khan 2010; Khan 2012) that ultimately bar implementation of 
long term investment projects.
Energy pricing reform is imperative for various reasons. First, the sector traditionally absorbs large 
subsidies that do not directly benefit the poorest segments of the country. With extreme poor 
households' share in total electricity consumption at less than 0.1%, energy subsidy is highly 
regressive in Bangladesh (International Institute for Sustainable Development [IISD] 2012). 
Secondly, long term investment including FDI in the sector largely depends on rationalisation of 
pricing, as allocation of capital requires a balanced return and risk. The present price of gas for 
instance does not provide sufficient cash flow to support further gas exploration.
Thirdly, the energy price adjustment process should also be analysed from an efficiency 
perspectives with low or subsidised electricity pricing and other utility services discouraging 
consumers' to use them efficiently. 
Finally, power sector is one of the areas where the external influence has not solved the 
fundamental problem of the sector- rational pricing of electricity due to the nature of political 
settlement in Bangladesh. So it is imperative to study the sector by examining the interplay of 
various actors involved in energy sector reform. 
At the heart of many energy sector shortcomings is the pricing of primary energy (gas, oil, coal) and 
final energy products (electricity) which, in turn, functions of a number of economic and 
governance variables. Hence, it is important to understand those issues comprehensively. Reform in 
the sector is one of the ways to assess what policies have and have not worked in the past, towards 
understanding the sustainability of current policies on energy pricing. This could also help in 
understanding the roles of various actors including the government, D&DPs, organised labour, 
private sector and consumer groups and their interplay in the process. 
Rationale of energy price adjustment
Energy sector: reforms and outcome 
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11
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Energy sector reform generally follows a three pronged approach- public sector overhauling, gradual 
liberalisation with an expanded private sector role and regulatory reform. Before initiating reform, 
the vertically integrated government power utility Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) was 
solely responsible for electricity generation, transmission and distribution throughout the country. 
It was only in the mid 1990s that the sector witnessed a major policy shift, when the government in 
consultation with a large number of D&DPs including ADB, WB, DFID, JICA, Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau of Germany, and USAID, launched a reform project on Power Sector Reforms in 
Bangladesh (PSRB) (ADB 2005). 
The PSRB contained four key objectives: (i) the separation of sector regulation and operation; (ii) 
the autonomy and commercial orientation of the sector entities; (iii) unbundling generation, 
transmission, and distribution; and (iv) increased private sector participation. 
Reform in the power sector has increased private participation particularly in power generation. 
The sector's commercial performance improved significantly in reducing power distribution losses 
and in the operational performance of transmission system. The regulatory body Bangladesh 
Energy Regulatory Commission has also been formed whereby private and public sectors now have 
equal share in power generation.
The ruling party has shown interest in reforming electricity generation and transmission which 
gives them opportunities to align their political and economic interests. During the past BNP 
government's tenure (2001-06), considerable focus was placed on increasing transmission capacity 
and  it was widely reported that served their interests given their business allies' involvement in the 
sector. However, their priority to increase electricity transmission above generation capacity 
proved to be a wrong move in light of the chronic load shedding that prevailed.  
Increasing electricity generation capacity has been a major focus for the current government. 
When the AL government assumed power in January 2009, the effective capacity of power 
generation stood at approximately 3500 MW. The government has added approximately 4000 MW 
new capacity in various forms, including liquid fuel based, gas based or dual fuel plants. 
BPDB's generation report shows that as of June 2012, the total generation capacity was 7500 MW 
21while actual generation was between 4400-5000 MW . A small number of business players with 
22close relationships to the government have been awarded most of the power generation projects  
(Khan 2012 ). 
Despite this apparent success, the key informant interview and leading power sector experts feel 
that the main objective of the power sector reforms agenda remains unfulfilled (Khan, F. 2010).  
Even if some of the power generation constraints and transmission are addressed, expensive power 
seems to be the only solution (Tamim 2012). To find an answer to the unfulfilled objectives of such 
reforms, it is essential to examine the political economy of power mix.
d
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21 Bangladesh Power Development Board Website provides real time as well as time series data about power generation. 
Available at http://www.bpdb.gov.bd/bpdb/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=151&Itemid=118 
22 Also see Power Generation Project up to 2015, available at 
http://www.bpdb.gov.bd/download/New_Generation_Planning.pdf, accessed on 20 July 2012.
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Political economy of fuel mix: actors and interplay
Phase-wise generation expansion plan Global power mix (in %)
As discussed in the preceding section, the major objective of power sector reform remain 
unfulfilled due to the lack of rationalisation of energy prices which, in turn, is a function of 
appropriate fuel mix. Experts argued that power sector reform programmes in Bangladesh and the 
region missed the point that electricity is a secondary energy, with countries ignoring the need to 
ensure the supply of primary fuel in electricity generation (Khan 2012). Generation of electricity is 
generally adopted based on the principle of the least-cost expansion plan, which involves choice 
related to appropriate fuel mix and technology. 
However, it is not only the government who determines fuel mix. The D&DPs, politicians, consumer 
groups and civil society organisations are some of the key actors in deciding the fuel mix for 
electricity generation. 
According to the Power System Master Plan (BPDB 2010), the forecasted demand for electricity is 
19,000 MW in 2021 and 34,000 MW in 2030. The plan suggested a fuel mix comprising 30% 
domestic coal, 20% imported coal, 25% natural gas including LNG, 5% liquid fuel and 20% nuclear, 
renewable energy and power import (also see Table 14). It is not unusual that preference is heavily 
skewed towards coal at 50% since coal globally produces approximately 40% of electricity, 
followed by natural gas (22%), renewables (19%), nuclear (14%) and liquid fuels and other 
petroleum (5%) (See figure 19). Coal is the main source of primary energy in both China and India. 
Even one-third of the United States' electricity is generated by coal.
­ Immediate: 6 -12 Months
 Rental and Quick Rental Plants (liquid fuel)
­ Short term: 18 - 24 Months
 Peaking Plants (liquid fuel)
­ Medium term: 3 - 5 years
 Combined Cycle Plants (Gas or dual fuel)
 Peaking Plant (Gas or dual fuel)
 Coal fired steam plants
­ Long term: beyond 5 years
 Liquefied Natural Gas based Combined 
Cycle Plants
 Domestic/Imported Coal Power Plant
 Gas/Oil based Peaking Plant
 Nuclear Power Plant
 Renewable Energy
Source: Power System Master Plan, Bangladesh Power Source: Based on World Energy Mix Interactive, 
Development Board National Geographic Website
Table 14 Figure 19
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23 See International Energy Agency (IEA) website, available at http://www.iea.org/stats/index.asp 
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The stock of primary energy indicates that Bangladesh has comparative advantage in producing 
electricity from coal and gas. The country has an estimated 16.6 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of 
24
recoverable gas reserves left in its 23 gas fields as of January 2012 .  
However, apart from electricity generation, gas is being used in households and in producing 
fertiliser and other industrial outputs. The total coal reserves in the five coal fields of Bangladesh 
are estimated to be 2.9 billion metric tons and with a conservative recovery rate of 30 percent, the 
25
available reserve could translate to about the energy equivalent of 20 tcf of natural gas .   
While natural gas remains the dominant source of primary energy, the price of this form of 
hydrocarbon is being kept under-priced by successive governments, primarily, not to upset the 
middle class vote banks (IGS 2009). In the absence of price signal in the market the sector faces 
considerable constraints to meet the growing demand not only in electricity generation, 
households and industrial activities are also constraints by the unreliable supply of gas.  
Currently about 600 MW power cannot be generated due to gas supply shortage (Tamim 2011). 
While BAPEX has shown significant success in exploring natural gas, the lack of finance, technology 
and political will bar the entity from expanding its capacity. While D&DPs and the government 
favour greater involvement of international oil companies in natural gas exploration, such actions 
often face strong opposition from civil society organisations.
Bangladesh's transition to a diversified fuel mix, particularly coal-based electricity production, 
faces considerable hurdles from all the actors bar consumer groups. A large number of interviewees 
felt that due to environmental concerns the D&DPs, left-wing political parties and civil society 
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organisations are not in favour of producing electricity from coal with existing technology . 
However like the gas sector, the elected governments do not have much incentives or capacity 
under the competitive clientelist political settlement to develop long-term infrastructure projects 
(Khan 2012).This lack of political and social consensus, governance issues and D&DPs reluctance bar 
the country's electricity generation with the least cost fuel input of coal.  
As a result, the sector has had little success in developing coal and gas-based base load power plants 
over the past three and a half years. The government cancelled submitted bids for five coal-fired 
power plants in July 2012, which were estimated to generate approximately 2,500 MW of 
electricity, a major setback to offering low-cost electricity from base-load power plants. The 
politicians, the government agencies and private sector players have given more focus to rental 
power plants which rely on oil as a primary fuel and can be materialised within 6 months to a year.  
Consequently, the government licensed nearly three dozen high-cost oil-fired power plants to 
enhance electricity generation in the last three years. However, given the higher fuel costs in the 
international markets, these power plants run at 47% capacity on an average  (New Age 2012).
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24 A report indicates that Bangladesh has 16.59 Tcf of gas left in 23 fields. According to the Hydrocarbon Unit the country's 
estimated gas reserve was 28.20 Tcf in November 2011 (Financial Express 2012b).
25 Unpublished Document of Dhaka Electric Supply Company Ltd. (DESCO), available at www.fkk.weebly.com/ 
uploads11/2/5/7/1257637/desco.docx
26 Our interview with D&DPs also confirms that they don't support coal fired electricity plants for environmental concerns.
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Given the government's inability to diversify fuel mix in line with its Power System Master Plan, 
consumers are experiencing relatively better electricity services yet with much higher tariffs (The 
Daily Star 2012c). On the contrary, the least-cost generation expansion plan with appropriate 
choice of fuel mix could have given the consumers' affordable electricity (Table 15). 
According to Tamim (2012b), along with efficiency improvement, using mainly indigenous primary 
fuel (50% coal, 30% gas, 8% renewable including hydro) and imported liquid fuel (12%), the 
average electricity production cost can be maintained at Tk.4/kWh. However, the provision of least-
cost electricity in the context of Bangladesh is not only a function of economics, but also of the 
sector's governance structure (see Box 3).
Table 15
Domestic Coal 116 0.05 4.12 0.05
Indian Coal 70 0.04 3.09 0.04
Indonesian Coal 170 0.07 6.04 0.07
Domestic Coal (> 600 MW) 116 0.04 3.14 0.04
Indian Coal (> 600 MW) 70 0.03 2.35 0.03
Indonesian Coal (> 600 MW) 170 0.06 4.60 0.06
Natural Gas (Local Price) 1 0.01 0.93 0.01
Natural Gas (International Price) 7 0.08 6.70 0.08
Natural Gas (Local Price) (CC) 1 0.01 0.53 0.01
Natural Gas (International Price) (CC) 7 0.05 3.83 0.05
Source: fkk.weebly.com/uploads/1/2/5/7/1257637/desco.docx   
Box 3
Our analysis shows that while it is possible to provide cost-effective electricity, the power sector's 
governance structure is a major barrier.
The interviewees of this research projects highlighted a plethora of governance issues 
concerning the sector: longer maturity time of projects (often taking longer than scheduled 
time); large public sector procurement; lengthy procurement processes; weak contract 
enforcement; higher technical system loss; weak network system; collusion and corruption; 
extremely poor internal governance; higher levels of investment risk; policy uncertainty with 
change in government; bureaucrats' risk-averse approach fearing future charges of corruption. 
In addition, the quick rental power plants are not only economically inefficient, but also breeds 
problems like corruption.
Comparison of tariff for different types of coal and gas
Expensive solution to electricity problem and governance structure of the power sector
Primary Fuel Price (USD/ Tariff (USD/ Tariff (BDT/ Tariff (USD/
MT or USD/ kWh) kWh) kWh)
 MCF)
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The market based reforms have been less than effective in addressing such governance issues. 
Yet more importantly, there is perhaps an inherent limitation of market based reforms in 
addressing them. This is not to say that reforms are unnecessary, but that they are probably 
incompatible in the context of Bangladesh (and other developing countries for that matter). The 
reasons are extensively analysed in Khan (2010, 2012).
The base load power plants/ IPP investments, for instance, are key to supplying cost-effective 
electricity. However, they are difficult to materialise owing to governance problems. The D&DPs 
with capacity to finance infrastructure and power projects, insist on transparent procurement 
guidelines and bidding procedures in the power sector. However, the sector is controlled by a 
small number of bidders based on personal relationships with political insiders (Khan 2012). 
Thus, while leveraging political connections some companies could secure power projects, they 
face difficulties in financing them (Bibiyana 1, Bibiyana 2 and Meghnaghat 2, for instance) as 
with an underdeveloped capital market, the financing for large infrastructure and power 
projects generally come from the international agencies. 
Our discussion with a number of D&DPs also confirms the view that owing to governance 
problems, they are unable to utilise available funds for power projects. Moreover, in the 
competitive clientelism, those projects do not get commitments from politicians as their regimes 
are too short to materialise those projects (Khan 2012).
It is therefore not surprising that even after three and half years of the current government, the 
power sector has been unable to make any significant headway in materialising IPPs/base load 
power plants, resulting in high-cost electricity with rapid growth in rental power plants. The 
government's guarantee to protect the BPDB's solvency (single buyer of electricity and supplier 
of fuel) prompted short-term projects with greater private participation. However, in the case of 
IPPs investors are not convinced that either the government or its agencies (bureaucracy) are 
capable of protecting their long-term investment leading to higher risk-premium for long-term 
infrastructure projects.
There is a consensus between the D&DPs and the government to rationalise energy price, adjusting 
electricity tariffs upward. However, the current approach does not offer a cost-effective solution as 
far as electricity services are concerned. Reform in various aspects of the power sector, notably 
transmission and generation of electricity, has fulfilled some reform objectives, yet this has been 
achieved by accommodating political interests. The sector faces significant governance challenges 
which are the key barriers to generating electricity with an appropriate fuel mix, an important 
determinant of affordable electricity. 
To offer electricity at a competitive price in the medium to long term, there is a need for large-scale 
investment both in gas and coal sectors, two critical primary fuels where Bangladesh's sizable 
reserves enable comparative advantage. However, the current governance structure which is a 
function of the country's political settings, has proven a challenge to attracting the requisite 
investments and therefore establishing base load power plants.
Case conclusion
95
Chapter 4: External Influence and Economic Governance
96
Market based reforms have been of little help in this regard, as Khan (2012b) observed “that the 
problem in the power sector is that long-term contracts and calculations are difficult when the 
political settlement has features of competitive clientelism with short time horizons of the ruling 
coalition and with low and declining governance capabilities of the bureaucratic organisations 
who regulates the investment in these sectors.” 
Thus, while in the last three and a half years, the government, its agency bureaucracy and their 
close business allies have increased electricity generation capacity markedly, this increased capacity 
could not be exploited fully due to lack of coal and natural gas supply. Although the oil based rental 
power plants should have been phased out by this time to allow other primary fuels notably coal to 
augment its share, these plants are likely to maintain their share in the next few years, increasing 
supply cost of electricity and undermining the fundamental objective of the power sector reform.
The analysis indicates that key reforms in the Bangladesh economy were introduced in periods of 
severe economic constraints. Cross-country experience also suggests that significant changes 
generally emerge from crisis, yet, there must also be a political response to crisis (Cabral et al 2006). 
This research indicates a similar pattern that any reform that presents the potentiality of political 
gains, either through rent or increasing vote banks - will find support from the politicians. 
However, political incentive alone has proven inadequate unless there is a firm commitment from 
politicians and the commensurate capacity of bureaucrats. 
The influential actors involved in the process of economic reform are namely: D&DPs, politicians, 
private sector, bureaucrats and organised labour.  D&DPs have been the key players in promoting 
as well as influencing the reform agenda in Bangladesh. Politicians' support for reforms on the 
other hand has varied widely, wherein some cases they facilitated reforms and in others, they did 
not make firm commitments. The business interest groups comprised largely of the private sector 
and businessmen-turned politicians, often influenced reform to secure their vested interests. 
Whenever decentralisation becomes the proposition of any reform, bureaucrats had a tendency to 
resist it, as this might have affected their activities and in turn result in relinquishing control over 
the sector. Organised labour opposed reforms, often liaising with political parties. However, over 
the years their influence has declined to a large extent because the politicians who control them, 
have been given substantial incentives to facilitate reform.  
Politicians showed commitments towards key reforms of private participation, privatisation, 
economic openness, macroeconomic stability, agriculture reform and public resource mobilisation, 
inter alia. The state played a significant role in mobilising internal resources, by cutting subsidies 
and mobilizing tax and other revenue, however tax evasion and public spending leakages remain 
rampant. 
The government hesitated to reform in certain areas which are politically costly such as energy price 
adjustment. Their lack of commitments towards reform measures such as modifying the fuel mix in 
favour of coal and developing other large infrastructure has emerged as a key challenge for 
4.5 Conclusion and the way forward
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sustaining growth. This is largely due to the short time horizon of any ruling political party, 
declining governance capabilities of the bureaucratic organisations and the market-based reform's 
limitations in improving governance capabilities. The case study on the energy price adjustment 
significantly highlights these facts. 
With regard to D&DPs' policy advocacy, denationalisation and privatisation policies have worked in 
some sectors but simultaneously have not produced measurable change in others. The banking 
sector case study indicates that privatisation including private participation, may not be a solution 
to the problems accumulated through nationalisation, unless emphasis is placed on regulation and 
supervision. The adoption of international best practices played an important role in improving 
regulatory quality in the banking sector.
The study also suggests that the reform's continuation of success is uncertain if the nexus between 
politicians and businessmen find ways to channel reform gains to serve their vested interests. As 
observed by Mahmud (2001), if there is a demand in the political system for illegal incomes and 
rent-seeking, economic reforms alone will not be the remedy.
As far as reforms' impact on good governance is concerned, the study identifies a number of facts. 
First, in line with the burgeoning body of research (World Bank 2010, Khan 2010, World Bank 
2007b), it suggests that the D&DP guided reforms have had little impact in improving overall 
governance structure of the economy. Nevertheless, their sectoral impacts are mixed. The case 
study on the banking sector reform clearly suggests that liberalisation does not automatically 
improve governance quality. However, governance quality in private banks has improved, 
particularly in the post-2000, thanks to the adaptation of the global best practices as well as grating 
more autonomy to the Bangladesh Bank to regulate the sector.
Second, the case study on energy price adjustment is a revelation of more complex issues 
concerning growth and governance. Some of the reform objectives concerning governance have 
fulfilled- system loss in the power sector has declined and a regulatory body has instituted. 
Nevertheless, market-based reform in energy and utility sectors have been unsuccessful in 
improving overall governance quality, thereby precluding the long-term investment in the sector 
critical for cost-effective electricity production. 
The reason being, as also identified by Khan (2012) that the D&DP guided market-based reforms 
and their governance expectations do not serve the vested interests of political elites. This has 
generated tensions between politicians and the D&DPs, depriving the power sector of urgently 
needed financing and other large infrastructure projects, the Padma Bridge most notably, which 
could be another interesting case study in this discourse. The absence of a mature financial system 
as well as the country's saving-investment gap, compels Bangladesh to depend on D&DPs for a vast 
array of infrastructure and power projects that otherwise might not be possible. 
That said, there are limitations to economic reforms. Rodrik et al (2002), Alcala & Ciccone (2004) and 
Kaufmann et al (2007) indicate the importance of institutional features such as corruption, rule of 
law and general governance issues such as political accountability, quality of bureaucracy etc. in 
determining whether the outcomes of reform would be beneficial. In retrospect, the reform 
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advocacy of the 1990s which urged developing countries with weak institutions to undertake 
economic reforms with the implicit assurance that political progress and good governance would 
follow as a consequence, has proven to erroneous (Nachane and Islam 2009).
Going forward, economic reform is a lengthy and continuous process and while Bangladesh has 
made significant strides, more still needs to be done. The country's future challenge to growth 
could arise from its governance challenges, as it is already being witnessed in power and 
infrastructure sectors.
 
At low level of development, governance has apparently not been a major constraint to growth, as 
comprehensively argued by a number of scholars. Moreover, sectors such as agriculture and 
informal sector activities were not affected by governance constraints (Mahmud et al 2008). 
However, for the next phase of growth, reforms in the financial sector notably equity and debt, and 
capital market liberalisation, energy sector particularly coal and gas based base load plants, the 
infrastructure sector and other modern urban sectors will be critical. 
D&DPs role could be even more important as they remain the preferred source of financing for 
large projects. However, the WB, ADB and other development partners' greater emphasis on 
governance performance as the major determinant of fund allocation poses an enormous 
challenge in this regard.
What are the solutions to the growing mismatch between D&DPs reform agenda and their 
governance expectations? Our interview with experts suggest that there is a need for compromise 
by both government and D&DP stakeholders to find a workable solution. Since D&DPs have 
acknowledged that their governance reform expectations were overambitious, they should revisit 
their rigid criteria in fund allocation by placing higher weight on sectoal performance than 
governance criteria. Given the market-based reforms limitations in addressing governance 
problems in sectors such as energy, utility and infrastructure, owing to political constraints, D&DPs 
should study the 'political settlement' within Bangladesh arising from competitive clientelism of 
the post-1990s, when they recommend governance reforms in these sectors.
Moreover, given the limitation of market enhancing governance capabilities (to make markets 
more efficient by reducing market transaction costs) in Bangladesh, this is also the right moment to 
contemplate the need for alternative thinking on governance, such as growth-enhancing 
27governance capabilities (Khan 2008, Khan 2009) . However, further research is needed in this 
regard. 
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27 According to Khan (2009), growth-enhancing governance capabilities are capabilities that allow developing countries to 
cope with the property right instability of early development, manage technological catching up, and maintain political 
stability in a context of endemic and structural reliance on patron-client politics. Khan (2012) has gone as far to question 
the applicability of the market-enhancing governance agenda where developing countries such as Bangladesh are 
concerned. 
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Chapter 5 : NGOs as Drivers of Policy Change: Between Policy Autonomy and External Influence
5.1 Overview
5.1.1 Research objectives
Bangladesh has made impressive gains in social and economic development over the last four 
1decades despite various slippages . One interesting feature of the country's development story is 
the important role of civil society, especially NGOs, as development partners of government and 
donors. Since independence, Bangladesh's government faced the dilemma of addressing 
numerous development challenges with limited resources and capacities. 
Donors thereby became sources of financial resources and technical assistance and NGOs, in 
addition to implementing their own development programmes, became civil society partners in 
donor funded government development projects. Furthermore, with the basic orientation of 
donors' development assistance shifting from the Needs Based Approach (NBA) to the Rights Based 
Approach (RBA) over the last two decades, the NGO role has accordingly changed to attain broader 
scope. 
During the NBA era, donors and governments engaged NGOs mostly in service delivery for health, 
education, social safety net and microfinance. With the RBA, NGOs started emerging as governance 
actors in collaboration with donors and government. In effect, they began playing broader roles in 
policy change through policy advocacy, policy research, campaigning, lobbying, reviewing law, 
drafting law, media mobilisation and social mobilisation.
It is therefore important to investigate whether and to what extent NGOs, as civil society actors, 
influence policy change. It is also imperative to explore if (and to what extent) the NGO policy 
advocacy agenda with the government is guided by donor priorities based on NGO dependence on 
donor funding.  
C H A P T E R
5
NGOs as Drivers of Policy Change: 
Between Policy Autonomy and 
External Influence
1 Since 1990, the country's economy is growing more than 5 percent on average every year. At the same time, annual 
poverty reduction rate is about 1 percent. The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of gender parity in primary and 
secondary school enrolment is met well before deadline. The child mortality rate has reduced by half and life expectancy 
has increased by more than 15 years (World Bank 2005). Despite the ongoing global economic crisis, Bangladesh's 
growth rate was recorded 6.6 percent in 2011. 
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The resulting research objectives are as follows:
 The capacity of NGOs as policy actors in relation to government and donors 
 The processes constituting NGOs' role in policy change vis-à-vis government and donors
 Forms and degrees of external influence on NGOs' policy change agenda
NGOs' scope of activities as civil society actors grew further since the 1990s with the return of multi-
party democracy. NGOs became government partners in implementing national development 
frameworks such as the Fourth Five Year Plan (FYP) for Financial Years (FYs) 1990-95, the Fifth FYP 
for FYs 1995-2000 (Haque 2002, p. 418) and even the ongoing Sixth FYP for FYs 2011-15.
From the 1990s onward, NGOs also started advocacy on democratic governance issues of 
decentralisation, rule of law, access to justice, corruption and transparency, human rights, and 
good governance. Two broad trends of 'service delivery' and 'issue-based activism' (Lewis 2010,      
p. 162-163) in the country's NGO activities are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as NGOs involved 
in service delivery were sometimes also involved in activism and vice versa.  
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that replaced the FYPs as the national development 
strategy from 2002 provided greater policy space for NGOs. As stipulated by the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), PRSPs had to be country-driven, result-oriented, 
comprehensive, prioritised, partnership-centric and based on a long-term perspective. 
This bottom-up approach in policy planning necessarily made NGOs integral from policy 
formulation to implementation. NGOs and other civil society actors became key participants in the 
national consultation under PRSP process, which later formed the foundations of general and 
2sectoral PRSPs . The PRSPs featured four sets of supporting development strategies in which NGOs 
played a critical implementation role: ensuring participation, social inclusion and empowerment; 
promoting good governance; providing service delivery; and, caring for the environment and 
sustainable development. 
Although civil society actors, particularly NGOs, backed by donor support, were already involved in 
policy advocacy, the PRSP process was unique in providing them direct and formal participation in 
policy making for the first time. 
The current government however has departed from the PRSP format that was in practice 
between FYs 2002-2010 and reverted back to the FYP format, currently implementing the 
country's Sixth FYP. Unlike the PRSPs, the wider population and civil society actors have 
therefore not been consulted in the ongoing Sixth FYP formulation. The Sixth FYP is rather 
based on Vision 2021 that is the election manifesto of the current government party. No 
widespread efforts were visible on the government's part to incorporate various stakeholders' 
suggestions in the current FYP. 
5.1.2 Rationale of the research
2 The section 3.19 of PRSP 2005 states “The output of consultations worked as general guidelines for preparing the 
thematic group reports as well as the PRSP.”
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The greater involvement of NGOs that happened in PRSP format of national development 
framework has apparently been reversed. However, the government continues to recognise NGOs 
3as its partners, particularly with respect to socio-economic development .
The research objectives will be examined in two case studies: the Right to Information (RTI) and 
Human Rights, where greater involvement of NGOs occurred. 
The methods used are mainly literature review, document analysis and qualitative interviews, with 
secondary literature reviewed on civil society, NGOs and development. This research analyses policy 
advocacy documents of concerned NGOs, national and international policy frameworks, relevant 
laws, donor strategies and donor correspondence. 
A total of twenty key informants were interviewed that included RTI activists, human rights 
activists, academic experts and government officials. Based on the three main categories of 
explanatory, descriptive and combined methodology (Morra and Friedlander 1999, p. 3), this 
research employs the explanatory case study method.
The rationale for selecting the two stated case studies is their significance in terms of country 
situation, constitutional obligation, national development frameworks, political party agenda and 
development assistance agenda.
Transparent and accountable governance and human rights are enshrined in the country's 
constitution with democracy and human rights featured prominently in fundamental principles of 
state policy in Part II of the Bangladesh Constitution. Part III of the Constitution includes a list of 
fundamental rights of the citizens of Bangladesh.
Governance and Human Rights are among key concerns in national development frameworks. The 
Sixth FYP of the Government of Bangladesh identifies improving sectoral governance and 
protecting human rights as two of the major challenges in achieving Vision 2021. The Outline 
Perspective Plan, (OPP) 2010-2021, serves as a strategic document to materialise Vision 2021. One of 
the visions of OPP for Bangladesh is 'a resilient democratic nation' that stresses on right to 
information and free media. The very first of 'development priorities' identified by OPP is 'effective 
governance'. 
Bangladesh's leading political parties have also expressed their commitments to democratic 
governance and human rights in party constitutions. The ruling Awami League commits to 
recognising human dignity and humanistic values, and, to set up a strong government system in 
order to ensure people's participation and empowerment at all administrative levels down to the 
5.1.3 Methodology
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3 The Sixth FYP doesn't contain any set of supporting strategies like the outgoing PRSP format that apparently had greater 
scope of NGO involvement in governance processes. For example, in the Sixth FYP, NGOs or other civil society actors are 
not included in strategies for 'improving governance.' They are rather discussed under strategies for 'strengthening 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)' with apparently secondary priority attached to them after businesses. It seems that the 
government is more interested to see NGOs as service providers than as governance actors. A civil servant also expressed 
similar opinion in his interview terming NGOs nothing but government contractors. It is also noted in the Sixth FYP that 
there is no mention of civil society in the strategies although there is some passing reference to civil society in few latter 
sections mainly with respect to climate change adaptation and third party monitoring of FYP implementation.      
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4grassroots . The main opposition, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), sets as one of its objectives, 
the establishment of stable democracy through parliamentary, multi-party democratic 
government as elected by the people's direct vote and to bring equitable national progress and 
5development . 
Transparency and accountability as well as the protection and promotion of human rights, are 
therefore among the main challenges to Bangladesh's development and governance, and the 
subject of continuous public debate.  
In this context, the recent Right to Information (RTI) has been proposed by the country's civil society 
to ensure transparency and accountability in governance. Though the country's human rights 
situation has not satisfactorily improved even after transition to democracy in the early 1990s, the 
rule of law under democracy has increased human rights protection in some proportion. While 
there is greater awareness about human rights among the country's population, human rights 
violations in general have not declined and newer forms of such violations are on the rise.   
Transparent and accountable governance as well as promotion and protection of human rights are 
related to the top priorities in development cooperation between Bangladesh and its donors. 
6Furthermore, good governance and human rights are central themes  in the Country Assistance 
Strategy (CAS) or similar development cooperation frameworks of both bilateral and multilateral 
donors. 
Hence, assessing NGO advocacy in RTI and human rights offers greater scope in understanding 
external influence over the NGO advocacy agenda. As RTI and human rights become common 
interface between NGOs and political parties, assessment of NGO role in these two policy fields will 
tell more about the policy change space they enjoy in the existing political system.
The findings of this research give elaborate account of what roles NGOs play in policy change and 
how they carry out their roles vis-à-vis government and donors, yet they cannot be taken as 
standard generalisations.  
While there are common patterns among NGOs' role in policy change, there will be plenty of 
variations across cases as well; which is why the NGO role in the cases of RTI and human rights will 
not be always comparable to cases in other policy fields. Both RTI Act and NHRC were initiated 
during the Care Taker Government (CTG). NGOs' role in policy change may vary during political 
governments.    
Limitations of the research
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 4 The Constitution of the Bangladesh Awami League (www.albd.org) (Accessed: 10 may 2012).
 5 Bangladesh Nationalist Party-BNP Constitution (www.bangladeshnationalistparty-bnp.org) (Accessed: 10 may 2012).
6 In World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) 2011-14, 'stronger governance' is one of the strategic priorities. Good 
governance is the first thematic driver of Asian Development Bank's (ADB) Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) of 2011-
15. In USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) 2011-16, Development Objective (DO) one is: 
increasing citizen confidence in governance institutions. According to Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for 2007-13, good 
governance and human rights is one of the three focal areas of European Commission's (EC) development commitments 
to Bangladesh.      
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Structure of the chapter
5.2 Governance, civil Society and external influence   
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section is an introductory one. The second section 
discusses conceptual linkages between governance, civil society and external influence by drawing 
on relevant literature. Sections three and four are the two case studies respectively. Each case study 
focuses on actors, roles and processes in the policy change following background discussions. A case 
specific conclusion is also drawn at the end of each case study. The concluding section draws a 
general conclusion on the research findings and charts the way forward.  
Governance relates to making and enforcement of rules for governing collective human activities 
by involving multiple actors to maximise collective welfare. Governance can be understood as 
horizontal relations between organisations instead of conventional vertical arrangements 
(Cleveland 1972); public sector reform through reduction of transaction costs (North 1990); system 
of rules with transnational implications (Rosenau 1995); the three E's of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness (Rhodes 1997); setting of rules that guide rule-making (Hyden 1999); and governing 
without government (Pierre and Peters 2000).
Civil society can be generally understood as “the private domain which exists in the space between 
(a) the state and its various apparatuses, and (b) the economy and its various expressions (British 
Council 1999 in Van Rooy 2004, p. 5).” In other words, civil society is “a realm in the interstices of the 
state, political society, the market, and the society at large for organisation by non-state, 
nonmarket groups that take collective action in the pursuit of the public good (Alagappa 2004, p. 
32).” NGO also belong to this realm as non-profit private entities. 
Civil society is therefore an important actor in governance process. This can be assessed by applying 
Stoker's (1998) five propositions about governance. Stoker's first and second propositions about 
governance define it as “a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond 
government” and notice “the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and 
economic issues.” 
This is correct when considering that civil society is often the source of actors outside government, 
who share its service delivery and decision-making responsibilities, thereby blurring boundaries 
between government and 'non government' in addressing social and economic issues. 
Stoker's third and fourth propositions about governance stipulate “the power dependence 
involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action” and “autonomous 
self-governing networks of actors.” We also notice that government depends on civil society in the 
governance process and that the latter tend to form and constitute self-governing networks. 
Stoker's last proposition of governance defines it as “the capacity to get things done.” Again he is 
right since civil society actors are tapped into for bridging capacity shortages in government 
agencies or for capacity building.
The emergence of the governance paradigm, particularly the good governance agenda, is closely 
linked with the changing orientation of development assistance. Increasing scepticism about 
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development assistance set in during the 1980s mainly for corruption, bad policies and misuse of 
development assistance in many of the recipient countries (Bauer 1991, p. 45-49 in Hout 2007, p. 3). 
The World Bank then (1989, 1992) presented good governance as the answer to these challenges 
(Abrahamsen 2000, p. 48). They were followed by Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2004), Collier and 
Dollar (1999) and World Bank (1998), who made powerful empirical claims that development 
assistance only works in countries that follow good governance and good policies (Hout 2007, p. 
19). Simultaneously, other donors also joined the World Bank's good governance bandwagon 
(Abrahamsen 2000, p. 48). Since the 1990s, the international donor community pursued the 
promotion of good governance, which mainly stipulated a new set of aid conditionality for 
economic, political and administrative reforms (Hyden 2011).
As development assistance is generally underlined by specific development thinking and policies, 
the prominence of the good governance agenda rendered policies the centrepiece of development 
cooperation. A country's policies had to be 'good' in order for it to achieve 'good' governance. To 
be good, policies and governance arrangements had to meet standard criteria that were 
internationally agreed upon and accepted by both donors and recipients. 
If necessary, such policies could be learned and borrowed from other countries. Thus, policy 
transfer between donors and recipients became more frequent (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p. 5). 
This generally constitutes processes by which knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in one country is replicated in another country. 
The Government of Bangladesh introduced the Right to Information Act in the very first session of 
the ninth parliament. In her message at the international conference titled “Right to Information: 
Law, Institution and Citizen” held in Dhaka on 21-22 June 2009, the Prime Minister said, “In our 
election manifesto, we … pledged to ensure free flow of information. That is why we enacted the 
th th
Right to Information Law on March the 29  this year in the first session of the 9  parliament. As we 
have enacted the law, we are now committed to implementing it. Our Constitution guarantees 
every citizen the freedom of thought, conscience and speech irrespective of religion, race, caste and 
sex.” But the story of the arrival of the RTI concept in the country, its gradual popularity and its 
gaining momentum through enactment of the RTI Act is far more complex. This is an interesting 
case of government-civil society-donor linkages in policy making. 
The case study will enable us to identify NGO actors of policy change in the RTI; analyse the role of 
NGOs vis-à-vis government and donors in introducing the RTI Act, along with the processes through 
which their role took shape; and to decipher whether the NGOs' RTI advocacy agenda was 
externally driven or home grown.   
th
The idea of Right to Information (RTI) emerged in 18  century in Scandinavia. In 1766, the joint 
parliament of Sweden and Finland passed the Access to Public Records Act. In 1946, the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted the Resolution 59(I) that states, freedom of Information is the 
5.3 Case study: Right to Information
5.3.1 RTI and good governance: National and international contexts
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touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations (UN) is consecrated. Then Article 19 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) recognised the right to information as an 
7essential part of the freedom of expression . This was reiterated in Article 19 (2) of the International 
8
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1966 . 
Similar legislative developments occurred in other countries with the United States pioneering the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in 1967. Between 1990 and 2000, many other countries around 
the world passed similar laws. India is the regional RTI pioneer in South Asia, where after decades of 
civil society movement and advocacy at grassroots, state and national levels, its RTI Act was 
introduced in 2005 (Article 19 et al. 2001). As of January 2012, approximately 90 countries 
worldwide have Right to Information (RTI) or Freedom of Information (FOI) laws 
(www.right2info.org).
There is evidence that countries tend to perform better in Transparency International's (TI) 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) following the adoption of an RTI law, although the correlation is 
not definitive (Iftekharuzzaman 2009) (See Table 16). It is then possible to assume that the 
“upsurge of the RTI law worldwide indicates the growing recognition of the importance of the 
citizens' access to information as a catalyst for strengthening democracy, promoting human rights 
and good governance, and fighting corruption (Iftekharuzzaman 2010).”
Table 16
Croatia 2003 3.7 3.5 - 3.4 4.1 4.4
India 2005 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.4
Pakistan 2002 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5
Romania 2001 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.7 3.8
Slovenia 2003 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.4 6.6 6.7
Turkey 2003 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.6
Bangladesh is continuously found at the lower end in the 0-10 score of Transparency International's 
9
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) since 2001 . From 2001 to 2005, Bangladesh was consistently at 
the bottom of the ranking, with the lowest score among all countries. Only in 2004 and 2005 did 
Bangladesh share its lowest spot with Haiti and Chad respectively. The country's CPI score 
Changing CPI scores of some countries that adopted RTI (0-10 Scale)
Country Year of RTI 2003     2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
law adoption
 7 UDHR Article 19: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless 
of frontiers.”  
 8 UDHR Article 19 (2): “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art 
or through any media of his choice.” Bangladesh became a party to ICCPR in 2000.
9 CPI Score captures perceptions of the degree of corruption among business people and country analysts and ranges 
between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). So, higher score means lower perception of corruption and lower score 
means higher perception of corruption. The ten clusters of score are: 0-0.9, 1.0-1.9, 2.0-2.9, 3.0-3.9, 4.0-4.9, 5.0-5.9, 6.0-
6.9, 7.0-7.9, 8.0-8.9, 9.0-10. 
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marginally improved from 2006 to 2011, when the country's CPI score was limited between 2.0 and 
10
2.9 despite marginal increase year by year. These scores remain among the lowest in the world .
It is apparent that Bangladesh's RTI movement emerged amid the country's continuous 
underperformance in democratisation, good governance and corruption prevention. The fact that 
the RTI law was introduced to address the above governance challenges is evident from the RTI Act 
2009 preamble. It recognises that ensuring the right to information is necessary for the 
empowerment of people, as well as to increase transparency and accountability, decrease 
corruption and establish good governance.
The Right to Information Act, 2009, received the President's assent on 5th April, 2009 and was notified 
in the Bangladesh Gazette on 6th April, 2009. The RTI Act's preamble stipulates core constitutional 
and legal principles underlying the law and a set of concerned definitions. Article 2(g) of the laws 
defines “right to information” as the right to obtain information from any authority. 
The act also includes information provision authorities, information providing units, preservation-
publication-access, designated information officer, an information commission and remedies. 
Under the RTI Act, the Right to Information Rules 2009 was introduced on 1st November 2009. This 
included administrative procedures for receiving information requests, providing information, 
information request fees and information request forms. 
The general stakeholders involved in RTI's realisation were the government, civil society and 
donors, under whom various actors contributed respectively. The main government actors were 
Prime Minister's Office (PMO), Law Ministry, Information Ministry, Jatiyo Sangsad (National 
Parliament) and Law Commission Bangladesh. 
The main civil society actors were NGOs promoting good governance; particularly Manusher Jonno 
Foundation (MJF) and its partner NGOs, Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) and Article 19 
Bangladesh. Major donor actors were the bilateral agencies namely Department for International 
Development (DFID), Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA); the 
multilateral development banks namely World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB); 
International Organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and, International 
NGOs (INGOs) like TI, Article 19, Asia Foundation and Open Society Institute.      
RTI in Bangladesh is an interesting case of government-civil society-donor interface in policy 
change. The RTI movement cannot be considered 'bottom-up', rather it can be termed as 'middle-
up' and 'middle-down' because the initiative was not from the general population or 'bottom' of 
society but from the civil society that is situated at the 'middle' of society. They mobilised the 
'bottom' in one hand and lobbied with the 'top' or government on the other hand. Under the 
leadership of some of the country's leading NGO personalities, a coalition of NGOs focused on good 
5.3.2 RTI Act: actors, roles and processes
NGOs 
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10 CPI scores of Bangladesh (2001-2011): 0.4 (2001), 1.2 (2002), 1.3 (2003), 1.5 (2004), 1.7 (2005), 2.0 (2006), 2.0 (2007), 
2.1 (2008), 2.4 (2009), 2.4 (2010), 2.7 (2011).
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11governance promotion and backed by the donor community,  acted as 'policy entrepreneurs' in 
advocating the RTI law agenda to the government and mobilising its public support. Although the 
government enacted the RTI Act and accordingly formed the Information Commission, it did so 
only after being lobbied by civil society advocacy. 
As part of NGO advocacy for good governance since the 1990s, there was increasing focus on 
freedom of expression, media freedom, participatory local government, human rights, women 
rights, child rights, disability rights and gender equity. NGOs increasingly felt that exercise of the 
above rights and democratic citizenship was often restrained by lack of access to necessary 
information. In the 2000s, there was increasing public debate about corruption, transparency and 
accountability.  
Those NGOs promoting good governance began emphasising corruption as a major challenge and 
in their search for remedies, started forming a consensus about RTI's legal recognition. The urgency 
for an RTI law was greater than ever. As a major thematic campaign, MJF undertook an RTI 
12movement with different stakeholders and initiated an RTI law drafting process . Both these 
 initiatives were implemented in collaboration with Partner NGOs (PNGOs) as well as International 
NGOs (INGOs) like TI Bangladesh (TIB) and Article 19, who were in the movement with various 
stakeholders. All the NGOs involved in RTI advocacy came together to form the RTI Forum in 2008. 
The RTI movement had continuously engaged the government all through yet the then 
government still refrained from introducing the RTI law. The subsequent caretaker government 
then accepted the civil society demand placing an RTI Ordinance for public consultation and 
eventually issuing the RTI Ordinance on October 2008. As the present government came to power, 
the ordinance was adopted as an act or regular law of the country in October 2009.
The civil society initiatives were also built on international statutes namely UDHR and ICCPR and 
were inspired by developments in other countries especially India. The Executive Director of MJF 
stated in a newspaper article that unlike India, the demand for the RTI law in Bangladesh did not 
start at the grass-roots level. Rather, “the demand was raised by civil society groups, realising that if 
Bangladesh were to have any chance of improving governance, curbing corruption and 
establishing accountability and transparency in public institutions, then a law on RTI would be the 
key tool to do so.” MJF sought technical assistance for its RTI advocacy from Commonwealth 
Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), a New Delhi based INGO that played an important role in expansion 
of RTI across Indian states (Anam 2009).
Essentially, NGOs' primary roles for RTI are demand generation, knowledge production, policy 
advocacy, issue based movement, network formation and technical assistance.  
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11 Initially, the NGO coalition for RTI movement was an informal one that consisted of MJF and its PNGOs, TIB and Article 19. 
But at the later stage of the advocacy campaign, the coalition was given a formal shape through formation of RTI Forum 
with largely similar membership. The two leading NGO personalities of the RTI advocacy were Shaheen Anam, Executive 
Director, MJF and Iftekharuzzaman, Executive Director, TIB.
12 MJF formed a Draft Law Core Group with responsibility for RTI law drafting through necessary research and 
consultations. The members of this expert committee were Barrister Tanjib-ul-Alam, Advocate, Bangladesh Supreme 
Court; Asif Nazrul, Professor, Dept. of Law, Dhaka University; Sultana Kamal, Executive Director, Ain O Salish Kendra 
(ASK); and, Dr. Shamsul Bari, Executive Director, Research Initiatives Bangladesh (RIB). Barrister Tanjib-ul-Alam 
conducted most of the research while the rest supported him with their comments and guidance. 
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Donors
Donors of the leading NGOs of Bangladesh RTI movement
Donors are important actors in the RTI movement for a number of reasons. First, as a funding 
source, since all major NGO actors of the country's RTI movement especially MJF, TIB and Article 19 
along with their PNGOs are direct or indirect recipients of development assistance (See Table 17). 
Secondly, donors are often sources or inspirations of NGO advocacy agenda on RTI.
The role of donors in NGO agenda setting can be voluntary, coercive or mixed. NGOs may 
voluntarily seek ideas and suggestions from donors due to their own capacity constraints. But the 
donor role may also result from development assistance conditionality, in which case NGOs have to 
include certain donor prescribed components or follow certain strategies in their advocacy 
programmes. 
But there may also be a convergence of donor and NGO thinking about goals, objectives and 
strategies, which was overwhelmingly the case in the RTI movement's donor-NGO collaboration in 
Bangladesh. There was already a broad consensus among the major donor agencies and NGOs with 
respect to good governance promotion; thus once the NGOs recognised RTI Act as a useful tool to 
promote good governance, the donor community supported them without opposition.
Table 17
DFID DFID DFID
Norwegian Ministry DANIDA Netherlands Ministry of 
for Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs
Norwegian Ministry of European Commission
Foreign Affairs
Swedish SIDA Ford Foundation
UNDP Fritt Ord
SDC Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
Open Society Institute
Swedish SIDA
William and Flora Hewlett 
Foundation
Source: MJF, TIB and Article 19 websites
A brief review of major donors' principles and commitments in providing RTI development 
13
assistance aptly begins with DFID, one of the largest bilateral donors in Bangladesh . DFID's largest 
MJF TIB Article 19
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13 DFID has currently 27 projects in the country with a total budget of GBP 1,119,424,777.14. Between 2008 and 2011, DFID's 
annual project allocation for Bangladesh more than doubled from GBP 100 million to over GBP 200 million.
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individual sector group of funding is Government and Civil Society. DFID's resource commitments 
to RTI may have played an important role behind the introduction and implementation of the RTI 
law (See Table 18). 
Table 18
Access to GBP Government and Completed  Increase access
Information for 228,977 civil society to information
Greater (USD 363,283) through enactment
Participation  of a progressive 
and Government    right to information
Accountability law
 Empowerment of 
individuals and civil 
society organisations 
to demand 
information to 
advocate their 
interests
 Facilitate change in 
culture and capacity 
of public officials to 
supply information
GBP 3,315,339 TIB Ongoing  Facilitate citizen
(USD 5,259,951)  demand for 
transparency in
public, private 
and non profit
transactions
15GBP 29,500,000 MJF Ongoing 
(USD 46,803,225) (2008-2013)
14Source: DFID website .
A review of DFID strategy for Bangladesh during the period 2000-2005 finds that addressing 
governance and corruption is one of the two deepening areas of emphasis. But in realising this 
goal, DFID favoured a subtler and less confrontational approach with multiple entry points under 
its country assistance plan of 2006 onwards (Batkin et al 2006, p. 9). RTI law appears to be one such 
entry point that presented scope for reducing corruption and enhancing good governance in a less 
confrontational manner. 
DFID development assistance for RTI
Project Title Project Allocation Fund Recipient Project Status Project Objectives 
(as available) (as available)
14 http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/Default.aspx?countrySelect=BD-Bangladesh (Accessed: 10 May 2012)
15 http://www.manusherjonno.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6&Itemid=7 (Accessed: 10 May 2012)
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However, no explicit interest or specific commitment for RTI was found on DFID's part from some of 
DFID's key development assistance policy documents regarding Bangladesh (Batkin et al. 2006, Barr 
and Barnett 2006). This is also indicative of Bangladesh civil society's ownership over RTI advocacy 
agenda-setting, despite subsequent RTI resource commitments from DFID and other donors.
The findings are also quite similar regarding the second major donor, the Norwegian Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs. Bangladesh is one of the largest recipients of Norwegian bilateral development 
assistance, having accumulated more than USD 1 billion over the years. Although strengthening 
governance and combating corruption are two key priorities for Norwegian development 
assistance to Bangladesh, these contributions were not specifically for governance. Under these 
16 priorities, MJF received NOK 60 million (USD 10.34 million) worth of grant support from Norway
for the period 2010-2012. This is exactly double its earlier contribution of NOK 30 million for the 
17period 2007-2009 .
Whether the doubling of this Norwegian grant to MJF resulted from the latter's successful advocacy 
for the RTI law in Bangladesh or mere coincidence cannot be definitively clarified. Nonetheless the 
convergence of governance perspective thinking among Norwegian government and MJF is 
definitely visible. 
This is evident from the Norwegian government's development assistance priorities in 2008. These 
identified vibrant civil society with free media and active pressure groups as one of the three 
national factors that affect development and poverty-levels of countries and hence were 
18influenced by development assistance . Norway's support for MJF thus aligns with its approach to 
development assistance. MJF, its PNGOs and other NGO actors of the civil society advocacy for RTI 
showed all signs of vibrant civil society, while they acted as a pressure group on the government for 
RTI law reform.
We can conclude that donors are not just sources of funds to promote RTI, but they are also sources 
of technical assistance, policy ideas and policy agenda.      
Civil society advocacy and commensurate donor support would have never realised the RTI Act 2009 
without Bangladesh government's enactment of the law. The RTI law was first introduced by the 
CTG as an ordinance that was later adopted by the current political government as a full-fledged 
law. But even the previous political government was engaged in the RTI law advocacy process of 
civil society. 
For instance, MJF organised the 'Seminar on Right to Information' on 5 September 2005 in Dhaka, 
where the then Minister for Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs attended as chief guest, with the 
Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Ministry of Information and the 
Government
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16 Bangladesh & Norway: platform for partnerships, The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Dhaka, 2012.
17 http://www.norway.org.bd/News_and_events/ (Accessed on: 12 May 2012) “Contract between the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Manusher Jonno Foundation (MJF) regarding support for a Human Rights Funding Mechanism.” 
18 http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/development_cooperation/norwegian-development-assistance-in-
2008.html?id=493308 (Accessed : 12 May 2012) 
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Information Secretary as special guest. All the three high-level government representatives 
accepted RTI in principle, but remained non-committal about relevant legal reform (MJF 2005,               
pp. 6-7). Nevertheless, a civil society initiative led by MJF for a draft RTI law went forward.
Despite the government's passiveness in moving forward with the introduction of an RTI law, the 
government-civil society dialogue over the legal reform continued. Throughout 2006, MJF 
organised a series of divisional consultations on the draft RTI law, where government officials 
participated with other stakeholders and about 70 recommendations were put forth (MJF 2006,        
p. 9). As the draft RTI law was submitted to the Information Ministry in 2007, CTG came to power 
thus opening a window of opportunity for the RTI cause. 
MJF, with the RTI Forum, approached the CTG to materialise the RTI law, all the while continuing its 
advocacy as with the previous government. The civil society advocacy until then also produced 
some champions amongst committed government officials, who played a vital role from inside to 
influence the government to accept the demand for RTI law. 
The CTG's Ministry of Information formed a drafting committee where the MJF point person for RTI 
was included as a member. Thus the otherwise all-government member drafting committee had at 
least one member from civil society. The committee actively considered the civil society draft law 
submitted by MJF and also an earlier Law Commission report, to devise a government draft of the 
proposed RTI law. The government draft was then made public for comments and public 
consultations were organised. 
The MJF representative in the drafting committee noted that there were lively discussions and 
debates in their meetings and despite being the lone non-government member, she had never felt 
marginalised. Rather, she had been entitled to equal opportunities to make contributions as her 
fellow government members; and even identified the Information Ministry Secretary chairing the 
committee and the Law Ministry's committee representative as two enthusiastic champions of RTI. 
There were, in fact, considerable similarities between the civil society draft law (the CS draft) and 
the RTI Ordinance introduced in October 2008, (the Ordinance) which later became RTI Act 2009 
(the Act). The following CS draft provisions were adapted in entirety in the ordinance: the 
overriding power of the law; specific inclusion of NGOs as information providing authorities; 
inclusion of women as Information Commission (the Commission) members; mechanisms sensitive 
to peoples with disability; free-of-cost information provisions for poor people in consultation with 
the Information Commission; wider responsibilities for the Commission; and  similar legal authority 
vested in the Commission as in civil courts with regard to complaints. 
Despite the fact that the government adopted the RTI law following civil society advocacy, the 
former exercised considerable ownership over the outcome. That is why there are also some 
variations between the two documents (See Table 19).
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Table 19
Source: Comparative Assessment compiled by Farzana Naim, Director (Governance) and Ruma Sultana, 
Programme Manager, MJF. 
However the government exercise of ownership over the RTI law outcome didn't always reduce the 
law's scope, with several of the government's own provisions strengthening the law. A strong point 
of the Act is obligating information, providing authorities to publish annual reports of their 
activities, which raised urgencies for transparency and accountability, in contrast to the CS draft 
and the Ordinance's provision bi-annual reports. Furthermore, the Commission quorum was 
reduced from three members in the Ordinance to two members in the Act, which facilitated the 
Commission's meetings to be more regular.
    
Based on the above discussion it can be concluded that NGOs were the proactive civil society actors 
for policy change regarding RTI in Bangladesh. Lack of access to information in the country was 
constraining scope for good governance in general and transparency and accountability in 
particular. When the government was not forthright in ameliorating the situation through 
necessary policy reforms, it was several leading NGOs working for the promotion of good 
governance that came forward with appropriate policy propositions in the form of the RTI Act. 
These NGOs successfully adapted the idea from other countries with technical assistance of INGOs 
and consequently advocated for the introduction of an RTI law, prepared a draft law, generated 
public opinion in support of the law and engaged with government accordingly. While donor funds 
Differences between provisions of the CS draft, the Ordinance and the Act
5.3.5 Case conclusion    
Draft RTI Law 
(CS Draft)
 Included note sheets or their copies in 
the information list
 Explicitly mentioned political party as 
information providing authority
 Information providing authority 
extended up to Union level
 Broader scope of publication of 
information by public authorities
 Strong protection of whistleblower
 Higher rank accorded to CIC
 Made IC sole authority to appoint 
employees
 Presentation and discussion of IC's annual 
report in parliamentary standing 
committee
 Lesser numbers of exemptions from 
providing information
RTI Ordinance 2008 and RTI Act 2009
(the Ordinance and the Act)
 Excluded note sheets or their copies from 
the information list
 Political party not mentioned as 
information providing authority
 Information providing authority is 
extended up to Upazila level
 Reduced scope of publication of 
information by public authorities
 Indirect mention to whistleblower 
protection
 Did not specify rank and allowances of CIC 
and other Information Commissioners
 Government to appoint employees of IC
 Submission of IC's annual report to the 
President who may or may not send it to 
parliament
 Bigger numbers of exemptions from 
providing information
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provided necessary resources for RTI movement advocacy, the agenda-setting was driven by the 
NGOs. The donors also didn't have any explicit influence whatsoever beyond their fund 
contributions. 
However, civil society's prioritisation of RTI reflects internationally recognised values of good 
governance, freedom of expression, transparency, accountability and corruption prevention, 
which are enshrined in international regimes and often promoted by donors. Facing NGO policy 
advocacy, the government eventually accepted the demand for the RTI law, introduced the RTI Act 
and implemented it with NGOs' technical assistance. 
The origin of the human rights movement in Bangladesh can be traced back to the popular upsurge 
against the undemocratic regime and deteriorating human rights scenarios of the mid-1980s, 
19ultimately resulting spawning prominent human rights NGOs in Bangladesh . Over the past 
decade, civil society has tried to play their part in compensating for the state's deficiency or 
sometimes even indifference, in promotion and protection of human rights of the citizens 
regardless of their political affiliation, ethno-religious identities and socio-economic status. 
However, to what extent NGOs' human rights activism resulted from locally-felt demand or  
policies prescribed by external actors i.e. donor agencies, international organisations or foreign 
governments remains an uncharted area due to the lack of noteworthy empirical research.
This case study explores if NGOs, as civil society actors, demonstrate a tangible role leading up to 
policy change, regarding protection and promotion of human rights in general and the formation 
of a national human rights commission in particular. Secondly, the history of human rights activism 
by NGOs is studied to analyse their roles and constitutive processes in the human rights field, vis-à-
vis the government and donors. Finally, their activities are further examined to identify if they were 
guided by external influence.
Even before the concept of civil society gained currency in Bangladesh (David Lewis 2004, pp. 113-
120), NGOs were already involved in the promotion and protection of human rights (Dina Siddiqi 
20
2006, p. 11) . Therefore, a human rights oversight body was on the NGO advocacy agenda for quite 
some time. Despite the NGOs' demand for such a body, successive governments hardly paid 
adequate attention to the matter. Traditionally, the NGO-government relationship was sometimes 
marked by mutual suspicion, as hinted by David Lewis (2010, pp. 159-180), unless NGO activities 
21were purely development-oriented or unrelated to human rights and rule of law .
Bangladesh's past record of human rights does not bode well. There is history of human rights 
abuses using state apparatus, especially law enforcing agencies, the more recent example being the 
5.4   Case study: Human rights movement and National Human Rights Commission
5.4.1 Human rights scenario of Bangladesh
19  For example, ASK, BLAST and Odhikar were established in 1986, 1993 and 1994 respectively. 
20 David Lewis argued that 'civil society' as a concept gained popularity in Bangladesh in the 1990s. However, ASK was 
established in 1986. Other similar organisations that were functional even before included Coordinating Council for 
Human Rights in Bangladesh (CCHRB), Bangladesh Society for the Enforcement of Human Rights (BSEHR) and 
Bangladesh Human Rights Council (BHRC).
21 Opinion expressed by a legal expert in interview.
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formation of the special law-enforcement agency, Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), aimed at bringing 
serious offenders who evaded capture to justice.
While RAB was purportedly established as a desperate response to chronic law and order failure, it 
liquidated some outlawed criminals and seemingly gained popularity among the masses because of 
its apparent quick delivery of justice (Wikileaks Cable 2005). Despite fervent condemnation by 
human rights NGOs and other civil society actors, these extra judicial killing went unabated as 
evident in the report by Human Rights Watch. Since RAB's inception, at least 1,600 people have 
been victims of extrajudicial killings at its hands (Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 296).
In more recent times, the extra judicial killings in 'crossfire' have been replaced by even more 
serious human rights violations of 'forced disappearance' that too at alarming rate. One 
interviewee commented that the dead bodies found later showed signs of torture techniques used 
by law enforcement agencies. The Human Rights Watch quoted Odhikar as saying that “more than 
50 people have disappeared since 2010" (Human Rights Watch 2012). 
Given Bangladesh's 'poor' track record of human rights, donor countries prioritised this issue in 
their development cooperation agenda (European Union 2006, p. 17). As Bangladesh's access to 
their market expanded and they continued providing aid for good governance promotion with 
their tax payers' money, the reason for the latter's interest in human rights becomes self-evident.
There was demand for a human rights 'court' or an oversight body to safeguard against human 
rights violations by the civil society organisations quite early on (ASK, BLAST, Odhikar 1997). 
Moreover, the Constitution of Bangladesh delineates the provision for an Office of the 
Ombudsman, a constitutional body, to provide checks and balances to the Executive branch.
However, the formation of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was not a result of the 
previous home-grown demand. It was instead a result of the complex interplay between and 
among the actors involved, with their converging and often diverging set of interests. The 
following discussions review the roles of different actors and the process through which the NHRC 
came into being.
Civil society actors like NGOs take their cue from the international treaty obligations, their activities 
generally in line with the principles enshrined in them. Their intervention approach also suggests 
that their activities are mostly aimed at filling up the vacuum left by state deficiencies i.e. poor 
governance. Let us first discuss activities of major human rights NGOs.
Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), established in 1986, is recognised as one leading human rights NGO of 
Bangladesh. Alongside legal advocacy and legal aid, ASK monitors civil and political rights; 
economic, social and cultural rights; women's rights and labour rights situations in Bangladesh. 
With regard to its specific contributions to the NHRC establishment, ASK provided its opinion on 
the draft ordinance (ASK 2008, p. 19) with recommendations on how to make the commission 
5.4.2 Actors, roles and processes
NGOs
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independent and effective. However, ASK expressed concern regarding the inadequate 
''independence, transparency, accountability and effectiveness of the institution (ASK 2009, p. 
23).'' Despite the fact that many of ASK's recommendations were not reflected in the final Act, it 
continued to be vocal in demanding ''viability and effectiveness'' of the Commission (ASK 2010, p 18).
Another prominent human rights NGO, Odhikar, that asserts blunt stance on human rights 
violation, has been working on political and civil rights with more recent focus on 'forced 
disappearance'. Odhikar considers itself a 'human rights movement', rather than human rights 
NGO. The organisation has proved to be outspoken on rights issues and a harsh critic of successive 
governments. Within a week after the CTG assumed power, Odhikar issued a press release 
condemning arrest of three student political activists and asserting that the emergency rule was a 
22violation of human rights . Odhikar's human rights defenders program mobilises young 
volunteers to fight for human rights. 
Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST), established in 1993, primarily focuses on 
litigation, and legal aid. In addition to advocating for legal reform, BLAST sought to uphold the 
rights of the poor by facilitating their access to justice (BLAST 1997, p. 15).  The initial stage of the 
organisation marked campaigns and advocacy at the grass root level. The so-called 'law-clinics' 
were set up to provide legal aid to those who could not otherwise afford lawyers. 
BLAST's human rights activities were voluntary in nature; and occurred at a time when legal aid was 
“not often among the priority activities” for both the donors and other NGOs. It also organised 
workshops on the need for a human rights commission. BLAST took up Public Interest Litigation 
(PIL) for the first time in Bangladesh with funding from The Asia Foundation and its activities were 
more directed at human rights movements as claimed by its report (BLAST 1997, p. 48).
Table 20
Source: Compiled from the official website of the NGOs
Activities of human rights NGOs
22  Interview of Odhikar official.
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ASK
 Advocacy
 Human rights awareness
 Human rights monitoring
 Legal aid
 Training
BLAST
 Advocacy
 Public interest litigation
 Capacity building
 Legal aid
 Investigation
 Networking
Odhikar
 Human rights monitoring 
through documentation 
and fact finding
 Community human rights 
watch through human 
rights defenders
 Police station monitoring
 Networking (national 
and international)
 Advocacy
 Public interest litigation
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These human rights NGOs did not work in isolation, but instead maintained strong linkages with 
other like-minded organisations. ASK, BLAST and Odhikar forged strong networks with other 
human rights NGOs including Madaripur Legal Aid Association (MLAA), Bangladesh Human Rights 
Enforcement Committee (BHREC), Bangladesh Human Rights Commission (BHRC) and 
Coordinating Council of Human Rights of Bangladesh (CCHRB). BLAST and ASK jointly undertook 
'Legal Advocacy and Participation of the Civil Society Project' to fill up the deficiency of 
coordination among human rights based NGOs. In the late 1990s, ASK, BLAST and Odhikar jointly 
started publishing annual status reports about human rights in Bangladesh.
The question of good governance within NGOs also surfaced as data was being collected for this 
case study. A remarkable reason for NGOs' enthusiasm for human rights issues, as pointed out by a 
veteran human rights activist interviewed, stems from funding and enthusiasm of donors. With the 
increase in donor funding for NGOs working on rights issues, more and more NGOs are following 
suit. Another interviewee pointed out that the NGOs previously involved in micro-credit lending 
activities have, nowadays, turned to 'human rights promotion,' understandably because of the 
increasing inflow of donors' funds. It is also alleged that relatively more money is spent on 
employees' salaries and remunerations than for the actual promotion of rights by the human rights 
NGOs. As one veteran human rights activist pointed out, “those who work in human rights 
organisations are no longer 'human rights activists', rather they are 'human rights employees.' 
Human rights activists were often reluctant to discuss about NHRC. Some of them were critical of its 
activities and believed that the commission balances its activities to preclude any conflict with 
government interests and that it serves outright the purpose of the government to belly criticism 
over its human rights performance. 
One interviewee claimed that the NHRC is not fully independent and that commissioners 
nominated by the government hold ruling party leanings, an allegation also voiced by members of 
civil society (The Daily Star 2012). After six alleged 'muggers' were shot dead by RAB in Narsingdi 
district, the NHRC condemned the killings with the reservation that RAB also has the right to self- 
defence (BBC Radio 2012).
The donor countries and agencies engaged in human rights promotion do so through the 
government, civil society or, oftentimes, a combination of both. Of all the donor organisations, the 
Netherlands, DANIDA and Swedish SIDA placed special priority on Human rights, Democratisation 
and Good Governance, often referred to as 'HRDGG' in their policy papers. 
Moreover, previous studies revealed that Nordic countries are more inclined to fund human rights 
issues (Neumayer 2003); and according to ASK's official website, three of its top six donors are 
Scandinavian countries. These issues also appeared in the media when the Dutch and Danish envoys 
raised human rights issue as they called on the Prime Minister (The Daily Star 2009).
Even before the NHRC came into being, DANIDA had been working closely with the Bangladesh 
Government and civil society to train up the government officials on human rights and good 
Donors
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23governance . DANIDA's involvement in Bangladesh was aligned with its objective to “[s]trengthen 
the implementation of human rights and access to justice” and its view that there was “non-
existence or a dysfunctional state of oversight and guardian institutions” on human rights in 
Bangladesh.
The DANIDA strategy plan taken in 2005, explicitly expressed its intent to increase support for civil 
society organisations. From 2005 onwards, DANIDA gave 'more emphasis on human rights and 
good governance as well as support to other areas, primarily civil society organisations,' (DANIDA 
2005, pp. 28-29), scaling up its assistance to human rights promotion particularly through 
cooperation with civil society; assisting civil society organisations to "monitor the human rights 
situation; and carrying out information and advocacy activities" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Denmark 2011). From 2006-2010, DANIDA funded about US$ 8.2 million for such activities and 
while its assistance to the transport sector declined, the assistance in human rights rose from 18 
percent to 25 percent of its total assistance. 
Among its 2009 targets as stated in its strategy paper, DANIDA would extend support to the Human 
Rights Commission when established. Bangladesh and Denmark “agreed on a set of partnership 
obligations” where Bangladesh committed to “ensure the functioning of an independent, 
operational National Human Rights Commission,” which was not in existence at the time the 
strategy paper was formulated. DANIDA also agreed to “gradually enhance channelling of funds 
through government systems as financial management capacity improves” and “increasingly 
implement programmes through government structures and dismantle parallel structures 
(DANIDA 2005).”
The role of UNDP in the National Human Rights Commission formation is worth considering, owing 
to its direct, widely visible role in putting forward the NHRC concept, drafting the legislation and, 
finally, ensuring its daily functions. The process for establishing the NHRC was also initiated with 
the assistance of UNDP from as early as 1994 under the project titled Institutional Development of 
Human Rights in Bangladesh. It is interesting to observe that this proposal coincided with the 
Human Rights Protection Act of India passed only a year earlier. Launched in 1995, the project 
aimed at supporting the process of framing the necessary legislation (UNDP 2005, p.14).
The UNDP was less involved with the human rights NGOs apart from the domain of legal aid (UNDP 
2004, p. 20), despite acknowledging their effectiveness in implementing rights related  programmes. 
UNDP teamed up with the Legislative and Parliamentary Affairs Division under the Ministry of Law, 
Justice and Parliamentary Affairs in its ongoing Access to Justice (A2J) project during the period July 
 242007June 2012, for which it pledged US$ 3 million . In this timeline, UNDP substantially assisted in 
the drafting, development and enactment of the National Human Rights Commission Act 2009, in 
addition to helping reform other related legislations.
23 The country strategy of Denmark adopted in 2005 clearly talks about establishing a Human Rights Commission. Its second 
five-year phase of the Human Rights and Good Governance Programme commenced in 2006. In agreement with the 
GoB, a total of DKK 220 million was allocated for human rights programme, of which approximately 168,330 U.S. dollars 
was supposed to be spent on fellowship and training purposes.
24 However, UNDP's fund is gathered from other donor countries. The fund for ongoing project on NHRC capacity 
development running during 2010-2015 is almost equally shared by DANIDA, SIDA, SDC and Korea, other than 
regular amount covered by UNDP itself .
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In light of this donor 'activism,' the question of whose agenda was promoted by the external actors, 
deserves to be addressed. As far as human rights issues are concerned, they are not exclusively the 
donors' agenda. These obligations are not directly imposed by the supranational organisations like 
the UN; nor are they solely prescribed by donors. Rather, every country that signed and 
subsequently ratified the international human rights regimes like UDHR and ICCPR equally belongs 
to such international obligations. Therefore, a country's obligations under the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) are not 'external' because the signatory country itself is party 
to it. This particular way of policy transfer is what can be called 'lesson drawing' where literally 
democratic western values are replicated in the countries of the Global South (Richard Rose 1993).
It is also worth noting that when it came to human rights issues, there were fluctuations within 
some of the external actors' fixed policies. For example, DFID funded a wide array of development 
projects in Bangladesh in collaboration with both the civil society and the government. In DFID's 
1998 country strategy paper, good governance and improved human rights were ranked second 
only to basic services for the poor and pro-poor growth (DFID 1998, p. 9). 
Conversely, revelations by some reports suggest that the British government faced legal challenges 
for providing training and assistance of other forms, in breach of its declared policy, to RAB (The 
Guardian 2012). The United States also assisted with training and assistance to RAB because it was 
considered an important counter-terrorism ally (Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 299, The Daily Star 
2010).
As mentioned earlier, many of the human rights violations in Bangladesh over the past decade have 
been perpetrated by state agencies e.g. the law enforcement agencies. Against this backdrop, the 
National Human Rights Commission Act 2009 was passed in the Parliament on 14 July 2009, 
following its promulgation of National Human Rights Commission Ordinance 2007 by the CTG on 
23 December 2007.
Before introducing such laws, the government consults and takes into account feedbacks, in 
principle, from NGOs and civil societies and academia, often as part of its conditionality for donor 
funds. How much of these feedbacks are reflected in the final outcome remains to be explored, 
given the mutual suspicion between NGOs and the government (Aminuzzaman 1998). NGOs 
complain that their human rights demands are not ultimately met even though the law was passed. 
As far as the NHRC is concerned, the civil society actors expressed their view on the proposed human 
rights law, after the government had invited comments from civil society organisations. 
25Nevertheless, the government is increasingly engaging with the NGOs .
When the last CTG came to power, it undertook a number of initiatives arguably to garner donor 
support to legitimise its take over. The introduction of the NHRC was often seen as its search for 
legitimacy and support from the international community, as well as a means to placate civil 
society, whose members were also present in the CTG. As a result, human rights continued to be 
Government
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the project documents and agreements between donors and government on NHRC that we reviewed contain explicit 
provisions for civil society consultation.
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violated despite the NHRC formation taking place. During the CTG, “arrests, illegal detention and 
26
other forms of intimidation” were orchestrated . 
The current party in government's election manifesto was explicit in outlining that it would ensure, 
in addition to universal human rights, the independence and effectiveness of a human rights 
commission, in line with both Article 11 of Bangladesh's Constitution and a shared vision of the 
party: “a democracy in which fundamental human rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity 
and worth of the human person shall be guaranteed (Bangladesh Awami League 2009).” 
During the previous government of 2001-2006, there were incidents of human rights violations e.g. 
attacks on religious and ethnic minorities, alleged extra judicial killings popularly known as 
'crossfire' and Islamic extremism. The present government also stresses its progressive secular 
credentials, which could be an important reason why the current political government accepted 
the NHRC. This did not necessarily translate into an effective NHRC, due to a lack of commitment to 
higher levels of accountability to a powerful and independent human rights commission. The 
current government has not facilitated the NHRC to be fully functional.
There are justifiable reasons to question the Commission's independence as it is kept heavily 
dependent on government funding, which is also inadequate in amount. It suffers from a shortage 
of skilled human resource; and due to the lack of such trained personnel cannot operate its own 
investigation. The UNDP in fact seconded employees to the NHRC, to run its day-to-day basic 
administrative functions, with even some of its staff paid by the UNDP.  
However, the Commission is not at liberty to dispatch official letters to any organisation without 
vetting by the Law Ministry (New Age 2011). The commission has no permanent office premises as 
of yet and is housed in a rented apartment. All these signs are clear evidence of the fact that the 
government does not fully own the idea of the human rights commission.
Out of its own volition Bangladesh ratified several international treaties related to human rights. 
Nevertheless, as a result of such action, it was obligated to pass local legislations to foster human 
rights. Even though the NHRC was formed, the government does not necessarily abide by or comply 
with all of the core human rights regimes. Bangladesh signed some of the human rights related 
conventions with reservations, meaning that the treaties are not endorsed in their entirety 
(Odhikar 2009, p. 4). 
For example, the Convention on Civil and Political Rights was signed with reservations but the 
subsequent and often considered more significant and complementary Optional Protocols to the 
same treaty were not ratified. Neither have successive governments ratified the Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance including Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture (OPCAT), which is arguably more pertinent to the human rights 
violations perpetrated by the state in Bangladesh's context.
26 One Odhikar official alleged that he was taken into custody in 2007, after publishing a report of a custodial death. He was 
released only after a phone call was made from the Dhaka embassy of one of Bangladesh's most important donor 
countries, to the government high-ups.
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5.4.3 Case conclusion 
5.5. Concluding observations 
First: the capacity of NGOs as policy actors to bring policy change
Policy change in RTI
Policy change in Human Rights and NHRC  
Second: roles of the NGOs as policy actors and associated processes 
Based on this case study, it is concluded that NGOs are one of the key actors in human rights 
protection and promotion in Bangladesh. They played a commendable role by various activities 
including advocacy, legal aid, training, research, social mobilisation and movement. The NHRC was 
mainly an external actors' agenda that civil society welcomed from the very beginning, due to these 
two actors' convergence of interests. However, NHRC's institutional design did not reflect civil 
society's expectations in terms of independence and effectiveness. However, civil society has 
remarkably maintained autonomy in its agenda-setting, despite the involvement of external 
actors, by prioritising the issues within the human rights agenda which are more germane to the 
need and context of Bangladesh. Even though the NHRC has been formed, civil society did not 
relent its human rights activities and movement.
To draw the conclusion, it is now time to return to three research objectives to review what answers 
were found. 
NGOs in Bangladesh can sometimes bring policy change as policy actors while other times they 
cannot. The analyses of NGOs' roles in the introduction of RTI and in protection and promotion of 
human rights and establishment of NHRC respectively necessitate this mixed answer. 
Some leading NGOs working on good governance promotion in Bangladesh realised RTI's 
usefulness in enhancing transparent and accountable governance in the country. They started 
lobbying with Government for necessary policy change through RTI law, which eventually led to 
the RTI Act. In this instance, NGOs as policy actors are found to be useful for policy change.  
The human rights NGOs have been leading voices for human rights promotion and protection in 
the country, in contrast to successive governments' lack of interest in this regard. Human rights 
NGOs sometimes discussed a national human rights body as NHRC, but it was not a priority agenda 
in their policy advocacy. NHRC was formed as result of donor technical assistance during the CTG, 
therefore human rights NGOs had limited success as policy actors in human rights promotion and 
protection. Furthermore, their role was very limited in NHRC formation.
The roles of Bangladeshi NGOs as policy actors can be manifold. They may have roles in various 
stages of policy process including policy concept generation, policy formulation and policy 
implementation. Their policy change roles take effect through their interactions with the other 
two policy actors, government and donors. 
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The success of NGOs in policy change is however conditioned by levels of government response to 
NGO advocacy and development cooperation with donors. Again, government response to NGO 
advocacy varies according to policy field, whether it is RTI or Human Rights and regime type, CTG or 
a political government. 
NGOs were the main policy actors for RTI ahead of government and donors. As part of introducing 
RTI, NGOs adapted the idea from neighbouring countries, undertook necessary research, prepared 
draft law, consulted with various stakeholders and advocated with the government. Although the 
initial government response was not satisfactory, a window of opportunity opened when the CTG 
took over amid a stage set for the policy reform. 
Corruption was recognised as a major roadblock to good governance in Bangladesh by different 
stakeholders; and the limited scope of transparency and accountability was identified as a key 
factor behind corruption. For the CTG who had limited time to deal with multitude of governance 
issues prior to holding of general election, civil society actors' RTI law proposals appeared as a ready 
instrument to start reversing corruption. There was even a draft law prepared by civil society for the 
government to act upon. 
The process of legal reform was further expedited by the presence of some RTI champions within 
the rank and file of public administration and the CTG cabinet. Furthermore, several influential 
cabinet members were leading civil society figures who shared the thinking of civil society 
advocates for RTI. The RTI Ordinance was introduced by CTG and the following elected government 
adapted it as RTI Act. 
This is indicative that RTI agenda forwarded by NGOs was not only recognised by the technocratic 
CTG but also the ensuing political government. Although not all the ordinances of the CTG era were 
enacted into law by the present government, the RTI Ordinance was accepted wholeheartedly 
albeit with some changes. 
So although NGOs were the main policy change actors, their ultimate success depended on the 
response of government to its initiatives. While a political government was not introducing RTI law, 
the CTG introduced the law as ordinance and the following political government incorporated it as 
an Act. 
As the CTG made fighting corruption high on their policy agenda and were convinced by NGO 
advocacy that RTI would be an appropriate anti-corruption tool, they initiated the RTI law. The 
following political government that made big commitments to fight corruption also retained the 
RTI law.
Human rights protection was never short of challenges in the country and considerable efforts to 
address them were always wanting from successive governments. Human rights NGOs were 
pursuing successive governments with policy reform proposals which would improve human rights 
protection. 
RTI: actors, roles and processes 
Human rights and NHRC: actors, roles and processes
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The government responses were generally not satisfactory. As the governments tend to consider 
human rights as a sensitive issue, policy advocacy of human rights NGOs were often subject to 
government suspicion. However, the country's governments were always supportive of service 
deliveries by human rights NGOs, i.e. legal aid for the poor.
The window of opportunity for human rights was not as wide as RTI under the CTG. There was a 
new set of challenges for human rights during the military backed CTG with its crackdown on 
allegedly corrupt politicians, through random uses of emergency powers. The outgoing political 
government has not been responsive enough to human rights violations as especially evident from 
unabated extra-judicial killings by law enforcing agencies. 
But general system of law enforcement and judiciary were simultaneously operational. That was 
not the case under emergency rule as scope of impunity for law enforcement agencies increased 
considerably with special powers, while the scope for a fair hearing from the lower judiciary 
decreased. One accumulated outcome was exacerbated risks of human rights violation. 
Human rights NGOs found human rights more challenged and human rights activism more difficult 
under CTG than under political government on many accounts. The NGOs had other priorities at 
hand than pursuing a human rights commission. Therefore, the NHRC formation was not an 
outcome of civil society's advocacy that was rather averse to such an initiative by an interim 
(unelected) government. 
However, human rights NGOs and organisations offered recommendations to the CTG, aimed at 
NHRC's independence and effectiveness. But many of these recommendations were not 
incorporated into the NHRC Ordinance, upholding loopholes through which the executive's 
dominance over the human rights commission could creep in. These loopholes made it possible for 
the following political government to reconstitute NHRC to its liking and there are increasingly 
more reasons to question NHRC's independence and effectiveness. 
Human rights violations occurred during both the CTG and preceding political governments. Yet 
the CTG acted differently than its political predecessor by forming the NHRC. Nonetheless, the CTG 
was not very receptive in accepting NGO demands regarding the NHRC, a response typical of 
political governments. The resulting loopholes in NHRC were not corrected by the subsequent 
political government; rather, it capitalised on the loopholes to increase the executive's influence 
over NHRC. It therefore appears that compared to RTI, Human Rights was politically riskier to give 
too much room to NGO demands.  
The RTI movement was funded by donors, but the advocacy agenda forwarded by its proponents 
were not borrowed upon as much. For example, it was the independent decision of MJF to launch a 
thematic advocacy campaign. RTI was a focus within general advocacy for good governance by MJF 
that was chosen by itself, yet not opposed by its donors. 
The NGO ownership of RTI advocacy agenda is further evident from the fact that MJF even did not 
have any separate funding head for RTI. It was not a thematic area of MJF programme but a cross-
Third: the determinant of the policy change agenda of NGOs- external influence or policy autonomy 
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cutting issue that is being mainstreamed across themes. However, the idea of RTI Act was inspired 
by its success in other countries specially neighbouring India and technical support for RTI advocacy 
was in fact received from a New Delhi based INGO.
NHRC was an outcome of government-donor negotiations where NGOs were more of observers 
than actors. As a technocratic government, CTG was more inclined to institutional reforms that 
donors long proposed but political governments usually refrained from implementation. But the 
ensuing institutional design of NHRC was to the government's own liking and NGO 
recommendations were not incorporated. So, NHRC was a mixed policy transfer since it was 
partially voluntary and to a minor extent, coercive. 
It was also partially voluntary as the CTG decided on its own about NHRC but had to depend on donor 
funds and technical assistance for its realisation. The minor extent of coerciveness is due to the 
structural disadvantage of CTG as an interim government, which lacked the same legitimacy as a 
political government and hence could be benefited from legitimacy accrued through introduction of 
NHRC.
It is still not certain whether there is sufficient scope for NGOs to influence policy change. The 
country has returned to FYP as national development framework, which doesn't explicitly 
27recognise the NGO role in policy formulation and implementation .
The RTI and NHRC governance impact on respective fields is still to indicate clear success. Even after 
28three years of the RTI Act's introduction, it is still not widely used by broad sections of people . 
Moreover, the country's position in CPI is still among the lowest in the world. Human rights 
violations are still frequent while NHRC have not yet proven effective to address them. Government 
ownership of NHRC is still in question while its secretariat is still funded by donors.
For RTI and NHRC to achieve their full potential, NGOs, as representatives of civil society will have to 
continue their engagement with government and gradually scale up their involvement in the 
governance process. Simultaneously, the government also has to be more mature in its response to 
NGO initiatives. It has to further institutionalise NGO participation in governance through the 
setting up of mechanisms of formal consultation. There should be greater support for the effective 
implementation of the RTI Act and for the full functioning of NHRC, overcoming narrow political 
interests.
The way forward
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 27 Current government is preparing a draft law for NGO regulation. A concerned minister of government recently claimed that 
the proposed law will increase transparency and accountability in NGOs. But some observers expressed doubt that the real 
motive of the law is to tighten government control over NGOs in order to limit their scope of good governance promotion. 
 28 According to the Annual Report 2011 of Information Commission, 7,808 information requests were submitted last year. 
The number is very small compared to huge population of the country.
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Chapter 6: Democratic Transition, Consolidation and External Influence in Politics: Bangladesh Perspectives
6.1 Introduction
This year's The State of Governance Report aims to assess inter alia how external stakeholders 
influence the domestic social and economic policies and how such interventions shape 
1Bangladesh's political governance structure as a whole . In this assessment, the country's political 
system, more precisely democratic governance (or lack thereof) plays an important determining 
role. The political dimensions of external influence act as an essential intervening variable in our 
analysis of external intervention in Bangladesh. 
The study works with a hypothesis that external influence in Bangladesh is largely catered by 
domestic political weaknesses. More precisely, it postulates that ineffective democratic institutions 
generate the space for external influence in the country. The political institutions thus have not 
been able to serve the national interest of leveraging the country's geo-political and economic 
advantages as created by the globalisation process. 
To analyse the role of external influence in Bangladesh's political discourse, the study 
conceptualises the phenomenon through supply-side and demand-side perspectives. The demand-
side examines how the political distortions of Bangladesh generate demand for external 
penetration. The supply side, on the other hand, focuses on opportunities that Bangladesh retains 
through the geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions vis-á-vis the external actors and examines 
the extent to which the country has been able to exploit those to its advantages.
To test the hypothesis that the domestic political weaknesses channel the room for external role-
playing, the study views political weakness through the democratic framework lens, which, 
nevertheless, elicits other cross-cutting political issues. Our study and analysis are thus organised in 
terms of a democratic transition and consolidation framework, which investigates the roots of 
political malfunctioning giving rise to external influence. 
In terms of methodology, the authors relied on both primary and secondary sources while 
conducting the study. Relevant and contemporary literatures including newspaper postings, 
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reports, journal articles and books have been extensively reviewed combined with several key 
informant interviews.
This chapter is organised into four sections: Democratic Transition, Democratic Consolidation, 
External Influence and Conclusions. The section on democratic transition analyses several key 
components of the transition process of democracy in Bangladesh. The democratic consolidation 
section examines the status of Bangladesh's consolidation effort in the light of some indicators set 
by democratic theorists. The external influence section, as the chapter's major focus, concentrates 
on the demand and supply sides of external influence in Bangladesh and rigorously analyses how 
the malfunctioning of democratic and political institutions create room for external influence. 
Referring to the preceding sections and focusing on regional geopolitical discourse, geo-economic 
reality, militancy and extremism issues, the study highlights the advantages that Bangladesh could 
exploit from constructive engagements with the international community. The section also 
discusses whether the country's weak democratic system is producing a sub-optimal outcome for 
the nation. 
Finally, the concluding part summarises the study findings proposing a set of recommendations for 
policy makers to address the issues of democratic deficit spotted in the study, and to limit the 
undesirable elements of external influence in the country's socio-economical order.
The past decades have witnessed the most remarkable development toward global democracy, 
which is often referred to as the 'Third Wave'. In the beginning of this 'Third Wave' of 
democratisation in 1974, the number of electoral democracies in the world was merely 39 (Megan 
22009), and all of those were categorised as Free States  by the Freedom House Index. By 2011, the 
 number of electoral democracies rose to 117. Nevertheless, only 87 of those states qualified as Free 
(Freedom House 2012). In the later period of the Third Wave in the 1990s, the world witnessed the 
explosion of so called 'Hybrid Regimes' that refers to the states that only fulfil the minimal 
conditions of electoral democracy.  In such regimes, there is a serious deficiency in the essential 
attributes of liberal democracy. 
The vast majority of states in Asia and Africa that emerged from the detritus of the European 
colonial empires have failed to make viable transition to democratic rule, Bangladesh being no 
exception. The democratic transition in Bangladesh has shown a number of paradoxes. It 
experienced many abrupt political transformations throughout its entire political history. The 
country's initial representative government following independence quickly and abruptly 
progressed to military and pseudo-military regimes that prolonged one-and-a-half decade before 
finally returning to multi-party parliamentary democracy in 1991. The current scenario, in the midst 
of 2012, poses a serious question as to its democratic progress that is, whether the country will be 
able to elevate itself to a consolidated democracy or be experienced an authoritarian reversal. 
6.2  Democratic transition
2 Free states are ones that score 2.5 or better on the Freedom House scale.
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A democratic transition, as Stradiotto and Guo (2010) observed, is the interval between an 
authoritarian polity and a democratic regime. The methods of the transfer of power are considered 
the key element for democratic transition. The authors also argued that the democratic transition is 
a political process aimed at establishing a democratic political system, initiated either from above 
or below or a combination of both. 
It is achieved through promoting democratic values and goals, accommodating opposition, 
allowing bargaining and compromise between different political forces for the resolution of social 
conflicts and institutionalising pluralist structures and procedures. Moreover, the authors 
identified four modes of democratic transition: conversion transition, cooperative transition, 
collapse transition and foreign-imposed transition. The conversion mode refers to elitism reflecting 
non-linear relations between the government and opposition; the cooperative democratisation is 
more consensus-based; the collapse mode renders the destructive opposition that resort to any 
means to let the government down; while the foreign intervention mode implicates foreign 
military interference to overthrow the respective regime.
The democratisation drives in Bangladesh could be categorised into three inter-linked processes 
that came through different phases of democratisation initiated by the elite class, liberalisation by 
military governments and transition based on either patron-client coalition or opportunistic 
democratisation after the 1990s. 
Historically, politics in the Indian subcontinent was dominated by the elites' protection of their own 
interests, which was the main objective of their political agenda. The elites were clustered into 
different interests groups, e.g. landlord elite, professional elite, Hindu and Muslim elite, trading 
elite, etc. (Khan 1980). During the colonial period, several democratic institutions, i.e. 
representative legislature, political parties, and the electoral process, gradually evolved and paved 
the way for a democratic choice. Following the colonial regime's departure in 1947, emerging 
Bangladeshi (the then East Pakistan) political elites were comprised mostly of the educated 
professional class. 
After independence in 1971, Bangladesh opted for parliamentary democracy and the Awami 
League (AL) which provided leadership during the independence struggle emerged  as the main 
political party. Political parties such as National Awami party (Bhashani) and some other small 
parties started to take the role of opposition (Jahan 2005, Ahmed 2004). Through a series of coups 
and counter coups following the 1975 gruesome assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the 
Founding Father of the Nation, the military ascended to power. The military, backed by the 
bureaucracy, emerged as the new political elite in Bangladesh and played a dominant role until 
1991 when after a successful mass upsurge toppled the last surviving military regime of General H. 
M. Ershad. Bangladesh entered a new era of democratisation.
Following the ouster of the military establishment in 1990, democratisation in Bangladesh 
witnessed a new shape that could be defined as 'opportunistic democratisation' (Welzel 2009, Gros 
6.2.1 Background of democratisation in Bangladesh
Bangladesh's journey towards democracy
Transition in 1990: towards an opportunistic democratisation?
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1998). In it the politicians perceive democracy as a challenge to an autocratic rule, not as an 
opportunity to establish an entirely new governance system or regime. They are more likely to 
agree to implement the first phase of democratisation, which is political liberalisation, and then 
adopt the second phase of deepening democratisation. Opportunistic democratisers are not 
necessarily incumbents since they can also be found within the rank of political opposition (Gros 
1998). 
Since 1991, most ruling and opposition political leaders situated themselves as opportunistic 
democratisers. Both major parties feature a strong patron-client network based on the distribution 
of benefits once they ascend to power through elections.  
Transition to democracy thus becomes complex, having a variety of possible courses and end 
results, depending on the socio-economic context of an individual country and regional conditions. 
Bacon (n.d.) stated that democratic transition requires three components: the end of an 
authoritarian regime, the installation of a new democratic regime and democratic consolidation. 
United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP's) international forum also considers consensus 
and compromise important elements of democracy (UNDP 2011). Some key aspects of the 
democratic transition process have been analysed to provide the reader with a general overview of 
transition alliances in Bangladesh. This will gauge whether the country's politics remain mired in 
the transition crisis, which leads to external interventions of various types. 
Democratic transition means the transfer of power from an authoritarian regime to a democratic 
regime, (Murtin and Wacziarg 2011) or from a democratic government to others through peaceful 
elections. To ensure democratic transition, the military must be subordinated to the authority of 
the elected civilian officials (Diamond 1997). However, for more than fifteen years in its history, 
Bangladesh has been either governed directly by martial law or by military rule behind a civilian 
facade. 
The nation has experienced at least four successful and seventeen abortive coups d'état in the post-
independence period (Riaz 1998). Even in the post 1991 era, allegedly several military plots to 
topple the democratically elected governments took place. Although the military government's 
departure in 1990 allowed the country's adoption of parliamentary democracy, the question 
remains whether Bangladesh has overcome the challenges of military intervention in its politics. 
The political parties, due to a lack of mutual trust in one another, frequently demand military 
deployment during national elections, granting the military a supervisory role at this key transition 
point. A slight deviation from the military's perceived neutral role can decisively sway the balance 
between the competing parties or alliances. 
The transition to democracy requires a social contract with a country's constitution providing that 
contract in the form of fundamental rules. While a national consensus-based constitution can be 
6.2.2 Democratic transition process in Bangladesh
Military intervention and democratic transition
Constitution as an instrument of transition
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the symbol of a break from the past, whether Bangladesh's constitution provides such a consensus 
among competing political interests and groups remains contested, especially when there are 
several unresolved and contentious issues i.e., nationalism (Bengali/Bangladeshi), status of religion 
and indigenous people, foreign policy, among others. Successive regimes, however, amended the 
constitution numerous times to serve their narrow political interests, undermining national 
consensus. In most cases, no specific and/or written proposal was presented to the public as 
referendum before such amendments were made. 
During a democratic transition period, a number of issues pertaining to electoral process have to be 
addressed that includes the need to establish clear rules and procedures for elections and an 
independent body of people as the authority supervising and managing the electoral process. The 
rules and procedures further include the availability of good electoral records and voter lists, and 
the obligation of loyalty towards democracy by the parties (UNDP 2011). 
Bangladeshi political parties still struggle to find a smooth means of transferring power from one 
regime to another. Due to mistrust and suspicion, opposition parties frequently show reluctance to 
participate in elections under the incumbent. Hence, the non-party caretaker government, a 
unique system in the world, was introduced in the constitution to conduct the national election. 
th
However, with a few attempts, the system has now been considered redundant through the 15  
amendment of the constitution. In the middle of 2012, with just one year until next general 
elections, the same debate for a credible election mechanism dominates the political discourse of 
Bangladesh.
Historically, Bangladeshi politics unfolded as a process of the unmitigated conflict of power. 
Political negotiation and compromise among the key political actors mainly Bangladesh Awami 
League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)is virtually non-operative in Bangladesh's 
democratic culture. 
While national consensus is necessary for any democratic transition that leads a nation to 
consolidate its democracy, such consensus proves rare in Bangladesh since the historic agreement 
on the parliamentary form of governance reached between the two major parties in 1991.  
Bangladesh is therefore yet to overcome the transition crisis as some of its key elements are still 
missing in democratic practice. 
Democratic consolidation, as termed by Sorenson (1993), is the last and final phase of democracy. In 
an ideal or strict form, and at this stage of democracy, democratic institutions are functional and 
capable of transferring power to an opposition party.
Election as transition process
Political consensus for democracy and willingness to compromise
6.3. Democratic consolidation
Chapter 6: Democratic Transition, Consolidation and External Influence in Politics: Bangladesh Perspectives
130
Figure 20
Source: Based on George Sorensen's (1993, p. 42) model on transitions toward democracy
Linz and Stephan (2001) illustrated three minimal conditions that must be satisfied before 
democratic consolidation. First, state integrity has to exist to ensure a free and authoritative 
election. Second, democratic transition has to be accomplished. A necessary, but by no means 
sufficient condition for ending a transition process is the holding of free and contested elections. 
Third, rulers need to govern democratically without infringing upon the constitution, violating 
individuals' and minorities' rights, or impeding the legislature's functions, and by ruling  within the 
bounds of the state.
There are other indicators that define the democratic consolidation process, some of which are also 
discussed in individual sections. Whether Bangladesh's democracy is consolidated or is in the 
process of consolidation has to be measured in the light of the criteria and indicators discussed 
herein.
Since the restoration of democracy in 1990-91, Bangladesh has practiced a parliamentary form of 
government for nearly two decades. This however, leaves in question, whether democracy has 
been consolidated. This section attempts to comprehend how various institutions of Bangladesh 
are performing with regard to democratic consolidation. 
Linz and Stephan (2001) argued that democratic consolidation requires that citizens develop an 
appreciation for the core institutions of a democratic political society, political parties, legislatures, 
elections, electoral rules, political leadership, and interparty alliances. They further elaborated that 
a state of law (rule of law) is vital to the consolidation of any democracy. Despite the growing 
prominence of civil society, political parties also remain very crucial for any democracy. 
Democratic transitional phases towards consolidating democracy
6.3.1 Democracy in Bangladesh: whither consolidation?
A) Political society
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i) Parliament
Parliament boycotts by opposition
The legislature can prepare a better ground for democratic consolidation by agreeing to develop 
rules to transform the legislature into a vital platform for resolving mutual conflicts amongst the 
political actors. The chances for democratic groundwork become more tangible when these actors 
recognise the legislature as the prime mechanism of conflict resolution (Hussain 2007).
th
The 15  amendment (2011) of the Constitution, which sought to resolve many outstanding and 
divisive issues at one-go, created a public outcry amongst the opposition groups. Like many others 
in the past (i.e., fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth amendments of the Constitution), this 
amendment once again reveals how Bangladesh parliament overlooks the consensus issues and 
opts for widening rather than narrowing the divisions.
So far in its democratic history, Bangladesh Parliament has largely failed to facilitate social 
consensus and political conflict resolution. Rather, its political actors have encouraged extra-
parliamentary settlement of major political disputes. The post-1975 military regimes tried to settle 
many divisive political issues through military promulgations (though they later managed to get 
them endorsed through rubber stamp parliaments). 
 Since 1991, two major democratic transitional crises have been resolved outside the Parliament the 
3 4settlement of Caretaker Government (CTG) issues in 1996  and the CTG crisis in 2006 . Other than 
conflict resolution, the parliaments have also been largely dysfunctional for the last two decades, 
plagued by opposition boycotts (Table 21). 
Table 21
Total Boycotts 118 days 156 days 223 days 208 (out of 254 
th
(43% of total (41%) (60%) days as the 13  
working days) session ended 
th
on 8  July 2012).
(82%)
Source: Azim 2011;  Liton 2012; The Daily Sangbad 2012
Individual oversight techniques at the Parliament have also been largely ineffective since 1991. In 
the fifth parliament, for example, 94% of the notices served for discussion have been rejected while 
the share was 96.6% in the seventh parliament (Hussain 2007, p. 119).
Parliaments Fifth Seventh Eighth Ninth
(1991-96) (1996-2001) (2001-2006) (2009-)
 3 Although the Caretaker bill has been passed by the parliament, it was only materialised when the opposition had been 
able to corner the position on the street not in the Parliament's plenary debate.
4 Parties' failure to resolve the debate over Caretaker Government formation in dialogue ended up in street battles and 
subsequent military intervention and declaration of emergency on 11 January 2007.
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Article 70 of the Constitution prohibits floor-crossing of members of parliament (MPs) i.e., voting 
against the party line, which discourages members from speaking freely within the floor. The spill 
over effect of this arrangement is that the parliamentarians often remain reluctant to criticise party 
decisions to any extent for fear of being singled out within the party. 
Although institutionalisation of the party system usually increases democratic governability (Linz 
and Stephan 2001, p. 368), however, major political parties of Bangladesh, particularly AL and BNP, 
have been criticised for their undemocratic party system and culture. These parties are dominated 
by their party chiefs, who often take the important party decisions opaquely. 
The internal organisational structure of these parties is also less than democratic. The party 
activities such as policy-making, decision-making, and committee structuring are centred around 
the cult of the leader. The annual and bi-annual councils barely take place on time and when they 
do, prove a mere formality bestowing all powers into the hands of the party chiefs to select the 
remaining post holders of the parties (The Daily Star 2009e, 2009f). 
Political parties are also increasingly dominated by business people, which contributed to the 
exponential rise of interest politics in Bangladesh. For instance, only 27% of MPs elected in the 
1970s' legislative assembly enrolled their profession as business persons or industrialists. This 
increased to more than 50% in the fifth, eighth and ninth parliaments (Jahan and Amundsen 2012, 
p. 31). According to some accounts, this development has adversely impacted the country's 
democratic governance. 
One of the root causes of the poor governance in the country lies in the political parties functioning 
process itself.  Political parties are rarely transparent both in terms of their source of income and 
their source of funds (see Box 4). 
Much has been said about the political party reforms in Bangladesh, but very little progress has 
been made other than the party registration and a few other sporadic instances of progress here 
and there. During the 2007-2008 emergency regime, there was an effort though,\ in both major 
parties, to address the leadership succession issue, which  later miserably failed, leaving the 
reformists on the verge of political extinction (The Daily Star 2007a).
Political parties require money to carry out their day to day activities. In Bangladesh, the 
sources of political parties' funding are not transparent. It should be, however, transparent and 
accessible to the citizens for the sake of democracy and good governance. Political parties in 
Bangladesh, irrespective of size and ideology, hardly keep any account of their funding sources 
and expenditures. There are allegations that most of the political parties in Bangladesh receive 
funds from abroad. According to an academician, “although it is difficult to prove, the reality 
ii) Political parties
Box 4
Political party funding in Bangladesh
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11
5 In an interview with a Dhaka University Professor. 
133
5is… political parties in Bangladesh receive foreign  funds.”  Media reports at times allege such 
 clandestine financial dealings of Bangladeshi political parties with their foreign backers. 
Although parties refuted the reports.
Bangladeshi society is still very divided over the question of identity. The major political parties 
in Bangladesh have either pro-Islamist or pro-secular agendas with sympathetic foreign 
backers. Political analysts believe that parochial versions of Islam have powerful backers in the 
Gulf States (Fair 2005). There are allegations that some Middle Eastern countries heavily fund 
both public and private Islamist initiatives in the country, effectively exporting their brand of 
Salafist Islam to Bangladesh. The money channelled from Gulf States has enabled many 
Bangladeshi islamists to run financial institutions, schools, hospitals, industries etc. and dictate 
terms in the political process because of their strong economic background (Hossain 2005). 
Political parties in Bangladesh usually utilise their leverage when they remain in power to 
6
channel the public resources into the hands of the party leaders or supporters (IDEA  2004). 
According to Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), political finance in the prevailing 
political culture is a covert matter for the party organizations, with party funds usually 
collected directly from businessmen and industrialists. Such funds are often donated 
voluntarily out of vested interests, and in many cases through extortion. 
As per a new legislation, the political parties have to be registered with the Election 
Commission and have to submit their audit reports annually. Such law regarding audits of party 
funding remained only on paper and are yet to be operationalised (TIB 2009). After the 1996 
elections, nearly 95% of the MPs did not submit the individual expenditure report, and after 
the 2001 elections none of the parties submitted reports of electoral expenses. Interestingly, 
after the 2008 elections most candidates and parties submitted their electoral accounting 
reports before the EC (TIB 2009). While this is a welcome development, there is also a need for 
transparent accounts of financial and non-financial wealth of parliament members and 
ministers.  It is believed that they capitalise their offices to make  money  of questionable 
sources to influence the election next time.  
Rule of law is closely connected with the liberal political system, which is synthetically characterised 
by a system of checks and balances and entrenched individual rights protected by an independent 
judiciary (Marvall and Przeworski 2003, p. 147). As to the correlation between the rule of law and 
democratic consolidation, theoretically if a freely elected Executive infringes the Constitution, 
violates the rights of individuals and minorities or impinges upon the legitimate functions of the 
legislature thus failing to rule within the bounds of a state of law, their regimes are not considered 
democracies (Linz and Stephan 2001, pp. 93-94). Others argue that the democratic transition from 
authoritarian rule can be brought to completion through achieving both democracy and rule of 
law simultaneously (Marvall and Przeworski 2003, p. 147).
iii) Rule of law
6 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
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Of the three apparent indicators (mentioned in previous paragraph), there has been no serious 
allegation of infringement of constitution against the democratic governments in Bangladesh. As 
for overtly impinging upon the legislature's legitimate function, only sporadic hiccups between the 
7executive and the judiciary,  sometimes between the legislature and the judiciary, can be cited.  
However, the successive regimes scored poorly when it came to human rights and equality before 
the law. Though Article 26-47, the Constitution provide citizens with a guarantee of their lives and 
liberties, the violation of human rights and law enforcement abuses in Bangladesh are rather rife, 
facilitated by other sets of legislations such as the 1974 Special Powers Act, which permits arbitrary 
detention without charge; and Section 54 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which allows detention 
without a warrant. The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2009 also provides an overly broad definition of 
terrorism and generally fails to meet international standards, which allows room for repression on 
dissents. The law enforcing agencies are widely accused of violating human rights. From 2004 to 
March 2011, the human rights watchdog Odhikar (2010) reported that at least 732 people were 
killed in the name of crossfire by the elite force, Rapid Action Battalion (RAB). 
As to the equality before the law scenario, arbitrary withdrawal of so-called politically motivated 
cases by Executive Orders is a direct assault on the very principle of the Rule of Law that every citizen 
is equal before the law. During 2001-2006, the four-party alliance government withdrew 5888 cases 
including murder and rape cases by executive orders against its party men (Dewan 2009), while the 
present government in its three years' tenure, as of 21 December 2011, has withdrawn at least 7100 
cases (The Daily Prothom Alo 2011a). 
A democratic system weakens when there is explicit rejection of the legitimacy of a democratically 
elected regime by (significant) parties, movements, or organisations (Diamond et. al 1997, p. 19). 
Key political parties in Bangladesh, when in opposition, have frequently and explicitly questioned 
the legitimacy of the elected regime (The Daily Star 2004; 2011c). 
Diamond (1997) illustrates how democratic consolidation effort faces serious setbacks when one or 
more political actors resort to “knocking at the barracks door” for military support in their political 
struggle. Although there is no credible evidence that any of the major parties did so, both the 
leading parties point their fingers towards each other for their alleged roles in coups and counter-
coups that took place in Bangladesh  (The Daily Star 2012f). 
Another negative indicator of democratic non-consolidation may be the categorisation of 
democratically loyal opponents as disloyal instruments of outside actors (Diamond et. al 1997, 19). 
The examples of such manifestation are plenty in Bangladeshi politics. Here one party blames the 
other for either turning Bangladesh into India's vassal state (The Daily Star 2012g) or into an ISI-
agent (Inter-Service Intelligence Agency of Pakistan) (The Daily Star 2012h).
iv) Negative politics and indicator of non-consolidation
7  As in the recent case when a High Court judge made some derogatory remarks over parliamentary proceedings and the 
Speaker, which allegedly breached Article 78(1) of the Constitution. [The Daily Star 2012i]
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B) Civil society
C) Socio-economic development
Civil society can contribute to democratic consolidation only if other institutions are also 
favourable, and if actors in civil society behave in a "civil" way, respecting the law and other social 
and political actors, while accepting and not seeking to usurp or conquer democratic political 
authority. In transitional democracies, there are, however, financial and political weaknesses 
within civil society, which hinder its development. Direct international assistance to 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and the cooperative linkages loom large in the quest for 
democratic consolidation (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, pp. 48-56).
With changes in donor policy to assist non-government organisations (NGOs), the number of civil 
society organisations in Bangladesh soared since the 1990s. Although civil society organisations 
have supported the inference of high civil society involvement in social service and welfare, they 
have a low rate of participation in policy advocacy, lobbying etc. 
Rather, penetration, co-option and politicisation of civil society have reduced their ability to 
generate democratic norms, articulate interest or monitor state actions. Therefore, the civil society 
is yet to emerge as a vigilant force to uphold good governance and consolidate democracy in 
Bangladesh (Tasnim 2007, p. 103).
In recent times, there is simmering tension between the government and civil society. The 
government often accuses civil society of seeking to usurp or capture political authority citing the 
latter's role during the period of military-backed Caretaker regime in 2007-08. In this connection, 
the draft Foreign Donation (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Act 2012 gave rise to  contentions that 
the government is cracking down on civil society groups to put them under political control (The 
Economist 2012).
Although ideally democratic consolidation is largely a matter of political crafting, Przeworski 
(1991) shows that there is an impact of economic development and performance on the democratic 
consolidation process. The study illustrates that there is a 12% chance of breakdown of democracy 
in any given year among the lowest-income countries. Similarly, the expected life of democracy 
increases with percapita income, up to the income level of over $6,000 (in 1985 purchasing-power-
parity, [PPP]). Przeworski further suggested that democracies are significantly more likely to persist 
when they experience real economic growth, in excess of 5% annually. 
As to these theoretical propositions, Bangladesh lies in the mixed zone. While it is still a low-income 
country with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita $1659 in PPP terms, its economy has been 
growing faster for the last two decades at an average of around 5% annually (World Bank 2010). 
Nevertheless, one-third (31.5 %) of its population still lives below the poverty line 
BBS  2010  thus demonstrating that the benefits of growth are not equally distributed. 
8Regarding inequality, the Gini co-efficient  of income shows that the national level income 
inequality of Bangladesh has increased in the last one and a half decades from 0.432 in 1995/96 to 
(Bangladesh Bureau 
of Statistics [ ] )
8 Gini co-efficient is a popular composite indicator of measuring inequality. It can vary between 0 and 1 with 1 being the 
most unequal state and 0 the most equal state.
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0.458 in 2010 (Dev et. al 2008, Titumir and Rahman 2011). Although there is no clear-cut consensus 
9among experts as to the correlation between inequality and democracy , it generally poses threats 
to the society's stability, which is, in the long run, detrimental to a sustainable democratic polity. 
Nevertheless, although traditional theorists (Saymour Martin and others) argue that democracy is 
the direct result of economic growth and that it can only stand where the foundations have been 
laid by a highly educated population and a culture of democracy, Acemoglu and Robison (2006, 
2007) oppose the idea, claiming that democracy can flourish in any kind of society, as long as the 
distribution of benefits implied by the democratic process are consistent with the underlying 
distribution of power. They further assert that a democracy is likely to collapse if such economic and 
political conditions are not met. 
Bangladesh's political society dominated by a winner-takes-all culture, with the ruling party's all 
out effort to corner the oppositions, benefits, resources or power, which are not properly shared 
with political elites beyond party line. Instead they are heavily concentrated in the hands of the 
ruling class. 
With regards to democratic consolidation, Bangladesh has made little progress since the 
restoration of democracy in 1991. Despite the economy growing faster and civil society showing 
significant strength and resilience, political institutions appear fragile, thus leaving the status of 
Bangladesh's democracy far from  being consolidated.
The phenomenon of external influence in third-world and developing countries is a stark reality. A 
country's domestic political weakness, coupled with its strategic significance, often caters to this 
kind of influence. External influence in Bangladesh fares with both dimensions. The following 
section analyses various dimensions of demand and supply sides of external influence in 
Bangladesh's political spheres.
The demand side of external influence in Bangladesh is facilitated by democratic weaknesses 
originating from incomplete transition and democratic non-consolidation. Transitional crisis 
(disruptive transfer of power, lack of consensus, and unwillingness to compromise) that leaves the 
political opposition vulnerable is the root cause of creating domestic demands for external 
influence. 
Since the 1990s, as the economy started performing well and subsequently creating enormous 
financial rents, coming into power and relinquishing it began involving high stakes. The non-
6.3.2 Whither consolidation?
6.4 Democratic malfunctioning and external influence in politics
6.4.1 Demand side of external influence
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11
9  Robert Dahl (1971), Huntington (1991) etc. suggest that democracy is not possible in highly unequal societies, whereas 
Bollen and Jackman (1985), Przeworski (2000) found no relationship between measures of inequality and democracy. 
[Acemoglu and Robinson 2006]
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consolidated democracy remains a major threat to the country's democratic transition through 
smooth transition to the power. 
During a transitional crisis (crisis surrounding the transfer of power), the role of outside actors can 
immensely sway the balance. The events of 11 January, 2007 (known as 1/11) explicitly shows how 
domestic political vulnerability can welcome intervention from outside actors and how such 
10interventions can dramatically shift the balance between political rivals (see Box 5).
In this bitter political reality and in the absence of institutional mechanisms for grievance handling, 
the strangled political opposition resorts to any means to return to power and often opts for 
outside alliance. The ruling party, at the same time, seeks to realign with their external friends to 
prolong their tenure. This zero-sum game often involves subversive activities to undermine each 
11other at the cost of national interests.
The AL and BNP, the parties dominating Bangladesh's political landscape over the last two decades, 
maintain their own trustworthy foreign allies. It is also alleged that they often give priority to           
their allies' interests above the national interests (The Daily Prothom Alo 2012a). While one is 
accused of maintaining friendly relations and leaning too much torwards India, the other is accused 
for its alleged relations with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. However, both are keen to maintain the 
same warm relations with the United States, which leads the post-Cold War global geo-political 
order. 
External influence does not take place in abstraction unless the grounds are prepared by the 
internal actors. The 'winner-takes-all' political culture and the failure of democratic institutions to 
mitigate political crises have led to the incident of 1/11. Before the ninth National Parliament election, 
political stalemate reached its peak, as the government and the opposition had unbridgeable 
differences over a number of key issues concerning the election process. This crisis of peaceful 
democratic transition allowed foreign interference into the nation's domestic affairs (see Box 5). 
Although the Caretaker Government (CTG) embodied in the Constitution on the basis of 
consensus, the third CTG of 2006-2007 found it extremely difficult to hold a free, fair and 
impartial election in the face of irreconcilable demands from the contending parties. On 11 
January 2007, responding to growing political confrontation, the President relinquished his 
position as the CTG Head, cancelled the 22 January election and declared a state of emergency 
under article 141A of Bangladesh constitution. A new interim government backed by the 
A) 1/11, External influence and democratic weakness
Box 5
1/11 (11 January 2007): How political weaknesses invite external interference
10 Before 1/11 crisis, the then ruling party exercised overwhelming controls over all state mechanisms and the opposition 
looked very much hopeless and undone. But then, the international players came into scene and allegedly manoeuvred 
the event.
11 Allowing some foreign elements to operate [10 truck arms haul case as discussed above] within Bangladesh to arm and 
train Indian insurgents which pose a greater danger to Bangladesh's own national security.
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Bangladesh military was installed. The International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that, 
“Bangladesh is under military rule again for the third time in as many decades” (ICG 2008). 
While political observers share the view that although external actors played a critical role in 
the 1/11 outcome, it was in fact a democratic failure engendered by contending parties that 
brought the external forces onto the scene. They are also of the opinion that the event was a 
necessary circuit breaker to restore political equilibrium. The intervention was welcomed by 
people in general, thus, the run-up to 1/11 was directly linked with the democratic transition 
12
and consolidation difficulties faced by Bangladesh.
13The transition crises include the disagreement over the election mechanism  and 
14constitutional loopholes  while the consolidation crises cover failure of institutions to mitigate 
and resolve the political crisis. The Election Commission  was blamed for producing a voter roll 
with over 12 million fake voters to favour the incumbent regime to engineer the election [The 
Daily Star 2007b]. Amid absence of such institutional remedies, the opposition took to the 
streets in Dhaka and elsewhere around the country. They then allegedly also resorted to extra-
constitutional means [creating environment for foreign mediation (The Daily Star 2007c)] and 
called on the military to intervene and stop the election (The Daily Star 2007d, 2007e). 
This is a classic example of the demand side of external interference, when domestic elements 
eagerly waited for external actors to act. Another institutional failure was the partisan role of the 
Executive head, the then President, when he failed to maintain his political impartiality thus 
eroding trust and confidence in the institution that could deliver [The Daily Star 2006b, 2007f].
Role of International Community: Amidst much political chaos, the international communities 
stepped in to break the stalemate, negotiated between the alliances, and when everything 
failed, took concrete measures to avert the one-sided election (ICG 2008). The measures 
included the suspension of Election Observation Mission by the European Commission and 
suspension of all technical support for the election by the United States (UN). 
The UN also issued a threat that the military would jeopardise its lucrative role in UN peace 
keeping operations if it facilitated an election boycotted by the opposition. In an interview, a 
Western ambassador in Dhaka admitted “we (the international community) were instrumental 
in the events in January” (ICG 2008). Besides, Loyd (2007) mentioned that, the international 
community did not discourage the military takeover and were probably more active than they 
publicly acknowledged. 
A UN official mentioned that, there was low key support from UN Headquarters for the coup 
(ICG 2008). One very significant issue with regard to the role of international community on 
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12 Interview with a couple of Dhaka-based political scientists and noted academicians.
13 Debates circumventing the Chief of the Caretaker Governmentmajor political parties failed to reach a consensus as to 
who should be the Chief of the Caretaker Government.
14 Disagreement over the explanation of some articles of Constitution. 
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and after 1/11 event was that although they supported and/or played a role in the declaration 
of emergency and installation of CTG in January 2007, they consistently sided with the election 
roadmap by December 2008 and persistently pressured the military and the CTG to abide by the 
15roadmap, the reform plan, timely elections and a return to democracy.
Although the 1/11 event and subsequent emergency regime had a lot to do with implicit or 
explicit support from external actors, it is important to acknowledge that the emergency 
government initiated some long-awaited political and institutional reform processes. 
Therefore, the international community's engagement in this particular instance was more 
constructive.
Economic interest is increasingly becoming a determinant factor for shaping inter-state relations 
and providing more balanced relations between nations. This is even true for the United States (US) 
and China, two arch rivals in Asian geo-politics. However, when it comes to relations between the 
least developed countries (LDCs) and the developed countries (DCs), the relationship often turns 
non-linear.
This is largely due to different trade facilities that the DCs offer to LDCs. For example, The European 
 Union offers Bangladesh (being the LDC member) duty-free and quota free (DFQF) access to  
16 products to its Market with GSP  facilities. The United States also provides 
GSP facilities for Bangladeshi goods. The impact of such benefits on Bangladesh trade is also 
staggering. In 2011, for example, 58.1% of total Bangladeshi exported goods were destined for the 
17EU market while another 18.25% was exported to the American market.  These facilities (quota 
free access and GSP) give Bangladesh an advantage over other RMG competitors including China 
and India. 
Through this trade largesse, DCs often enjoy the leverage to speak up on internal affairs. 
Sometimes it comes in the form of both political and non-political conditionalities. Political 
conditionality often involves addressing human rights violations, good governance and promoting 
the democratisation agenda, inter alia (Smith 1997, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs 
18
2012).
Multilateral lending agencies led by the World Bank and IMF also enjoy much leverage in exerting 
influence in domestic policy affairs through their lending conditionality. With loans, they often 
B) Trade and aid largesse: influencing through the other way around
Ready 
Made Garments (RMG)
15 Interview with an Advisor who served the key position with the Caretaker Government during the 2007-08. [also, see The 
Daily Star 2007g]
16 GSP is a formal system of exemption from the more general rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), especially its a 
system of exemption from the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle of WTO.
17 Bangladesh Bank's economic data. Authors compilation. Available from: http://www.bangladesh-
bank.org/econdata/export/exp_rcpt_blockwise.php. Accessed on May 12, 2012.
18 In the recent stand off between Bangladesh government and Grameen Bank and Dr Muhammad Yunus, the USA officials 
clearly sided with the latter and exerted pressure on government through various channels. It has also issued implied 
threats if their concerns are not taken into consideration. [The Daily Star 2012j]
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impose political conditionality on recipient countries in relation to economic policies, public 
19administration, transparency and accountability of government and rule of law.
As Cheryl Payer (Payer 1982), a renowned critic of the Bank, once noted that “the World Bank [is] 
perhaps the most important instrument of the developed capitalist countries for prying state control 
of its Third World member countries out of the hands of nationalists...” In the guise of aid and 
development assistance largesse, the allegations of influencing domestic policies against these 
lending agencies are plenty. Many allege that the recent cancellation of the $1.2 billion Padma Bridge 
credit on corruption allegations is related to the Bank's political agenda (The Daily Star 2012k).
The supply side of external influence involves the positive opportunities that Bangladesh's 
geographical advantage, particularly strategic location, and its sizeable market create for external 
stakeholders. Countries that seek to benefit themselves from these vantages are the primary actors 
of this equation. The following sections illustrate various dimensions of supply-side phenomenon 
of external influence in Bangladesh.
After nearly four decades since 1971, the roles and responsibilities of powerful actors have either 
changed or been altered. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1990, the USA has forged a 
strategic alliance with India to rebalance the power-game in Asia (Indian Express 2011). China, on 
the other hand, has found new interest in the former The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
(China Daily 2010) while Pakistan's Indo-centric focus remains unchanged. 
In this changing scenario, Bangladesh, being located in a strategically important position almost 
bisecting the north-eastern part of India from its mainland as well as offering a route to Southeast 
Asia including China- has been under the radar of all regional and many global geo-political actors. 
20With the growing significance of the Indian Ocean  and following the recent settlement of 
21Bangladesh's maritime dispute with Myanmar at ITLOS  (which opens up an immense strategic and 
economic potential for Bangladesh at deep sea), the Bay of Bengal is attracting wider strategic 
attention from countries including USA, China and India. 
In the wake of these developments, the forms and faces of external influence in Bangladesh with 
regard to geopolitics is changing rapidly. While China and Pakistan allegedly have an interest in 
6.4.2 Supply side of external influence
A) Geopolitics
i) The changing reality: from geo-politics to geo-economic complexity?
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19 Weder explains, 'political conditionality refers to the linking of aid to administrative and political reform in recipient 
countries, in the pursuit of what it termed “good governance”. There are four components to this: sound economic 
policies, competent public administration, open and accountable government; and respect to the rule of law. [Dewald 
and Weder 1996 cited in Marquette 2003]
20 In a recent article at Foreign Policy Magazine, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote that, “The Asia-Pacific has 
become a key driver of global politics. Stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas, the 
region spans two oceans -- the Pacific and the Indian -- that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy.” [Clinton 
2011, Dyer 2012] 
21 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Bangladesh v Myanmar, Case No. 16. Retrieved from 
http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=108 [Accessed 09 May 2012].
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destabilising North-eastern India, and Chinese special interests to counter US containment strategy 
in the Pacific persist, Bangladesh becomes a strategic nation. 
The US willingness to extend strategic interests to Bangladesh is evidenced by the signing of the 
22Status of Forces Agreement with Bangladesh in 1998  and the recently signed US-Bangladesh 
Partnership Agreement in 2012 (The Daily Star 2012l). 
Bangladesh's proposed deep-sea port also offers huge strategic interests for many countries. China 
has showed enthusiasm in financing and building the port (The Daily Star 2012m) to allegedly 
expand its String of Pearls Strategy allegedly aiming to encircle India as well as to reduce its 
dependence on the Malacca Straits for oil shipment (DeSilva-Ranasinghe 2011). 
However, as many experts have suggested, the construction of the deep-sea port has not made any 
significant progress due to this convergence and divergence of interests among countries. New 
Delhi and Washington remain sceptical about Beijing's intention of financing and building the port 
as one of the US Congressional research reports illustrates: the growing importance of Bangladesh 
“...could potentially be a state of increasing interest in the evolving strategic dynamics between 
India and China” (Vaughn 2010).
Figure 21
Source: www.marinebuzz.com
Nevertheless India is worried about China's growing interest in Bangladesh. This has been reflected 
in the statement of Kanwal Sibal, a former Indian foreign secretary and now a member of the 
Chinese String of Pearl Strategy
22 Although there is a hue and cry in Bangladesh on the SOFA issue, neither party accepts or denies the existence of such 
arrangement. However, US Congressional Research Paper [RL34531] shows there is an agreement regarding the status of 
forces between the two nations and USA is calling it an 'Exchange Notes' [Mason 2012]
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government's National Security Advisory Board, “this kind of effort (Chinese efforts in building sea 
ports) is aimed at counterbalancing and undermining India's natural influence in these areas” (The 
New York Times 2010).
Bangladesh's advantageous geographical position offers it considerable leverage in South Asian 
politics and especially with India. The Northeastern States (NES) of India are land-locked and 
virtually isolated from the mainland that costs the country extra time and money for transportation 
of its inbound and outbound goods and services. In fact, India spent an additional US$7 billion to 
transport goods and services to and from the Northeast and the mainland (Sobhan 2000) providing 
25% transport subsidy for facilitating the trade (Verghese 1998). The cost, however, has been 
estimated in 1990 and has increased in tandem with the exponential economic growth of India. 
Transit through Bangladesh would cut the distance between Kolkata and Agartala from 1600 km to 
23only 400 km . For quite a long time, the Indian government has been seeking transit/transhipment 
facilities to reduce this obstacle to the economic prosperity of its north-eastern part. However, in 
spite of India's frequent attempts to pursue Bangladesh, it has been continuously rejected on the 
grounds of Bangladesh's national security. 
To reciprocate this indifference from Bangladesh, India deployed various means of pressure mainly 
through unilateral withdrawal of waters from Trans-boundary rivers, imposing periodic 
export/import bans on goods and services to and from Bangladesh (The Daily Star 2012n, WTO 
2004), imposing non-tariff barriers in bilateral trade (Islam 2011).
However, there have been some break throughs since the current AL government assumed power 
in 2009, with New Delhi being granted some transit and transhipment facilities and both countries' 
positive gestures to address long-standing issues i.e., 6.5 kilometre land boundary demarcation, 
enclaves exchanging, trade facilitation, and wider transit facilities connecting Nepal and Bhutan. 
According to most analysts, when it comes to bargain, Bangladesh's interests are often 
compromised, largely owing to its weak negotiating power (see Box 6 below).
Apart from connectivity, the thriving Bangladesh economy, younger work force and potential 
mineral resource base also offer many prospects for outsiders. Bangladesh could well be explored 
as an investment opportunity, for both of its sizable consumer base and the availability of low-cost 
human capital. 
The size of Bangladesh's economy exceeded $100 billion in 2011 (and almost $282 billion in PPP 
th
terms) and is ranked 44  globally in terms of GDP size. Its imports stood at approximately $32 billion 
th
in 2011, making it 69  highest importing economy in the world. This has created a market opportunity 
for many especially China and India, who constitute 31% of Bangladesh's total imports [Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2012]. 
ii) Trade, market, and connectivity: new geo-economic reality
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11
23 “Need to Broaden the Scope of India-Bangladesh Engagement: Perspectives from Gangtok and Dhaka”, IDSA Comment, 
available at: http://www.idsa.in/idsacomment/NeedtoBroadentheScopeofIndiaBangladeshEngagement_ShristiPukhrem_241011 
[Accessed April 30, 2012]. 
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This bilateral trade and economic expansion have complemented China and India's respective 
geopolitical interests in Bangladesh. The perfect nomenclature of this shifting of geopolitical 
reality could be the new geo-economic complexity. This new reality effectively spreads across the 
regional or sub-regional level. 
The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States, brought the 
terrorism issue into the spotlight and attracted wider global attention. For many third-world 
countries, terrorism opened up a twin-channel of external influence: on one hand for the 
international terrorist groups to extend their networks through home-grown disgruntled religious 
extremists and, on the other hand, for facing increasing international pressure to clamp down on 
these facilities. 
Typically Bangladesh has not been known for terrorism, rather been generally lauded as a moderate 
Muslim country. The country has however experienced a rise in religious extremism, albeit to a lesser 
extent in the late 1990s, with attacks by Islamist militants targeting secular opposition politicians, their 
rallies and meetings, secular scholars, journalists, members of the judiciary and religious minorities 
(Grisworld 2005). These attacks were allegedly mainly carried out by the banned religious outfit, 
Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JUM), a pro-Taliban, Wahabi-oriented organisation having external links with 
other terror groups based in the Middle East and Pakistan (Ganguly 2006).
The international community, including United States and India, were extremely concerned about 
the rise of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. Selig Harrison, a prominent South Asian analyst, put it 
straightforwardly - “a growing Islamic fundamentalist movement linked to Al-Qaeda and Pakistani 
intelligence agencies is steadily converting the strategically located nation of Bangladesh into a 
new regional hub for terrorist operations that reach into India and Southeast Asia” (Harrson 2006). 
At the regional level, India constantly alleged that Bangladesh was becoming a safe haven for 
Islamist militants operating against New Delhi's interests (Financial Times 2006). In the wake of 
these developments, Washington and New Delhi took a common stance to exert pressure on Dhaka 
(Ganguly 2006, The Washington Times 2011). Multilateral pressures were also exerted at donor 
consortia in Washington, in a bid to threaten punitive measures against Bangladesh if actions were 
not taken to curb militancy (Ganguly 2006, Fair 2007).
The international pressure has been translated into a number of initiatives. Bangladesh has steadily 
turned out to be a partner in the United States' 'War on Terror' and has introduced necessary 
legislations in countering terrorism. The United States' Department of Justice (DoJ) also assisted 
24Bangladesh in signing all the 13 international Conventions on terrorism . Bangladesh is also a party 
to the  Regional Convention on 
Terrorism including its Protocol. 
Necessary domestic legislations like the Anti-Terrorism Act 2009 and the Anti-Money laundering 
Act (Bangladesh Bank 2011) have been promulgated to adhere to the provisions of the said 
international instruments. Recently, the Bangladesh parliament also passed the Mutual Assistance 
B) Militancy/Extremism: Convergence of national and international interests
South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC)
24 US Department of Justice, available at: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/opdat/worldact-programs/ctu.html [Accessed 
April 25, 2012].  
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on Criminal Matters Act, 2012, to join a global initiative to combat terrorism and hold trials of 
criminal activities (Bdnews24 2012).
External actors also played a strong role in strengthening security forces and mechanisms with the 
introduction of sophisticated technology to hunt down and dismantle the terrorists' networks. 
Foreign countries, especially the USA and the UK, have largely facilitated the formations of Rapid 
Action Battalion (RAB) and Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT), including providing them 
with training and equipment facilities (The Daily Star 2011, 2012i).
The rise of terrorism and the following joint initiatives are an example of convergence between 
local and global interests. Hence, external influence under those circumstances may be seen 
favourably where a country like Bangladesh is not in a position to deal with problems of terrorism 
alone, which possess cross-border linkages.  
As the supply side of external influence,  more precisely mutual engagement, offers opportunities 
for both Bangladesh and external actors, the country has so far been unable to fully realise its 
potentials and benefit from such engagements. It is largely due to the weak bargaining capacity 
resulting sometimes from the demand side constraint, the lack of consensus on national issues 
within the country and sometimes from bureaucratic incapacity and the political and moral 
bankruptcy of its leaders. Hence, instead of optimising the supply-side opportunities and making 
the engagement win-win, the lose-win demand-side phenomenon again pulls back the nation and 
harms the country's interests.
Box 6
There are plenty of opportunities to leverage Bangladesh's geographical and geostrategic 
location vis-à-vis the external actors such as US, China and India. However, Bangladesh has 
largely been unable to reap optimum benefits from these supply side benefits due to its weak 
bargaining power and lack of national consensus.
As far as India is concerned, it has enormous stakes in Bangladesh. The North Eastern states of 
India are effectively landlocked by Bangladesh except a 13-mile narrow strip known as Shiliguri 
Corridor or the chicken's neck. The northeastern region was connected to the mainland 
through broad roads, rails and inland waterways until the 1965 war with Pakistan (Dutt 2010). 
With the emergence of Bangladesh, things hardly changed except for the fact that India was 
allowed to use river and air transit. The loss of centuries old transit routes through Bangladesh 
caused the northeastern states of India to suffer from continuing isolation and economic 
backwardness as the distance between Kolkata and Agartala were extended to 1600  
25from the earlier distance of 400 . 
6.4.3 Lose-win game: Political bankruptcy and weak bargaining power
Weak bargaining power and missed opportunity
Kilometre
Kilometre
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25 “Need to Broaden the Scope of India-Bangladesh Engagement: Perspectives from Gangtok and Dhaka”, IDSA Comment, 
available at: http://www.idsa.in/idsacomment/NeedtoBroadentheScopeofIndiaBangladeshEngagement_ShristiPukhrem_241011, 
[accessed on April 30, 2012].  
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India has long tried to pursue successive Bangladesh governments to allow transit for its 
economic activities, but Bangladesh has turned down India's plea citing grounds of national 
security. A faction of politicians and some political parties vehemently oppose any such deal 
with India. However, the present ruling party believes, shared by many experts including 
26notable economists , that the connectivity will have a wider impact on the country's economy. 
These political divisions bar the country from objectively assessing the cost-benefits of the 
transit and connectivity issue and harnessing their benefits. Apparently India has convinced 
27Bangladesh to agree in principle to provide transit through road and rail links , but Bangladesh 
has failed to  the Teesta river water sharing accord and resolving a few other 
outstanding issues showing Bangladesh's poor performances in international bargaining. 
The deep-sea port at Sonadia, Chittagong is another such missed opportunity, due to the inept 
handling of cross-cutting issues. Although China and Bangladesh have agreed to further 
develop and use the Chittagong port, develop a deep sea port at Sonadia Island, and construct 
28road and rail links from Chittagong through Burma to Yunnan province in China , India seems 
29to be concerned at China's growing interest in Bangladesh . Although the erection of a deep-
sea port would be a win-win situation for both Bangladesh and China, this has been delayed 
due to the misalignment between key political interests determined by regional geo-politics. 
Experts allege that the delay in inking a deal with China on developing the deep sea port is 
apparently because the government does not want to disregard India's concern. Lack of 
political consensus on how to deal with this kind of pressure and the lack of decisive action on 
the part of the government is certainly hampering the country's interest. Thus, the gain for the 
country would have been much higher had the key political parties reached consensus on 
national interests.
The above discussion indicates that external influence in Bangladesh politics is largely catered by 
domestic political weakness. While on the demand side phenomenon, the domestic political actors 
themselves create vulnerable situations and invite external intervention; the same political 
weakness restricts the country from harnessing supply-side benefits in the nation's best interest. 
However, the intervention of external actors does not always mean a disservice to the nation, as 
these interventions sometimes could offer a 'win-win' solution in terms of the nation's broader 
interest. Such constructive engagement with external actors could pave the way for a better and 
warmer relationship. 
successfully seal
6.4.4 Epilogue of external influence
26 Inter alia Professor Mohammad Yunus, Professor Rehman Sobhan etc.[Rahman 2007, Sobhan 2011, The Daily Star 2011e]
27 Joint Communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to India of Her Excellency Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister of 
Bangladesh, January 12, 2010, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, available at: 
http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=100515482, [accessed on April 10, 2012]. 
28 Anand Kumar, “Chinese Puzzle in India-Bangladesh Relations”, IDSA Comment, April 19, 2010.  Available at: 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinesePuzzleinIndia-BangladeshRelations_akumar_190410, accessed on April 15, 2012.  
29 An Indian defense analyst, Anand Kumar put it this way, “a Chinese role in the development of Chittagong port is 
particularly worrisome to India... Through these ports, China is trying to fulfil two objectives  encircle India as part of 
its 'string of pearls', and gain other openings to sea. [DeSilva-Ranasinghe 2011]
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However, maintaining the equilibrium in relations generally depends on the strength of negotiation 
and bargaining power that could only emanate from domestic solidarity and broad-based national 
consensus, a function of democratic strength of the country and its institutional resilience.
This research sets out to understand the exact combination of factors that have undermined the 
process guiding democratic transition and consolidation in Bangladesh since 1991. It has also briefly 
attempted to evaluate the forces determining the equilibrium level of external influence what we 
witness in our polity. The chapter noted that even after two decades of democratic rule, the 
transition process is destabilised by the prevalence of a couple of key factors. 
First, the Constitution has suffered from ad hoc changes, and national or across-party consensus 
was not derived while such amendments were conceptualised and implemented. The most recent 
th
15  amendment of the Constitution with regard to the election process is one such example, which  
ignored any political consensus between major parties and faced intense opposition from many 
quarters. This has jeopardised the Constitution's capacity to provide the 'rules of the game' within 
the political arena that will be acceptable to all. Second, while the caretaker government 
monitored the election process in 1996, 2001 and 2008 to enable political governments to transfer 
power, the primary defeated political side has always rejected the election results by raising 
accusations of fraud and rigging. Such political practices have hindered the overall democratic 
transition in Bangladesh.   
Democratic transition fundamentally affects the issues that influence the patterns, contents, and 
degrees of democratic consolidation in distinct ways (Lee 2007). Efforts in Bangladesh democratic 
consolidation process are undermined by this incomplete democratic transition. 
The country's confrontational and highly divisive political culture is responsible for recurrent 
transitional crises and limping consolidation efforts, leaving most political institutions fragile. 
Parliament remains ineffective in facilitating broad-based national consensus and resolving 
conflicts amongst political actors peacefully. As noted earlier, some specific constitutional 
arrangements are also not in line with idea of deliberative or participatory democracy.
Political parties so far largely failed to be properly institutionalised, thereby they do not adhere to 
norms of internal democratic practices including leadership succession. Their power-centric mind-
set and rent seeking motivation encourages short-sighted and ruthless postures. Parties lack 
dynamism and remain fiercely resistible to sustainable reforms and change. 
The rule of law scenario is producing mixed results while the governments have failed to keep the 
human rights and rule of law record on track, the democratic regimes over the past two decades 
remain largely unscathed from allegations of constitutional infringements  (i.e., declaration of 
emergency etc.) and of impinging upon the legitimate functions of the legislature. 
Over this same period though, civil society has emerged as a key actor within the socio-political 
landscape of Bangladesh. On the whole their role has had a positive effect in bringing attention to 
key governance issues, even though they are still not as vigilant in the policy making domain.  In 
6.5 Conclusion
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addition, NGOs' role in social services has enhanced the living standards of the marginalised 
community, which may bear positive outcomes for Bangladesh's democratic process. Nevertheless 
in recent times, growing tensions between state and civil society actors can disrupt the progress 
witnessed thus far. 
Moreover, as O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986) noted that, the constructive behaviour of civil 
society actors who respect law, other socio-political actors and who do not to seek to usurp or 
conquer democratic political authority, can effectively contribute to democratic consolidation. 
Nevertheless, some civil society groups have expressed reservations regarding the idea of 
'respecting other social and political actors' and allegedly tried to pursue democratic political 
authority during the 2007-08 military backed emergency regime.  Here the media has played a 
more pronounced and catalystic role in Bangladesh democratisation process, although there are 
tensions and less than mature relations between media and political actors.
Lastly, the democratic deficit emanating from these transition and consolidation processes, enable 
external actors to assume a role of any kind. While external influence is not necessarily detrimental, 
the domestic political fragility and distorted power-games contribute to transmuting the prospective 
beneficial engagement into a win-lose situation, which is of ultimate disservice to the nation. 
Overcoming the transition crisis and consolidating the democracy will be the key challenge in the 
future to avoid undesirable external interventions in our socio-political and/or economic process. 
The political will to practice democracy within and beyond party lines as well as to ensure 
adherence to democratic values and processes, will continue to test the endurance of political 
leadership in Bangladesh.
Thus domestic political weaknesses arising from incomplete democratic transition and weak 
consolidation efforts provide the channel for unsolicited external influences; while weak negotiation 
skills squander the advantages of positive engagements with such external actors. Given the 
magnitude and uncertainty surrounding the country's political crises, it is not straightforward to 
suggest any concrete measures to rein in external interferences in Bangladesh politics. 
However, there are some issues that policy makers and politicians can consider. To address the 
incomplete transition, the country has to renegotiate and settle a number of political issues. Firstly, 
political actors have to build national consensus at least on some key issues pertaining to 
democratisation and good governance: to essentially abide by the rules of the political game vis-á-
vis election mechanisms, distribution of power and resources, militancy issues, etc. Without 
consensus, these issues will continue to foment perpetual mistrust between the political actors. 
Secondly, political actors have to demonstrate compromising and accommodating attitudes to 
resolve political problems through dialogue and to preclude any unsolicited mediating 
interference from external actors. 
Thirdly, the venal winner-takes-all political culture,  which offers too much stakes in power politics, 
has to be transformed to a more positive-sum game and win-win situation, to serve the people of 
this nation.  
The way forward
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Consolidating democracy can also provide a better safeguard against undesirable external 
penetration. In a democracy, the first prerequisite to redress political contentions is to ensure a 
functioning parliament, the absence of which hinders political dialogues and induces conspiracy 
politics, which is the most desirable circumstances for the outside elements. 
To diminish such possibilities, Parliament has to emerge as an avenue for building national 
consensus through deliberation of all issues pertaining to national interests. In this regard, 
revision of Article 145A of the Constitution, which guides the status of treaties signed with 
foreign countries, could provide a better safeguard to the government to avoid undue pressure 
30from external forces . The revision requires the government to place any prospective treaty, 
agreement and memorandum of understanding with foreign countries, to be vetted by the 
parliament and debated in there. 
The exception to this has to be kept very limited, and issues such as national security have to be 
clearly defined as past regimes exploited this loophole to evade controversial treaties and 
agreements with foreign countries. Parliament members should also be given more room in the 
Parliament to speak up freely or take separate stance [other than their respective party] on such 
issues, for which revising Article 70 of the Constitution is critical. 
Leadership succession is the other debated issue in Bangladesh politics, which has adversely 
affected political party reforms and institutionalisation efforts. Non-democratic leadership in 
political parties not only disregard party norms, centralises powers, monopolises party decision 
making,  but  also create space for compromising broad national interests. 
Therefore, to break the monopoly, dismantle personalised politics, and facilitate infusion of 
new blood, there could be a term limit for the executive posts of the government. As to the 
other elements of political party institutionalisation and their internal democratic practices, a 
clear-cut rule has to be set out in the respective party constitutions to elect the office bearers of 
the party. 
The Election Commission (EC) could step in to monitor the councils and elections of registered 
parties, to verify whether they adhere to the democratic norms while electing the office 
bearers. The EC can also provide a common mandatory guideline to parties for their leadership 
selections in the form of a template to be completed by the parties.
Without reforms and institutionalisation, the counter productive practices of parties and leaders 
will continue polluting the political landscape, thereby always facilitating a room for external 
penetration and unsolicited interference. Political actors must realise the importance of 
negotiation and compromise, and should initiate necessary reforms in the party in order to 
serve the national interest and to benefit themselves. 
If however, the political actors fail to either accomplish democratic transition successfully or 
consolidate it through bringing qualitative reforms and changes to the political arena, the 
country will likely face the risk of turning into a fragile and isolated state vulnerable to more 
varied forms of external interventions. The sooner the political actors/ leadership realise such an 
eventuality the better, so that they can redress and check the drift of the nation.
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11
30 Example of Turkish parliament's denial to allow US access to its base and its territory in the 2003 Iraq war can be worth 
noting. While Turkey remains a key US and NATO ally and the Turkish Government made a positive gesture to its allies 
and send a note to the Parliament to approve troops sending request, Parliament's subsequent refusal saved the 
Government from both external and internal criticism. [Otterman 2003]
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and the Way Forward 
Economic constraints, fragile politics and limited domestic resources created space for external 
stakeholders, particularly Donors and Development Partners (D&DPs), to penetrate Bangladesh's 
internal affairs in terms of policy influence, political interference and social sector intervention, 
immediately after independence in 1971. This external influence remains to be visible, albeit in 
varying degrees, in Bangladesh's policy and polity spheres even while the country's aid 
dependency has considerably declined, particularly in the post-1990s.  
Against this backdrop, The State of Governance 2010-11 Report offers broad perspectives on 
socio-economic, political and governance development within post-independence Bangladesh in 
the context of external influence. In doing so, it has focused on such key sectors and issues critical 
to socio-economic and political developments as well as subject to significant external influence as 
Democracy and Good Governance (D&GG) Agenda, Public Sector Service Delivery, Economic 
Governance, Right-based Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO)s, and Political Governance.
The analysis suggests that while external stakeholders' influence has been prominent in 
Bangladesh's socio-economic and political domains, its impact on the country's development 
discourse is, at best, mixed. Bangladesh has shown impressive performance in many socio-
economic indicators and some of the local ideas and innovations involving social sector travelled 
well beyond its boundaries. However, in other critical issues of policy formulation, ownership of 
policies, internal capacity development and governance quality, its success has been less 
pronounced. 
One of the limitations of this research is that it has been empirically difficult to isolate the 
causal effects and channels of external stakeholder-induced reforms on aggregate economy and 
polity from the home-grown ideas and policies. Nonetheless, the report does provide a detailed 
analysis of role of external influence in shaping Bangladesh's reform agenda as well its 
governance implications.     
The Report, in particular, uncovers the reasons for the less than expected outcomes behind 
D&DPs-influenced reforms. They are: flawed policy design and the state's limited 
implementation capabilities. 
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The D&GG Agenda revealed that the absence of the Government of Bangladesh's (GoB) own 
effective vision of democracy and good governance (D&GG) allowed for donors to push with 
various governance reforms. Progress on D&GG reforms was obstructed primarily due to two 
reasons: a few ministries pursued reforms led by technocrats but failed to mobilise the requisite 
political consensus around those reforms, causing slow progress; and reforms aimed at 
preventing rent-seeking were heavily opposed due to the bureaucracy's increased politicisation. 
With regard to the state's public service provisions, particularly in the health sector, major 
governance lapses undermined GoB's ownership of policies, leading to a situation of external 
dependency. Despite both the education and health sectors having been heavily influenced by 
donors, success in the education sector was more pronounced. In the latter's case, policy 
reversals occurred with changes in government, whereas in the former successive governments 
complied with broader objectives of reforms as they have not created a lot of losers. 
The analysis on economic governance indicates that any reform that presented the potentiality 
of political gain, either through soliciting rent or increasing vote banks, received support from 
the politicians. Nonetheless, political incentive alone has proven inadequate unless there is a 
firm commitment from politicians and a commensurate capacity of bureaucrats. 
With respect to NGO and Civil society sector, the involvement of the so-called third sector with 
rights-based governance advocacy proved often not to be a result of home-grown demand. The 
chapter observed that the formation of National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) became a 
result of the complex interplay between and among the actors involved, with their converging 
and often diverging set of interests. 
These constraints have been identified in a number of case studies involving various aspects of 
reform and governance, notably in the areas and issues of Health, Energy/Utility, Public 
Procurement, Parliamentary oversight, Local Government Support Programme, Right to 
Information (RTI) Act and NHRC. 
There has been success in overhauling several sectors as found in Banking, Agriculture, 
Education and External sectors, promotion of Private sector, Electoral reform, National Integrity 
Strategy, among others; promulgation of a number of laws and acts including the Right to 
Information Act, Decentralisation acts, Public Procurement Act, inter alia; and establishment of  
few institutions, namely Anti Corruption Commission and NHRC. 
However, sustainability of such progressive reforms in many instances has been thwarted by the 
GoB's lack of ownership and political will. The study indicates that in numerous cases, GoB 
formulated reforms, enacted laws, established institutions or accepted international standards 
in order to comply with D&DPs' conditionalities. However, in reality it thwarted or deferred 
their implementation and consolidation.
The report suggests that the absence of GoB's own national vision on policy reform and 
governance has created a vacuum in which the D&DPs penetrate its priorities. The chapter on 
D&GG shows that the GoB, which is at the receiving end of the donors' agenda, particularly on 
good governance, is now struggling to comply with the latter's reform agenda. 
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The state's capacity constraints, often owing to political imperatives, also convinced the D&DPs 
to forego their ambitious reform and governance agenda, and instead focus on selectively 
achievable reforms. As a result, the World Bank (WB) and Department for International 
Development (DFID) have been designing their reforms around promoting 'good enough 
governance', which implements targeted but largely depoliticised reforms. The United Nation 
Development Programme (UNDP) on the other hand, retained its focus on an all-encompassing 
agenda continuing to cautiously engage with political actors, albeit with a less than inspiring 
track record. 
There is also a rising trend in funding civil society movements to promote social sector as well as 
governance reform. The education sector case study suggests that NGO provisioning of primary 
education, demonstrated a superior performance with respect to efficiency and higher quality. The 
chapter on rights-based NGOs indicates that they also played certain roles in the formation of RTI. 
The institution of the NHRC which is politically sensitive was far less successful. NGOs' increasing 
involvement with rights-based issues (governance reform) has in fact created tensions with the 
state. Available reports reveal that the government is preparing a draft law for NGO regulation, 
to apparently tighten government control over NGOs in order to limit their scope for good 
governance promotion. 
Reforms' less than expected outcomes in terms of good governance that has become one of the 
key determinants of D&DPs' fund allocation in developing countries has put Bangladesh in a 
disadvantageous position creating much tension between GoB and D&DPs. Though the report 
indicates that market-based reforms have had their own constraints to improve governance 
indicators in Bangladesh, the case study on Energy Price Adjustment suggests that market-based 
reforms in energy and utility (including infrastructure) sectors have not been effective in 
improving overall governance quality, thereby precluding the long-term investment in the 
sector. D&DPs involved with the power sector also confirmed that governance problems 
precluded the utilisation of available funds. The tension between the WB and the GoB over 
financing of the Padma Bridge is yet another example of how severely governance issues 
impede the country's infrastructure development.
Bangladesh's poor governance has also restricted its access to funding initiatives such as the 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which is disbursed in countries with a pre-defined level 
of good governance. There have been several instances where funding of projects has been 
cancelled due to the GoB's lack of commitment towards transparent project implementation. 
Hence, the opportunity cost of poor governance becomes greater.
The report also reveals that in order for broader parameters of reforms to be successful, there is 
a need for proper implementation of economic and political reforms concurrently. In retrospect, 
the reform advocacy of the 1990s which urged developing countries with weak institutions to 
undertake economic reforms with the implicit assurance that political progress and good 
governance would follow as a consequence, has proven to be flawed (Nachane and Islam 2009). 
The analysis also indicates that the impact of D&DP-influenced reforms would have been 
considerably better than the current stage had there been concomitant changes in the political 
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governance parameters. Thus, reforms have been less than successful in rallying political support 
in a large number of sectors and areas. Furthermore, it overlooked the state's capacity to 
implement those reforms. Hence, the report attempted to understand the dynamics looking at 
two aspects with regard to politics: first, how the 'political settlement' phenomena that 
emerged in post-1990s often collided with market-based reforms' objectives; and second, how 
political weakness itself invites external influence.
A number of case studies postulate that the D&DPs reform agenda, particularly concerning core 
aspects of governance, is often incompatible with political priorities. Moreover, in some 
instances, despite implementing market-based reforms, certain sectors' fundamental issues 
remained unresolved. The case study on Energy Price Adjustment is an example of market-based 
reforms' limitations to understand the complex issues of the country's political settlement where 
reforms in the sector fulfilled many objectives, yet failed to provide cost-effective services to the 
consumers. 
This is in line with Khan's (2012) observation that “the problem in the power sector is that long-
term contracts and calculations are difficult when the political settlement exhibits features of 
competitive clientelism with short time horizons of the ruling coalition and with low and 
declining governance capabilities of the bureaucratic organisations which regulates investment 
in these sectors.”
The political scenario in Bangladesh that changed after 1990 replacing 'clientelistic 
authoritarianism' with a vulnerable democracy based on 'competitive clientelism', provides 
comparative stability when the underlying factional structure is very fragmented. However, by 
its structure, the ruling coalition here has a short time horizon and weak implementation and 
enforcement capabilities, creating high transaction costs, undermining institutional 
development, and ultimately resulting in poor governance. It is in this context that Khan (2010) 
even questioned the applicability of a market-enhancing governance agenda as far as 
developing countries are concerned.  
The report also suggests that the vulnerable competitive clientelism of the political system 
emerging in the post-1990s itself necessitates external influence. To understand the political 
dynamics of external influence, the study conceptualised the phenomenon through supply and 
demand. The demand-side examined how the political distortions of Bangladesh generated 
demand for external influence. The supply side focuses on opportunities that Bangladesh retains 
through geopolitical and geo-economic conditions vis-á-vis the external actors, and examines 
the extent to which the country has been able to exploit them to its advantage.
The analysis of political dynamics is organised in terms of a democratic transition and 
consolidation framework. Transitional crisis (disruptive transfer of power, lack of consensus, and 
unwillingness to compromise) which leaves the political opposition vulnerable, is the root cause 
th
of domestic demand for external influence. The recent 15  Amendment of the constitution 
regarding the election process, for instance, ignored political consensus between major parties 
and faced intense opposition from many quarters. This has jeopardised the Constitution's 
capacity to provide the 'rules of the game' acceptable to all within the political arena.
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The report therefore suggests a number of recommendations that may be useful for concerned 
stakeholders:
 External influence is not necessarily good or bad. Involvement and influence of D&DPs have 
resulted in many favourable socio-economic and political changes. If domestic actors do not 
acquire new ideas from outside, innovation and cross-fertilisation may not be possible. The 
import-substitution industrialisation in the early phase of Bangladesh's inception and the 
reign of 'license raj' completely ignored the virtues of globalisation restricting space for 
innovation (what is also known as creative destruction/learning-by-doing process). 
Moreover, modern understanding of nation building in development literature has 
converged to a very simple fact: creation and diffusion of ideas and appropriate institutions 
is central to the socio-economic prosperity of countries.  Nevertheless, there is a clear limit to 
the extent by which the external actors and influences can be effective in political reforms 
(to some extent economic and social sector reforms), given the very particular nature of 
political settlement.
While the focus on economic and social sector reforms, including public service provisions 
which are generally less challenging politically should continue, D&DPs should cautiously 
engage with the GoB where reforms are economically feasible and politically acceptable (by 
providing right political incentives). Reforms that are politically challenging owing to 
political imperatives as well as state's implementation capacity, should be prompted 
gradually, with a special attention to alternative channels through which the reform 
objective can be advocated. In this respect, D&DPs should conduct thorough 
research/assessment if a particular reform has a local demand, instead of imposing them 
from above. 
This also applies to civil society organisations and NGOs, which will have to continue their 
engagement with the government and gradually scale up their involvement in the 
governance process. The evolution from a 'needs-based-approach' to a 'rights-based-
approach' is a daunting task, often creating conflicts with the GoB. Thus, the third sector's 
engagement with governance reform should be selective and those needs should be home-
grown as opposed to imported ones. Simultaneously, the government has to be more 
mature in its response to NGO initiatives and further institutionalise NGO participation in 
governance through the setting up of mechanisms for formal consultations.
In public service delivery, drawing the lessons from health and education policy reforms, 
D&DPs agenda must ensure that reforms do not create too many losers, engages local actors 
(communities and NGOs in the case of education and health) and encourages 
decentralisation (where applicable). 
 Accommodation of political interest is equally important in economic reform, but drawing 
lessons from the banking sector reform, the D&DPs approach should promote 'liberalisation 
with regulations' so that politicians, bureaucrats and private sector are restrained from 
establishing absolute control over the concerned sectors. The global experience following 
the recent economic crisis also suggests that economic entities do not need to be 
overregulated nor should they be left to 'invisible hands'. As noted economists Rajan and 
!
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Zingales (2003) observed that a truly free and competitive market occupies a very delicate 
middle ground between the absence of the rules and the presence of suffocating rules."
In the political domain, while external influence is not necessarily detrimental, the domestic 
political fragility and distorted power-games contribute to transmuting the prospective 
beneficial engagement into a win-lose situation, which is of ultimate disservice to the 
nation. However, there is no easy way out. Consolidating democracy can provide a better 
safeguard against unwanted outside intervention. The political actors have to build national 
consensus on at least some key issues pertaining to democratisation and good governance: 
to abide by the rules of the political game (including election mechanisms, distribution of 
power, militancy issue etc). They will also have to develop compromising and 
accommodating attitudes, and resolve political problems through dialogue to avoid any 
unwanted mediating interference from external actors. 
To diminish such possibilities, Parliament has to emerge as an avenue for building national 
consensus through deliberation of all issues pertaining to national interests. In this regard, 
revision of Article 145A of the Constitution, which guides the status of treaties signed with 
foreign countries, could provide a better safeguard to the government, to avoid undue 
pressure from external forces. 
Non-democratic leadership in political parties not only disregards party norms and 
monopolises party decision making, but it also compromises broad national interests. An 
effective functioning of the Parliament is required in this regard so that the 
Parliamentarians can speak up freely, for which revising Article 70 of the Constitution is 
critical.
The research extensively used the theories and ideas developed by Khan (2009, 2012) to 
show that there is a limit to market-based reforms in Bangladesh. The reason being that 
those reforms and ideologies often conflict with the nature of political settlements. Thus, 
this is also the right moment to contemplate the need for alternative thinking on 
governance. Instead of only promoting extensive market-enhancing governance reforms 
which are often expensive to adopt (protecting property right, for instance), a more 
balanced approach is desired - with a new focus on growth enhancing governance 
capabilities that emphasise maintaining political stability in a context of patron-client 
politics and managing technological catch-up (as the readymade garment industry 
exemplifies,  [Khan 2012]).  However, further research is needed in this regard. 
The report acknowledges its limitations in answering many questions and concerns forthrightly. 
Nevertheless, this new approach of scrutinising governance evolution from the lens of external 
influence hopes to generate some important and informative debates and research on the roles 
and limitations of external influence in promoting reforms and addressing governance concerns 
in Bangladesh. 
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Over its four decades of independence, Bangladesh has been dependent for a 
very large proportion of its development budget on foreign donors – 
multilateral and bilateral agencies, as well as international NGOs.  Needless to 
say, these donors have often accompanied their assistance with various 
conditionalities and demands for policy change. Initially, these pressures 
centered more on economic policy but in the last couple of decades they have 
come to encompass a democracy and good governance agenda as well.
  
It is thus timely that the Institute of Governance Studies at BRAC University has 
devoted its fifth The State of Governance in Bangladesh Report to the role of 
external donors to public policy making and its impact. Coming at a point 
when the dysfunctionality of macro level governance in the country has 
become ever more manifest, this fifth annual study makes a valuable 
contribution to assessing what influence donors have brought to bear for good 
and ill in their efforts to improve the state of governance in Bangladesh.
Dr. Harry Blair
Associate Chair
Senior Research Scholar and Lecturer in Political Science
Yale University, USA
On the morrow of her birth, Bangladesh was branded as a “basket case” that 
was foredoomed to perpetual dependence on handouts from abroad. Defying 
the prophets of gloom and doom, she has emerged like the mythical phoenix 
out of the ashes of man made devastations and natural disasters. This is a 
triumph not only of her creative people but also of her well-wishers and 
development partners from abroad. The State of Governance in Bangladesh 
2010-11 unravels the complex Bangladesh conundrum that was characterised 
by simultaneous advances in economy and slides in governance and an intense 
love-hate relationship between Bangladesh and her donors.Written in a lucid 
style, this report is highly analytical and well-researched. It provides useful 
insights for theoreticians as well as practitioners of development, public 
servants and for those who are active in  the third sector.
Dr. Akbar Ali Khan
Professor, BRAC Business School and
Former Advisor, Caretaker Government of  Bangladesh.
